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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. PLACE OF PRESENT RESEARCH WITH REGARD TO 
ORGANISATIONAL LITERATURE 
 
The present dissertation aims to describe, interpret and analyse processes of corporate 
greening. Greening is understood here as any organisational processes, events, and 
interpretations that have some ecological relevance (including those organisational actions 
that are intended to have an ecological impact, as well as those that have additional, perhaps 
unintended, positive ecological effects).  
It should also be emphasised that this work is completely different from those efforts in 
the literature that attempt to delineate and prescribe the best practices for corporate 
environmental management what one might call the “environmental excellence literature.” 
Although the empirical research reported here is mainly focused on Hungarian companies 
considered to be leaders in environmental management, I have no intention to produce a 
“managerialist” account of corporate greening. In contrast, following the spirit of critical 
social research, my intention is more to understand and reflect upon the possibilities and 
limits of an instrumental, or means-ends, rationality, which is manifest in modern 
management sciences as well as practice, with regard to ecological problems and imperatives. 
Modern organisations and instrumentally oriented organisational sciences offer us a universal 
solution for social order (Reed [1996]). As modernity and modern life is overwhelmingly 
lived by and with large bureaucratic organisations, researchers should be very sensitive to the 
impacts of this organising logic (Alvesson–Willmott [1992]). Interpreting management and 
organising as a particular social practice allows one to overcome an exclusively instrumental 
perspective, which expresses an “ideology of efficiency,” and to critically address 
organisational processes and processes of organisational science in their broader socio-
politico-economic (intstitutional) contexts. The subsequent analysis of the present dissertation 
is thus informed and guided by this more general value-commitment.  
The present study is furthermore informed by contemporary philosophical debates about 
the nature of social reality and social science. More precisely, it is influenced by the debates 
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surrounding Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory and its receptions in organisation studies 
(see among others Giddens [1984]; Whittington [1988] and [1992]; Bryant–Jary [1991]; 
Friedland–Alford [1991]; Barley–Tolbert [1997]; Child [1997]). At the same time, the present 
research is affected by the critical realist approach to science and methodology in economics 
and organisational studies (see, among others, Tsoukas [1989]; Hodgson [1993]; Lawson 
[1997]; and Reed [1997]). Consequently, research should attempt to focus upon the dynamic 
interactions between variables at the individual level (values, attitudes, actions) and variables 
at the institutional level (organisational, sectoral, societal – or economy-wide), as well as 
upon the processes and mechanisms through which agents and structures mutually constitute 
each other. In this sense, it is reasonable to depict the “institutionalised logic of action” 
(Räsänen–Meriläinen–Lovio [1995]) as a unit of analysis. Institutions not only provide 
cognitive justifications for individual actions, but at the same time, political and social/moral 
underpinning. Institutions (structures) constrain as well as enable individual (strategic) 
actions, and, in turn, institutions are continuously reconstituted and reproduced by and 
through individual behaviour. Thus, corporations in particular and organisations in general 
may be conceptualised as socio-cultural practice (Reed [1992]). 
From a philosophy of science perspective, it seems reasonable to overcome the 
dichotomy between phenomenological/interpretive and structuralist/functionalist that has 
plagued social science. Giddens [1984], too, emphasises that structures gain their meaning 
and are created by and through social constructions of individuals, while those structures 
cannot be explained by, or reduced to, some aggregates of individual actions. Social reality is 
constructed, hierarchical and emergent in character. Out of individual actions, which 
themselves are always of an interpretive, meaning-making and social nature, qualitatively 
new levels of social reality emerge. In this sense, different hierarchical levels demonstrate 
new phenomena and are constituted by particular mechanisms and, in turn, exert their 
influence (constraining and enabling) upon the action sets of individuals, as well as upon 
processes of meaning-making. Structures embody social constructions of meaning and logic. 
Individual actions are situated within a plural field of institutions/structures. Therefore, there 
is room for individual strategic actions, though their particular operation cannot be interpreted 
without a reference to structures. 
Corporate greening is therefore interpreted throughout this study as an institutional 
change. The aim is to understand which institutional logics are “activated” or realised by and 
through the social constructions of corporate greening: which institutional structures are 
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dominant; and in which ways are those structures or logics enacted by particular actors in 
particular contexts. Since the subject matter of the research is located in complex interactions, 
processes and causal mechanisms, the dominance of qualitative research methodologies is 
inevitable (Eisenhardt [1989]; Tsoukas [1989]). Complementarily, the explorative nature of 
quantitative methodologies is also utilised.  
 
Like every researcher, I myself work within the limits of personal commitments, 
particular theoretical and practical sensitivities, and with background knowledge and 
subjective experience. Though at the same time, all of these provide me with a certain 
freedom, too.  I believe that explicitly stating them contributes to intellectual honesty. In the 
following, four personal preoccupations that to a great extent influence my approach to 
corporate greening – beyond my position with regard to the philosophy of social science – 
will be briefly summarised. 
First, I am persuaded that the human race currently degrades the biosphere, the habitat of 
all earthly creatures, to an alarming extent and endangers its life support mechanisms. 
Following, for example, Karl Polanyi [1946] and John Ruskin [1985/1862], among others, I 
tend to place the roots of our ecological problems in the dominant operating logic and 
mechanisms of industrialism and market society. 
Second, because a dominant institutional element of modern market societies and 
economies are large, bureaucratic organisations, including most business enterprises (Simon 
[1991]), one must thoroughly investigate their role in the present ecological crisis. I also tend 
to agree with George Brenkert, a contemporary business ethicist, that 
 
“… many of the environmental problems we confront are linked with prominent, 
mainstream… corporations. In short, problems of the environment do not simply 
attach to a few renegade corporations, but to mainline… business.” (Brenkert [1995], 
p. 676) 
 
Therefore, I believe that organisational researchers have a special task and responsibility to 
move beyond the managerialist and instrumentalist tenets of a large part of organisational 
studies, particularly the so-called “excellence literature.”  Concurrently, we must move 
beyond the current state of organisation and management studies aptly characterised by Paul 
Shrivastava as having a “denatured, narrow and parochial concept of organisational 
environment” (Shrivastava [1991], p. 705).  
Third, by interpreting organisations as socio-cultural practice (Reed [1992]), it seems to 
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be possible to overcome both the instrumental and the dichotomous way of thinking about 
organisations vis a vis society. It might help to critically understand and constructively move 
beyond the debate between anthropocentric versus ecocentric (or biocentric) management 
paradigms (see among others Purser [1994]; Stead–Stead [1994]; Gladwin–Kennelly–Krause 
[1995]; Purser–Park–Montuori [1995]; Egri–Pinfield [1996], Meriläinen [1998]).  Analyses 
might then be able to fulfill Brenkert’s dictum: 
 
“… we need to reach within corporations and the economic system to change this 
[business’ special] ethics and its corresponding structure.” (Brenkert [1995], p. 677) 
 
Fourth, I tend to see ecological problems as being tightly connected to social and 
political issues. The ecological crisis cannot be separated from the crisis of justice, both intra- 
and inter-generationally (Sachs [1995]). Wolfgang Sachs is therefore correct in pointing out 
that “global ecology” has emerged as a new arena of international political conflicts. 
Consequently, large organisations – a number of them economic in character – play their part 
in ecology-related global political games and organisational researchers have a corresponding 
role to play in broadening the perspective of their analyses. 
 
1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
One objective of the present study is to review the corporate environmental management 
literature from an organisational theoretical point of view, by establishing a typology. The 
other aim is to provide a broader introduction as well as a deeper analysis of corporate 
greening processes in the 1990s in Hungary. A survey conducted on a sample of Hungarian 
manufacturing companies is summarised in order to provide a comprehensive picture of 
environmental management practices and orientations applied by and characterising 
Hungarian industrial firms. Three case studies of Hungarian corporations, considered to be in 
the fore of environmental improvements, attempts to dig deeper into corporate greening, in 
order to understand the internal processes of greening and their connections to and 
interactions with the broader socio-economic context of the 90s in Hungary – according to the 
precepts of the hermeneutic social research tradition.   
Since empirical research on corporate greening informed by any organisational 
theoretical approaches is still in its infancy, especially compared to the other fields of 
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organisation studies, the following empirical research may be considered as being among the 
first steps of exploring this terrain of organisational inquiry. The aim of the case study 
research is, therefore, to provide a theoretical interpretation and theory-building of corporate 
greening in the Hungarian context. Doing so may enrich international research and theory 
building efforts in the field of organisational greening or environmental management.  
This study alone cannot be designed to analyse in detail all the relevant institutional 
aspects of corporate greening in Hungary (from environmental legislation and regulation 
through consumers’ environmental behaviour to green political movements, etc.) and, 
unfortunately, only some aspects were researched more extensively, during previous social 
inquiries. Therefore, the case studies themselves were designed to gain outside perspectives 
of the focal organisations under investigation in order to grasp the broader, institutional 
context and its dynamics in more detail. 
The empirical research aimed at shedding light on the following broader questions: 
 
1. How are ecological problems and issues interpreted by Hungarian corporations, their 
managers and employees? What kinds of discourse or narratives are applied when dealing 
with ecological issues affecting corporations? 
2. What are the most salient features or elements of the internal (organisational) as well as 
the external (institutional) contexts, into which corporate greening is embedded in 
Hungary during the 90s? 
 
1.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES APPLIED 
 
Since no comprehensive picture was provided by any previous research on corporate 
environmental management in Hungary, my initial research efforts were targeted to explore 
the broader trends and practices by applying questionnaire survey methods. By participating 
in three surveys in 1996, 1998 and 1999, respectively, access was available to three databases, 
which together provided a rich picture of corporate environmental management practices 
during the 90s (though I will only report here the results of one of them). However, by 
analysing the distinct databases, my principal aim was to gain insight into the diversity of 
firms’ environmental strategic orientations and performance. Multivariate statistical methods, 
particularly factor and cluster analyses were applied, despite the fact that the majority of 
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statisticians consider them mathematically “more uncertain” than the often-used methods of 
correlation and regression analyses. The choice of quantitative methodologies was implied by 
my commitment to a critical realist and/or critical hermeneutic philosophy of social sciences 
mentioned above.  
It is a commonplace that that time as an inherent variable, and interactive complexity, as 
an inevitable characteristic of social reality, should compel social researchers to take care 
when applying statistical methods. Moreover, exclusive reliance on quantitative 
methodologies is questionable and when applied, they should rather be treated as heuristic 
devices. Otherwise, given that by its very nature, empirical research closes off social reality, 
such investigations offer limited insight into causal powers and mechanisms. This problem is 
more acute in the cases of multivariate correlation and regression analyses than with factor 
and cluster analyses. Thus, this study consciously applied these latter statistical methods as 
heuristic devices to explore the diversity and plurality of the subject matter at hand and to 
guide the subsequent use of qualitative research methodologies.  
On the other hand, my research questions discouraged the application of those 
multivariate statistical methods which do attempt to describe correlations among different 
variables so as to infer causal explanations, and encouraged the use of those analytical 
methods which explore characteristic differences and similarities among the variables and the 
different groups of variables without allowing for any causal explanation. With regard to my 
subject matter, multivariate statistical methods allowed me to explore the different 
dimensions of corporate environmental performance which separated companies into more or 
less well-defined groups of differing environmental strategic orientations. The results were 
treated only as heuristic and exploratory in nature, and helped with the subsequent design of 
qualitative research. 
The fundamental objective of the qualitative research presented further on was to 
understand the perspectives held by representatives of industrial firms on corporate greening 
in Hungary during the 1990s. Seven case studies were conducted, out of which three stories of 
corporate greening will be introduced here, based on qualitative methodologies that enable 
the researcher to construct categories, theoretical concepts, and even models related to the 
subject matter. Following case study methodologies and qualitative data analysis methods, a 
number of major themes of corporate greening in Hungary during the 1990s were constructed. 
The very rudiments of a model of greening industrial bureaucracy will also be presented. 
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1.4. STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
The structure of the present dissertation is as follows. After this Introduction, Part I 
systematically presents, by developing a typology, the different interpretations of corporate 
greening found in organisational studies. This second part serves not only as a literature 
review but also as a crystallisation of my own theoretical approach. The fifth and sixth 
chapters differ from the first three chapters, in the sense that they both present a special 
example or type of organisational greening. Chapter 5 discusses the case of value-driven 
corporate greening by analysing the examples of so-called alternative business enterprises, 
such as The Body Shop Int. Plc., Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Inc., Patagonia, etc. The examples 
of these firms demonstrate most clearly that the achievements and radicalism of corporate 
greening does not only depend on the actors’ good intentions, motivations and values, but are 
heavily affected by the prevailing institutional logic of market society. In contrast, Chapter 6 
introduces an example of greening which can be considered as a social experiment that 
attempts to build a sustainable agricultural enterprise applying a different logic than is 
currently prevailing in today’s developed market society; specifically, Community Supported 
Agriculture (CSA). 
Part II summarises the results of the empirical research. Chapter 7 presents a quantitative 
empirical analysis, while the remaining chapters report on a qualitative research. Chapter 8, 9 
and 10 include three stories of corporate greening in Hungary during the 90s. Chapter 11 
summarises theoretical conclusions drawn from the qualitative research. Finally, Chapter 12 
provides a summary of the main findings of my research and the implications for further 
possible theoretical developments. This is followed by the Bibliography and, at the end of the 
dissertation, relevant publications of the present author are listed.  
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Part I 
Theoretical Approaches to Corporate Greening: 
A Literature RevIew 
 
 
This part attempts to summarise different interpretations of corporate greening prevalent 
in the relevant literature. Any theoretical experiment of this type should confront the problem 
of somehow limiting its reach in order to make the chosen task manageable, given the huge 
amount of writings on corporate greening. The typology of the literature on corporate 
greening presented below restricts itself to those theoretical perspectives and models that can 
be placed within the discipline of organisation studies. Two previous studies helped to keep 
the present analysis on track: Gladwin [1993] presented the classic lines of organisational 
theorising concerning the meaning of corporate greening, and Räsänen–Meriläinen–Lovio 
[1995] provided a first classification of “pioneering descriptions of corporate greening,” 
according to views on the nature of organisational change assumed. Table 1 presents the 
typology developed for purposes of the present dissertation.  
 
Table 1 A Typology of Literature on Corporate Greening 
 
Corporate Greening as 
 
1. Environmental Strategy 
Choice 
 
2. Organisational Change 3. Institutional Change 
1.1. excellence literature 2.1.  process approaches: 
2.1.1. change in strategic 
 management 
2.1.2. organisational 
 learning 
3.1. social constructionist 
approaches 
1.2. stage and categorical 
models 
2.2.  content approaches: 
2.2.1. technological change 
2.2.2. cultural change 
3.2. co-evolutionary approaches 
1.3. market and/or non-market 
strategy 
 3.3. political-economic 
approaches 
 
Within organisation studies on corporate greening, three main interpretations of greening 
are differentiated. The first strand of thinking that interprets corporate greening as the choice 
of the proper strategy has a straightforward functionalist tenet and, thus, is closely related to 
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the well-known contingency theory of organisations. Corporate greening is described and 
explained from this perspective as, at the simplest level, the application of the best 
environmental management tool-kit or, at a more complex level, the building of an integrated 
strategy reflecting a coherent environmental image of the organisation in question. Another 
major tenet of this first stream of interpretation of corporate greening is a ‘rationalistic’ and 
managerialist perspective: the general environment of the focal organisation is differentiated 
only to the extent of having different environmental demands and the focal organisation is 
represented only by a managerial body making strategic decisions (that is, rational choice of 
the proper environmental strategy). 
The second main interpretation emphasises corporate greening as a process of 
organisational change. Four streams of analysis may be separated here, according to the 
process and content of change. The first two strains of thinking put more emphasis on the 
process, rather than the content of change, but differ from each other in the conceptualisation 
of the change process: one of them applying a strategic management, the other an 
organisational learning frame of reference. The other two interpretations focus on the content 
of change (that is, “What is changing?”) in corporate greening, which is considered as either a 
change of technology or organisational culture. These change perspectives introduce dynamic 
aspects of greening, though they restrict them to internal organisational processes without 
including interactions with factors and processes of the general environment of the focal 
organisation in the analysis. The organisational theoretic paradigm followed by these studies 
is mainly of a functionalist and managerialist nature, though some studies follow a 
behavioural model of organisations. 
The third major interpretation of corporate greening is labeled as institutional, although 
this time, this term is applied to a grouping of theoretical perspectives that are sometimes 
considered divergent.  However, here they are grouped together, since they radically depart 
from the other two major interpretations in the non-functionalist and non-managerialist stance 
of their analyes. In more positive terms, all three perspectives included here – social 
constructionist, co-evolutionary and political-economic – share a fundamentally critical 
epistemology and a focus upon institutionalised practices and, in particular, power relations. 
Consequently, they integrate into the analysis of corporate greening the dynamic and 
constitutive interactions and processes of the focal organisations, as well as the general 
environment. 
The next three chapters and their sections introduce in detail the different interpretations 
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of corporate greening and subsequent models, descriptions and prescriptions. Since the 
purpose of the following analysis is to deliniate and differentiate ideal-typical interpretations 
of corporate greening in organisation studies literature, different studies will be referred to as 
examples of the separate strands of thinking and, by implication, a detailed analysis of the 
studies cited will be omitted. One should therefore be aware that every study or author quoted 
here usually expresses a more heterogeneous analysis or model than will be presented below. 
Consequently, the focus is not upon individual models or descriptions of corporate greening, 
but upon characterisation of the ideal-typical interpretations. On the one hand, this abstract 
exercise may provide the baseline of an assessment of empirical studies of corporate 
greening, including the ones presented later, and on the other hand, it should help clarify the 
theoretical position of the present author with regard to the chosen subject matter.  
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CHAPTER 2 
CORPORATE GREENING AS A CHOICE OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 
 
Since the 1980s, when corporate environmental management literature started to flourish, 
a perspective based on the general corporate strategy literature has become dominant. More 
precisely, the majority of business organisation studies on environmental management 
attempt to elaborate on the strategic nature of the so-called “environmental challenge,” or to 
develop corporate environmental strategy typologies (see a summary by Bhargava–Welford 
[1996]). An explicit or implicit starting point for these studies may be reconstructed as 
follows: the more demanding stakeholders’ environmental expectations with regard to 
corporate environmental performance, the more apparent and urgent the search for a 
“strategic fit” between the focal organisation and the general environment. The theoretical 
framework employed is static since, despite the frequent vague references to organisational 
changes, there is no description or analysis of processes and mechanisms underlying the 
strategy change evoked. These studies offer a wide spectrum of analytical tools and methods, 
and prescribe “best practices” or strategic actions in order to provide decision support for 
allegedly rational corporate managers with regard to environmental issues. 
The interpretation of corporate greening as a choice of environmental strategy may be 
separated into three strands of thinking. The first one may be termed “environmental 
excellence literature.” A list of tools and methods are provided for implementing 
“environmental best practices” that lead to improving environmental performance as well as 
bottom line. Receipts for business success are prescribed this time to “fix” environmental 
problems. From an organisational theoretic point of view, environmental excellence literature 
proves to be the less sophisticated and less critical. The second approach analyses corporate 
greening as a categorical choice of “the proper” environmental strategy, or as a 
developmental process along the stages of environmental strategy improvement. The third 
strand of analysis of corporate environmental strategy interprets corporate strategy as an 
integration of market and non-market strategies in a synergistic fashion. In the following, all 
three strands will be analysed. 
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2.1. ENVIRONMENTAL EXCELLENCE LITERATURE 
 
Authors representing this approach put their emphasis on the question of the 
development and application of an environmental management strategic tool-kit. 
Accordingly, they offer a wide range of management techniques and technological solutions 
that guarantee corporate environmental management with business success. The empirical 
evidence cited is usually based on different individual success stories of mostly well-known 
large, international companies (see, among others, Schmidheiny [1992]; Smart [1992]; 
Piasecki [1995]). Articles and books arguing along these lines all share a prescriptive style in 
order to induce corporate managers to believe the “win-win” reality of the environment–
competitiveness reltionship and act accordingly. As Dechant and Altman speak of 
environmentally leading companies:  
 
“The experiences of these firms carry a clear and urgent message – companies that 
continue to approach environmental problems with band-aid solutions and quick fixes 
will ultimately find themselves at a competitive disadvantage.” (Dechant–Altman 
[1994], p. 7, Executive Overview) 
 
On the one hand, authors arguing like this confidently speak of a sort of universal 
profitability of environmental mangement without any caution concerning contextual 
constraints. On the other hand, they typically offer their empirical evidence of 
environmentally as well as financially successful companies, as if all the achievements 
depend upon the commitment and knowledge of top management. If top managers are 
committed as well as knowledgable the (win-win) success is inevitable. There is nothing 
special with regard to solving ecological problems: it needs the usual, single-minded rational 
choice of a good strategy and effective top-down implementation of that strategy. The choice 
of a good strategy can be reduced to the careful search, collection and application of the best 
tool-kit fitted to the environmental demands of the general environment of the focal 
organisation. Companies able to carry out this task will gain competitive advantage; those 
incapable of doing so will loose and be selected out from competition.  
Dechant–Altman [1994], based on the examples of Johnson & Johnson, Procter & 
Gamble, IBM, The Body Shop, Lever Brothers, Pitney Bowes, Olin, Loctite, United 
Illuminating and Colgate Palmolive, among others, lists the following five elements of 
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environmental “best practices:” 
 
1. A mission statement and corporate values that promote environmental advocacy; 
2. A framework for managing environmental initiatives; 
3. Green process/product design; 
4. Environmentally-focused stakeholder partnerships; and 
5. Internal and external education initiatives” (op. cit., pp. 9–14). 
 
Though Dechant and Altman recognise the difficult road to environmental leadership through 
managing change and particularly managing human resources, the transition from the 
traditional mindset of seeing profitability and environmental protection as polar opposites to 
the new, “win-win” way of thinking is conceptualised as senior management’s commitment to 
and undertaking “greening as a rational, strategic choice” (p. 15). Their suggested “approach 
to overcoming short-term cost concerns and organisational resistance is to show the economic 
benefits of proposed environmental modifications” in the longer term (p. 16). Ultimately, they 
see environmental leadership as a “shift in corporate environmental thinking” (p. 7). 
Newman–Breeden [1992] claims that environmentally leading firms not only integrate 
environmental considerations into their enterprise strategy, but share common environmental 
best practices (like AT&T, Chevron, McDonald’s, 3M, etc.). The road to the win-win success 
is made of three crucial elements: 
 
1. Setting the vision by identifying critical capabilities; 
2. Designing the blueprint for organisational excellence; and 
3. Creating the processes for achieving continuous improvement (op. cit., p. 219 – 
emphasis in orginal). 
 
Newman and Breeden understand environmental leaders as companies realising that the 
reduction of environmental risks creates business opportunities (through eliminating pollution 
as production inefficiencies, anticipating future risks, acting pro-actively and innovatively, 
and building a good corporate reputation among stakeholders). They conclude that successful 
companies (in win-win terms) stick to their core business with regard to their environmental 
efforts as well (op. cit., p. 219). 
North [1992] intends to present a complete recipe of “how to make your business lean, 
green and clean.” The strategic tool-kit he offers entails the following: environmental action 
plan; environmental impact analysis (EIA); environmental audit; organisation of 
environmental functions; communication and participation; training for environmental 
management; dealing with wastes and pollution; energy saving; prevention of industrial 
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disasters (op. cit., pp. 95–143). 
Others, such as Elkington [1994] and Welford–Jones [1996], predict no less than the 
coming of sustainable corporations and intend to direct all efforts accordingly. While 
Elkington places his confidence in total quality environmental management, environmental 
life cycle analysis of products and voluntary environmental communication, Welford and 
Jones elevate the concept of “auditing for sustainability” to the distinctive practice of a 
sustainable corporation (an audit that also includes both environmental and social justice 
related impacts). 
Unfortunately, empirical evidence cited by the environmental excellence literature is less 
than adequate or persuasive, due to the lack of analytical and methodological rigor. Many 
companies often cited as examples of corporate environmental leadership would not stand a 
closer and more critical scrutiny. Moreover, environmental NGOs often charge the same 
companies applauded in the environmental excellence literature with “green washing.” It 
should be taken seriously whether researchers who uncritically provide such firms with a 
label of environmental leadership, based on limited experience or investigation, might not 
commit the same fault as that with which the companies are charged (cf. Welford [1997a]) 
 
In sum, environmental excellence literature suggests the following: 
 
• The choice of corporate environmental strategy is a rational choice (a well-structured 
problem); 
• There is a universal tool-kit for good and effective environmental strategy (its application 
results in a win–win success independent of time, place, organisational and environmental 
context); 
• The environment–competitiveness relationship can always be turned into a win–win 
situation (the environmental challenge should be taken as an opportunity, not a threat); 
• Corporate greening is a top-down process (the development and achievement of best 
practices depend solely on top managers); and, 
• Corporate greening is a well-known managerial and technical problem, the standard 
management paradigm should be applied (there is no need for paradigm change). 
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2.2. STAGE AND CATEGORICAL MODELS OF CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 
 
Researchers of these approaches to corporate greening question the reasonableness of a 
universally applicable environmental management tool-kit and argue that managers cannot 
save the effort of a thorough analysis of the general environment and organisational resources 
and capabilities and, thus, developing a unique strategic approach and tool-kit. Improving 
corporate environmental performance has many possible pathways from which to choose. As 
Hass [1996] points out, the models of corporate environmental strategy may be separated into 
two groups “based on their underlying structure: (i) stages along a type of 
continuum/progresion or (ii) categorical” (p. 60). The stage models of corporate 
environmental strategy prescribe steps towards improving environmental management or 
performance.  In contrast, categorical models of corporate environmental strategy 
differentiate a few environmental strategy postures and claim that depending upon the nature 
of environmental challenge as well as the economic sector to which the firm in question 
belongs, there is always a first-best environmental strategy choice. For example, for 
companies of some sectors, green product differentiation seems to be of little relevance, thus 
a so-called offensive environmental strategy might not be pursued. 
 
2.2.1. Stage Models of Corporate Environmental Strategy 
 
One of the most often cited and earliest stage models of corporate environmental strategy 
is presented by Hunt–Auster [1990]. Based on their work experience as consultants, the 
authors separate five levels of environmental management, primarily with regard to reducing 
environmental risks of toxic wastes: 
 
1. Beginner; 
2. Fire Fighter; 
3. Concerned Citizen; 
4. Pragmatist; and, 
5. Pro-activist. 
 
In the stage of beginner, firms have no environmental management practice and operate 
without taking possible environmental risks into consideration. The fire fighter stage of 
environmental management implies the recognition of environmental risks, but their treatment 
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is typically ad hoc or regulatory driven, and primarily forced by emerging conflict situations. 
The stage of concerned citizen is described by Hunt and Auster [1990] as firms that are 
rhetorically committed to reducing environmental risks and attempt to adapt to changing 
expectations, but are still far from having an integrated environmental management or 
institutionalising a dialogue with relevant stakeholder groups. The last two stages of 
improving environmental management are characterised by well-developed risk management.  
In a pragmatist stage, firms focus on developing and institutionalising a comprehensive 
approach to reducing environmental risk while still pursuing inwardly-oriented environmental 
management. Companies that reach the most developed stage of pro-activist have developed a 
genuine preventive management of environmental risks which also institutionalise 
stakeholder involvement. 
From the most underdeveloped stage of corporate environmental management to the 
most developed, the reduction, treatment and management of environmental risks are 
integrated in organisational routines; environmental commitment increases and becomes 
established; and, environmental risk management is gradually institutionalised throughout the 
organisational structure and culture. At the same time, Hunt–Auster [1990] also feel the need 
to provide a checklist for a successful environmental strategy. More progressively, they 
attempt to give guidance to unfreeze and transform misdirected and unsatisfactory 
organisational practice and routines that hinder the effectiveness of environmental risk 
management. This addition to their stage model constitutes a step towards a more dynamic, 
process model, however underdeveloped and unconvincing it is in the form presented. 
 
Roome [1992] and [1994] present a so-called “strategic option model,” intended to 
differentiate between general environmental strategies. Corporate environmental strategies 
are characterised according to the following main factors: 
 
• Environmental risk; 
• Market opportunities; 
• Regulatory pressure; 
• Organisational limits; and, 
• Capabilities for managing organisational change. 
 
Based on these five factors, five corporate environmental strategies might be separated 
(Roome [1992], p. 18): 
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1. Non-Compliance; 
2. Compliance; 
3. Compliance plus; 
4. Commercial and environmental excellence; and, 
5. Leading edge. 
 
A non-compliance environmental strategy may be typical of firms whose operations 
involve low environmental risks as well as low market potential for environmentally sound 
products or services. Some companies might deliberately suppress any environmental 
expectations, counting on the alleged fact that the environmental challenge is only a passing 
fad and investing resources in lobbying against environmental regulation. Moreover, there 
might also be some firms that lack resources and capabilities to catch up with increasing 
environmental demands and, therefore, may easily become laggards in competition. 
According to Schot and Fischer [1993], from the 1970s to the mid-80s the majority of 
industrial firms demonstrated a non-compliance or compliance environmental strategy, and 
thus lacked the willingness to internalise environmental issues. Petulla [1987] called this 
approach a “crisis-oriented management:”1 operating without a strategic approach towards 
environmental regulation, without an environmental function within the organisational 
structure, and an ad hoc management of conflicts with regulatory authorities as well as local 
communities. 
A compliance environmental strategy places its primary focus upon regulatory 
requirements – they might be called environmental “minimalist” or, as Petulla [1987] puts it, 
a “cost-oriented management.” Companies of this compliance orientation consider 
environmental regulation another cost of doing business and their job is to economise on 
these additional costs. However, according to Roome, these firms might easily find 
themselves in a laggard position, loosing their market shares if environmental expectations as 
well as stakeholder pressure raise and they are not able to accommodate such changes 
(because of large sunk costs in end-of-pipe technologies or rigid organisational routines, 
narrow cognitive frames, etc.). 
A compliance-plus environmental strategy intends to be a step ahead of regulatory 
requirements, in order to assure opportunities for a timely and least-cost adaptation. 
According to Petulla [1987], an “enlightened environmental management” expresses this 
approach. Improving environmental performance is considered to be a necessary requirement 
                                                          
1 Note a weakness of the typology developed here, due to the lack of an explicit treatment of the literature on the 
relationship between corporate environmentalism and crisis management. 
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of long-term market survival. Companies of a compliance-plus strategic orientation develop a 
written environmental strategy and an environmental policy statement, a commitment to 
continuous environmental improvement, establish an environmental unit or department within 
their organisational structure, monitor emissions, screen investment alternatives from an 
environmental point of view and frequently practice environmental compliance audits.  
Though firms of a compliance-plus strategy have moved from an exclusively defensive 
orientation toward a more pro-active one, their main strategic focus remains (current and 
future) environmental regulation.  Similarly, their pro-active strategic orientation still has a 
relatively shorter time horizon and they rarely expand it to a long term one that would raise 
questions regarding the choice of basic technology and product line, as well as the basic 
assumptions of organisational culture. 
Only companies of commercial and environmental excellence or leading edge 
environmental strategies consider environmental issues a new dimension of business 
competitiveness and act accordingly. The firms demonstrating these latter two types of 
strategic postures perceive environmental expectations as much more demanding than 
regulatory requirements. Besides environmental authorities, many other stakeholder groups 
(customers, suppliers, financial institutions, local communities, NGOs, etc.) are perceived to 
infer strong environmental demands upon the business sector. A commercial and 
environmental excellence strategy entails a well-developed market, as well as non-market 
communication strategy that attempt to establish and deepen a green image or identity for the 
organisation in question. Typically, these industrial firms try to make good business out of the 
environmental challenge. They might focus either on environmental differentiation as a 
competitive strategy or upon developing an environmental business unit that provides 
environmental products and services to customers.  
An environmentally leading-edge firm aims at radically reducing its environmental 
impact by transforming old technologies and product lines into innovative environmentally 
sound ones. Their focus is therefore upon environmental technology and product innovation. 
These firms typically express a high moral concern for the social good and the natural 
environment in their mission statements, and may initiate efforts to renew their organisational 
culture toward one with social and environmental responsibility. Strategically, they clearly 
aim to develop resources and capabilities to deal with environmental issues in order to gain 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
Roome [1992] emphasises that developing and renewing a corporate environmental 
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strategy should be an inherent part of the strategic management process and, consequently, 
requires planned and structured adjustments (p. 16). He goes on to argue for a so-called 
threat-response analysis as well as an environmental vulnerability analysis, upon which the 
rational choice of an environmental strategy should be based. A threat-response analysis 
focuses upon environmental impacts as related to organisational processes, products, 
resources and the elements of organisational culture. A firm’s environmental vulnerability is 
related to the assessment of environmental risks according to two dimensions: a scientific 
analysis of environmental impacts and stakeholders’ perception of those impacts. This is 
shown by Figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 1 Assessing Corporate Vulnerability 
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(Source: Roome [1992], p. 17) 
 
Both Roome [1992] and [1994] refer to the link between developmental stages of 
environmental strategy and the organisational changes that in fact constitute the 
implementation of the environmental strategy. Since a compliance strategy involves only 
technological changes and no changes in organisational structure and culture – as Roome 
[1994] argues – it implies a first-order change. In contrast, a compliance-plus strategy 
requires changes not only in technology but in organisational structure and management – it 
thus belongs to the category of second-order change. An environmental excellence strategic 
orientation, however, demands an organisational culture change as well. Changes in 
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individual as well as organisational behaviour, values, and attitudes are needed toward 
environmental consciousness – it is a third-order change process. Roome does not really 
specify in detail how those planned change processes take place, nor what particular factors 
and mechanisms hinder or support them, only giving a few hints as to what might be gained, 
such as the importance of change management capabilities within the organisation or the 
presence of environmentally aware and committed managers and employees, etc.  (Roome 
[1994], p. 74).  Therefore, Roome’s analysis remains, in this sense, a static one, lacking the 
specification of processes, mechanisms, and interactions of organisational change that are 
involved in corporate greening. 
 
A new approach to the theory of the firm as well as to corporate strategy has recently 
appeared and has been gaining prominence, called the resource-based theory of the firm. It 
has been applied to the interpretation of corporate environmental strategy as well (see Hart 
[1995] and [1997], Russo–Fouts [1997]). The resource-based theory of the firm goes beyond 
the general limit of the standard, structure–conduct–performance type economics approach to 
the theory of the firm, by opening the black-box of companies and taking their organisational 
resources or capabilities into account. There is a straightforward relationship between the 
resource-based theory of the firm and the core competence approach to competitive strategy 
(developed by Hamel and Prahalad [1990]). According to the resource-based theory of the 
firm, the strategic capabilities that produce sustainable competitive advantage should be based 
upon organisational resources which are valuable or rent producing; non-substitutable; tacit or 
causally ambiguous; socially complex; and firm specific or rare (Hart [1995], pp. 988–989). 
However, strategic capabilities might become strategic rigidities over time and with 
dynamically changing context. In order to avoid this uncompetitive option, firms should 
continuously renew their own organisational resources and capabilities, and adapt them to the 
changing general circumstances. 
Hart [1995] distinguishes three strategic capabilities relating to corporate 
environmentalism: (i) pollution prevention; (ii) product stewardship; and, (iii) sustainable 
development (p. 992). A strategic capability of pollution prevention is based upon the 
greening of production and operations; this contributes to an increase in resources efficiency 
(that is, reducing materials and energy loss in the form of waste and pollution), thus lowering 
production costs which results finally in improved competitive advantage. Hart relates the 
approach of pollution prevention to the logic of total quality management (TQM), which 
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involves the capability for continuous improvement and the upgrading of human resources 
and skills. 
A strategic capability of product stewardship resides, by contrast, in product design and 
development. From an environmental management point of view, it means the application of 
such tools and approaches as so-called cradle-to-grave life-cycle analysis (LCA) and design 
for environment (DfE), which also entails established environmental cooperation with 
stakeholders along the value chain (e. g. with suppliers as well as customers). In this case, the 
source of competitive advantage lies in product differentiation and good company reputation. 
A strategic capability of sustainable development might be found in a sustainable 
organisational vision and a strategic intent that focuses not only upon envisioning sustainable 
technologies and products but also upon the development of new markets for such 
technologies and products. Competitive advantage, in this sense, lies in the development of 
future markets. 
Hart [1997] claims the above model to be a stage model which prescribes corporate 
strategies directed to the vision of sustainable development as the most developed stage, 
providing long-term solutions for industry-related ecological problems. Hart goes somewhat 
beyond the standard arguments or scope of awareness dominant in the environmental strategy 
literature, in the sense that his stage model of corporate environmental strategy is embedded 
in political economic aspects as well. His starting point is the following:  
 
“Beyond greening lies an enormous challenge – and an enormous opportunity. The 
challenge is to develop a sustainable global economy: an economy that the planet is 
capable of supporting indefinitely.” (Hart [1997], p. 67) 
 
The political dimension of the problem is clearly stated:  
 
“The roots of the problem … are political and social issues that exceed the mandate 
and the capabilities of any corporation.” (op.  cit.) 
 
A well-known argument follows about the possible role of corporations and corporate 
managers: 
 
“At the same time, corporations are the only organisations with the resources, the 
technology, the global reach, and, ultimately, the motivation to achieve sustainability.” 
(op. cit.) 
 
Both articles by Hart warn the business world that sustainability, to the best of our current 
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knowledge, requires corporate strategies directed to reducing material consumption in the rich 
North, while allowing for an increase in the poor South. Clearly, political economy and 
political ecology factors are raised here. Yet, a difference between Hart’s model and the 
interpretation of corporate greening as political economic change is that the stage model 
above is silent about what kind of wider or deeper institutional changes are needed in order to 
enable sustainable corporate strategies, and about constraining as well as enabling factors of 
the current institutional arrangements. Hart’s stage model then seems to suggest that what is 
necessary for addressing the political aspects effectively is a cognitive or value change with 
regard to the actors of the current institutional setting (a global cognitive revolution), and a 
change toward environmentally sound technologies. Therefore, his model remains static and 
ultimately, offers no more than the rational and right choice of an environmental strategy. 
 
2.2.2. Categorical Models of Corporate Environmental Strategy 
 
In contrast to stage models, categorical models of corporate environmental strategy have 
no built-in developmental perspective. The rational choice of an environmental strategy is 
delineated by some specified dimensions, by which an assessment or rating of companies is 
possible. Steger [1993] defines two dimensions: market opportunities through environmental 
performance and environmental risks. The problem of strategy choice thus can be reduced to 
the positioning of a firm in a 2 x 2 matrix: 
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Figure 2  Environmental Strategies Based on Market Opportunities and Environmental Risks 
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(Source: Steger [1992], p. 151) 
 
Steger’s model treats the choice of an environmental strategy as a well-structured 
problem, in the sense that organisational managers were able to cope with the problems of 
information gathering and analysis with regard to environmental market opportunities (by 
market research, competitive analysis, etc.) and environmental risks emerging from business 
operations.  From Figure 1, one may infer the logic of the model: if, for example, market 
research demonstrates that customers are not willing to pay higher prices for improved 
environmental performance, but the environmental impacts of business operations should be 
mitigated in order to comply with regulations, a defensive strategy would be the rational 
choice. In other words, when there is no effective demand for environmental improvements 
there is no room for competing on environmental performance and the only rational strategic 
approach would be to comply with existing environmental regulations as cost efficiently as 
possible, and to avoid conflicts with other stakeholders in order not to hurt the bottom line 
through bad organisational reputation. In contrast, an offensive strategy constitutes the 
rational choice when, though corporate environmental risks might be judged low, the market 
is willing to reward improved environmental performance. Environmental management thus 
makes good business sense, in this case. 
Steger’s categorical model differs from stage models of environmental strategy in that it 
does not prescribe to pursue an offensive or innovative environmental strategy that might 
seem to be the most progressive among the four strategic postures. However, he also mentions 
that the rationality of an indifferent strategy does not involve the total irrelevance of 
environmental considerations (op. cit., p. 151) – it may well be a temporarily rational choice 
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and over time might even become self-defeating, though this option is not explored further by 
Steger. Therefore, there is no dynamism included and consequently, the applicability of his 
model is limited. A snapshot picture of environmental strategy choice is offered here in a 
static general environment – it is a strikingly mechanistic picture of organisations. 
 
In the Hungarian corporate environmental strategy literature, the first model, a 
categorical one, was presented by Kerekes and Kindler [1995]. This model – similar to 
Steger’s and Roome’s mentioned above – treats environmental risks as a particularly 
important dimension of strategy choice. The authors argue that environmental expectations or 
demands with regard to corporate environmental performance will differ according to 
company profile and the natural as well as social context of the focal organisation. In order to 
assess company environmental management, organisational capabilities for environmental 
risk management should be analysed and evaluated. Environmental risks involve two 
different dimensions. Corporate environmental risks, on one hand, emanate from standard 
business operations (corporate profile), including the nature of materials used, technologies 
applied and human resources and skills developed. This dimension is called by Kerekes–
Kindler [1995] the endogenous risks. On the other hand, the probability of an environmental 
accident or catastrophe and the seriousness of its consequences are also determined by factors 
external to the focal organisation. These are called exogenous risks, and include geographical 
location, ecosystem properties, demographic characteristics of the social neighbourhood, 
infrastructural conditions, environmental attitudes of local residents, etc. 
The model of Kerekes–Kindler [1995] prescribes differing roles for an environmental 
function within an organisation, according to the magnitude of endogenous and exogenous 
risks. For example, a company characterised by low exogenous as well as endogenous risks 
should establish a supporting environmental function at the middle management level of 
industrial plant operations, while at the other extreme, a corporation of high environmental 
risks makes a rational choice if environmental issues are treated at the top level as a major 
strategic concern. Furthermore, the authors argue for taking into account environmental 
market opportunities. Thus, four corporate environmental strategies might be categorised 
according to the aggregated environmental risks (including endogenous as well as exogenous 
risks) and market opportunities related to improved environmental performance: 
 
1. Indifferent; 
2. Defensive; 
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3. Offensive; and, 
4. Innovative. 
 
Operating with low environmental risks and having no environmental market 
opportunities may justify an indifferent environmental strategy. If environmental performance 
improvement cannot be marketised but environmental impacts of business operations are 
considerable, the rational choice involves a defensive environmental strategy. In contrast, 
when environmental risks are low but environmental market opportunities are promising, an 
offensive environmental strategy should be pursued (environmental and commercial 
excellence in Roome’s model above). If both environmental risks and market opportunities 
are high, an innovative environmental strategy constitutes a rational choice (leading-edge 
strategy in Roome’s strategic options model) (Kerekes–Kindler [1995], pp. 35–45). 
Csutora has recently further developed the model of Kerekes–Kindler and presented an 
empirically-based theory of corporate environmental strategy (Csutora [1998] and [1999]). 
Csutora’s model, while not breaking with the basic assumptions of the original, has the 
advantage of being able to compare the environmental strategic orientation of companies of 
different profiles and size. 
 
In sum, the stage and categorical models of environmental strategy share the following 
salient characteristics: 
 
• environmental strategy choice is a rational one; 
• environmental strategy choice is context dependent and depends upon organisational 
resources and capabilities, and the general environment (the environmental strategic tool-
kit is, thus, not universal but should be adapted to internal as well as external factors); 
• though only stage models express a clear evolutionary logic in the sense of prescribing a 
sequence of developmental stages of corporate environmental strategy, categorical models 
also share an implicit assumption of a progress toward innovative or sustainable 
environmental strategies over time; 
• there is room for so-called win-win situations, even for the most radical changes in the 
long-term (for example creating future markets); 
• the choice of an environmental strategy implies organisational changes and it is assumed 
that changes are planned and of a top-down nature and top management should practise 
transformative leadership; and, 
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• to reach a leading edge position with regard to environmental performance and 
management, gradual and incremental organisational adaptation are not enough, radical 
and discontinuous changes are also required. 
 
 
2.3. MARKET AND NON-MARKET ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGIES 
 
A third interpretation of corporate greening as a choice of environmental strategy might 
be distinguished because of a particular understanding of strategy as such.  Schot [1992] puts 
it as follows: 
 
“… the environmental aspects of management should no longer be regarded as being 
restrictive to business practice, but as a natural part of their social responsibility to 
society ...” (p. 35) 
 
This particular understanding of strategy has been developed by Baron [1995] and is 
called integrated strategy. An integrated strategy should provide a synergistic fit between the 
focal organisation and the market as well as non-market aspects of the general environment. 
The focal organisation should be positioned not only with regard to market competitors but 
non-market stakeholders as well. An environmental market strategy focuses on gaining 
competitive advantage – either by cost leadership through improving resources productivity 
or by an environmental product differentiation. A non-market environmental strategy focuses 
upon legitimacy and trust.2 It aims to gain legitimacy by establishing trustful stakeholder 
relationships and building or maintaining the credibility of the focal organisation within its 
organisational field. 
 
Schot [1992] develops related theoretical insights based on his qualitative research 
regarding environmental management practices of eight multinational chemical firms. The 
chemical industry was one of the first economic sectors that associated with environmental 
pollution and which, consequently, has suffered from a negative environmental reputation. 
The chemical sector has also produced major industrial accidents and catastrophes that have 
undermined public trust with regard to the industry as a whole. The names of Union Carbide 
                                                          
2 In the Hungarian management studies, a similar line of reasoning can be found within the business ethics 
literature (see particularly Zsolnai [1992] and [1993]).  
 38
and Bophal, Exxon Valdez and Love Canal are some of the signposts signifying the worst 
industrial accidents or hazards related to the chemical industry. It is – as interviews with some 
of the top executives of chemical firms presented by Schot [1992] underline – a major 
strategic issue of how to regain and maintain public trust and legitimacy for the sector in 
general. Top executives reported that a bad environmental reputation implies considerable 
monetary losses (e. g. falling share prices, worsening credit and insurance conditions, etc.). 
The main strategic tool for an effective non-market environmental strategy is 
communication, primarily with external stakeholders. If communication based on stakeholder 
dialogue is necessary for regaining public trust, it is a great challenge to the currently 
institutionalised identity of the chemical sector. The chemical sector – as Schot [1992] and 
others report (e. g. Simmons-Wynne [1993], Tombs [1994]) – has developed an identity based 
on objective science that can hardly involve or take seriously subjective perceptions 
expressed by different non-scientific stakeholder groups. Environmental issues have primarily 
been treated by the chemical industry as questions for science; that is, their existence and 
seriousness should first be justified scientifically, then a search for solutions may start, again 
guided by scientific methods and tools. Obviously, the approach of the chemical sector is that 
of the expertise or technocrat. Seen from this perspective, the opinion or perception of the lay 
public is unscientific, driven by biases and unjustified fears. According to Schot [1992], one 
of the critical issues is whether a dialogue might be initiated between the parties and whether 
external stakeholders would be involved – and to what extent – in environmental policy 
making. Based on his research, Schot [1992] reports that the largest chemical firms under 
investigation have not yet started a dialogue with stakeholders and their communication 
strategy, aimed at re-establishing credibility, does not go beyond providing technical 
information (p. 36). The more effective forms of stakeholder involvement that, at the same 
time, are also more credible, have not yet been established (op. cit., p. 37). 
Concurrently, the chemical sector is often reported as a leader in improving 
environmental performance and pursuing win-win environmental strategies. Many large 
chemical firms announced the launch of new, environmentally less harmful products or else 
modified existing products toward improved environmental performance. The majority have 
also established environmental units and other organisational institutions related to 
environmental management, formalised environmental criteria for supplier evaluation and 
selection procedures, etc. However, Schot argues that even the largest chemical companies 
have not initiated radical changes in their research and development structure and culture, by 
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integrating environmental considerations (op. cit., p. 40). 
Schot [1992] presents categories of environmental strategies based on his empirical 
research. His typology differentiates between environmental strategies that are  
 
• Dependent; 
• Defensive; 
• Offensive; 
• Innovative; and 
• Niche. 
 
Schot [1992] also points out that even the environmental leaders among the largest chemical 
firms under investigation are just implementing a move from a defensive to an offensive 
environmental strategy, while a few elements of their environmental strategies demonstrate an 
innovative approach to environmental management issues (pp. 42–43). 
 
Maxwell–Rothenberg–Briscoe–Marcus [1997] report the results of a thorough analysis of 
the environmental strategies of such large companies as Volvo, Polaroid and  Procter & 
Gamble. The main conclusion they reach is that these companies formulated their own 
environmental strategies in a way that is consistent with the main characteristics of their 
business activities and external environment, as well as with their existing market and non-
market strategies (op. cit., p. 128). In this sense, Volvo has developed its environmental 
management under the influence of non-market stakeholders (regulatory authorities, local 
communities) and consumers. In line with the general Swedish practice, Volvo made efforts 
to develop cooperative relations with environmental regulatory agencies and treated greening 
as an inherent part of its previously developed commitment to corporate social responsibility. 
Following its organisational traditions, one of the first steps towards greening was a 
company-wide environmental training programme that also involved suppliers and dealers (a 
total of 70 thousands people were involved – op. cit., p. 122). Polaroid has long been 
criticised because of production waste; therefore, the firm’s greening efforts focused on 
developing cleaner production techniques from the very beginning. Procter & Gamble has 
experienced an increasing environmental consciousness on the part of its consumer base and 
thus the first and foremost environmental problem to be addressed has become post-
consumption waste. 
Maxwell and co-authors argue that existing organisational capabilities have exerted a 
similarly strong influence upon the ways of greening, like the external factors briefly 
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mentioned above (op. cit., pp. 128–129). Actual greening efforts at Volvo gained support 
from or were integrated in the automobile manufacturing company’s social responsibility 
tradition. Procter & Gamble delegated environmental tasks, in line with its decentralised 
organisational structure, to existing product and geographic divisions in order to advance 
decentralised problem solving and implementation activities with regard to environmental 
issues. The formulation and implementation of an environmental strategy at Procter & 
Gamble was also based on the salient features of its organisational culture, stemming from 
well-developed brand management and consumer focus groups traditionally applied in the 
process of product design. 
At the same time, accommodating their environmental strategies to their organisational 
capabilities has resulted not only in a more successful process of implementation, but in 
newly emerging environmental conflicts (Maxwell et al. [1997], pp. 129–130). Volvo, for 
example, has further pursued its commitment to manufacturing large automobiles without any 
compromise and, however fuel efficient, they are still far from acceptable from the point of 
view of many environmental NGOs. That is, Volvo has not radically changed its product 
strategy with regard to environmental expectations – yet. Though Polaroid and Procter & 
Gamble have received environmental awards for their efforts, they had to face unexpected 
environmental conflicts due to the lack of a radically renewed product strategy. Both 
companies still produce throw-away products. 
Maxwell et al. [1997] also emphasise large difficulties emerging in the processes of 
organisational change implied by corporate greening (op. cit., pp. 130–131). Typically, 
corporate environmental management was previously assigned a so-called puffer role. It 
seems to be a very troublesome process to change it in order to fulfill a more pro-active role 
in line with the changing environmental demands of stakeholders. However, this process of 
change (i. e. greening) may come up against serious organisational resistance since it involves 
changing competences and power structures within the focal organisation. It might be much 
easier to overcome these difficulties or obstacles if environmental efforts and tasks are linked 
with existing organisational capabilities and culture. However, this may have the price of 
slowing down organisational changes or taking the edge off the radical nature of greening. 
Moreover, gradually raising environmental performance objectives higher and higher might 
become more and more difficult to implement over time (without changing the dominant 
organisational frame of reference or cognitive paradigm), since those changes will require 
more and more resources, which implies more and more conflicts between organisational 
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units. Maxwell and his co-authors thus reach a final conclusion (op. cit.,p. 132) that the large 
firms under investigation are inevitably faced with treating environmental issues as a 
challenge to their overall business operations. However, to reconsider a corporation’s overall 
business activity has such a very high price (not only in monetary terms) that the firms 
involved clearly prefer a step-by-step approach toward greening their operations. 
 
Reinhardt [1998] presents a detailed analysis of environmental product differentiation 
strategy. In order for such an environmental strategy to be successful, he determines three 
requirements (op. cit., p. 47): 
 
1. “willingness to pay of consumers for environmental quality; 
2. establish credible information about environmental attributes of the product; and 
3. defensible against imitation.” 
 
Citing the cases of chemical corporations (Ciba and Monsanto) as cases of industrial 
marketing (op. cit, pp. 47–55), Reinhardt persuasively argues that if a product helps industrial 
customers reduce their environmental risks and, consequently, save on environment related 
expenses, the first requirement of a successful environmental product differentiation strategy 
is met. Of course, environmental regulation may play a decisive role in determining 
environmental compliance costs. As to the second requirement, the credibility of 
environmental information might be strengthened by an established brand name and radically 
new product innovations lack these advantages. Furthermore, the environmental legitimacy of 
a product must be established not only in the market but – since it has a lot to do with 
environmental quality as a public good – in the wider social-political context (including 
regulatory authorities as well as green pressure groups). In order to reap so-called first-mover 
advantages (the third requirement above), an environmental product differentiation must be 
defensible against imitation. However, if an environmental product innovator experiences 
excess costs compared to its rivals, the innovator might be forced to move beyond a product 
differentiation strategy and lobby for more stringent environmental regulation in order to 
compensate for its cost disadvantage. 
Reinhardt [1998] also considers cases of consumer marketing, such as Patagonia and 
Heinz (pp. 55–67). He argues that consumers’ willingness to pay is the strongest when at least 
part of the resulting environmental improvement might be appropriated as a private good (e. 
g. as individual health improvement or avoiding risks to individual health). However, 
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appropriability conditions may differ among consumer groups and, by implication, an 
environmental product differentiation strategy should be based on a proper segmentation of 
consumer market (that is, the horizontal strategy of environmental product differentiation 
should be complemented with vertical considerations). Citing the example of Patagonia’s 
clothing products made of organically grown cotton, Reinhardt points out that 
environmentally sound products may demonstrate a so-called halo-effect with regard to the 
other products of the company in question – this clearly results in additional profits over the 
whole product portfolio (as has been in the case of Patagonia). It is even of more interest that 
a successful environmental product differentiation strategy seems to require a consistency 
over all aspects or elements of corporate communication: 
 
“... the fit between environmental product differentiation and the overall positioning of 
the firm is critical.” (Reinhardt [1998], p. 66) 
 
A key factor of Patagonia’s very successful strategy is that corporate environmental 
performance has been considered a way of communicating the essence of organisational 
identity or basic organisational values to consumers and other stakeholders. This constitutes 
an excellent example of connecting public good with private welfare for consumers. It seems 
clear, from the perspective of the resource-based theory of the firm, that it is much more 
difficult to imitate an integrated environmental strategy (a synergy between market and non-
market strategy) than a single environmental product differentiation strategic move. Thus, 
Reinhardt [1998] seems to be right in arguing that (in the case of Patagonia): 
 
“Environmental product differentiation is an organic outgrowth of an entire company 
culture.”; and “… the environmental positioning is an integral part of the business 
strategy …” (p. 67) 
 
 
In sum, the key features of interpreting corporate greening as an integrated, market and 
non-market, strategy are as follows: 
 
• The choice of an environmental strategy is a rational one (stemming from a resource 
analysis to understand strategic organisational capabilities and a competitive as well as a 
stakeholder analysis); 
• The essence or key to the success of an environmental strategy is the integration or 
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synergy between market and non-market considerations; 
• Corporate environmental performance cannot be reduced to a question of competitiveness 
in a narrow sense, but also has to do with the social legitimacy of a business enterprise; 
• Due to the issue of legitimacy (or credibility and trust), the environmental challenge to 
business enterprises is primarily a challenge to their organisational culture and values as 
organisational capabilities; 
• Organisational changes required by environmental expectations seem to be more radical 
than business enterprises are currently able and willing to implement; 
• Organisational changes are assumed to be of a top-down nature and there is no description 
or analysis of their mechanisms and processes, though the probable organisational 
resistance is emphasised (the analysis remains static). 
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CHAPTER 3 
CORPORATE GREENING AS 
ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
 
Most of the literature on corporate greening leaves no doubt that corporate environmental 
management involves organisational change. Meeting the environmental expectations of 
different stakeholder groups calls for organisational change and development. It is argued that 
assuring a fit between the focal organisation and its general environment over time is the 
basic question of organisational survival, on the one hand, and gaining sustainable 
competitive advantage, on the other. However, authors following this ‘change perspective’ on 
corporate greening may differ considerably from each other in their view on what is changing 
within the focal organisation, the extent of organisational change and the processes of 
organisational change, themselves. Descriptive and prescriptive approaches are again 
intertwined. A number of authors devote most of their attention to the extent of change 
required to meet the environmental challenge and to the possibilities of top managers to direct 
change processes – typically urging radical or transformative changes. Others prefer to 
analyse what sort of change processes are going on within organisational greening – for 
example, asking, if changes are incremental, not radical at all, what reasons account for them? 
Problems clearly emerge for both descriptive and prescriptive analysis of how to differentiate 
between incremental versus radical change. Where is the dividing line between “frame-
breaking” change and changes that do not have the transformative potential to change the 
previously dominant “frame of reference?” 
There is an extensive literature on organisational change. The analysis of corporate 
greening as organisational change given here is informed by the concepts and models 
developed by Child–Smith [1987]; Pettigrew [1987]; Johnson [1990]; Gersick [1991]; Wilson 
[1992]; Greenwood–Hinings [1993] and [1996]; Gelei [1996]; Hardy [1996]; Calori [1998]; 
Antal-Mokos–Balaton–Drótos–Tari [1999]; Dobák [1999]; Ford [1999]; and, Taylor [1999]. 
It might be argued that descriptive or prescriptive approaches to organisational greening 
can be divided into two perspectives, differing from each other in whether their focus is upon 
the process of change (how does change take place?) or the content of change (what is 
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changing?). Within the ‘process perspective’ on organisational change, one group of authors 
concentrates on the process of strategic management – how to incorporate environmental 
considerations into the process of strategic management? Another group of researchers of the 
“process perspective” relies on the models of organisational learning and conceptualise 
corporate greening as processes of learning. 
The “content perspectives” on organisational change might also be divided into two 
approaches. One approach interprets greening as technological change; the other describes or 
prescribes it as cultural change. Note, however, that it is only for the purpose of the present 
theoretical analysis of organisational studies on corporate greening that so-called content and 
process perspectives on organisational change are divided. One should be aware (see Gelei 
[1996]) that they are overlapping and connected in many respects. 
Before entering into the details of the four different perspectives on corporate greening as 
organisational change, it might be a useful start to introduce two relevant models (Shrivastava 
[1992] and Gray et al. [1995]) that characterise the interrelationships between the approaches 
separated here for theoretical convenience.  
 
Shrivastava [1992], based on his qualitative empirical research, developed a model of 
“corporate self-greenewal.” The strategic challenge of the social, political and economic 
dimensions of environmental pressures requires companies to transform themselves. 
Corporate environmental responsiveness implies initiating processes of “self-greenewal.” 
Corporate self-greenewal should include changes in all basic organisational characteristics; 
that is, radical or transformational organisational change. Transformative changes should 
appear in a company’s philosophy, objectives, strategies, product lines, packaging, production 
systems, organisational systems, deployment of resources, and stakeholder relationships – 
although changes will probably be gradual over time (op. cit., p. 12). 
Shrivastava’s [1992] empirical research includes one leading U. S. firm in each sector of 
the automobile, chemical, fast foods, oil and petroleum industries (pp. 13–17). The self-
greenewal of industrial firms examined follows a similar pattern of strategic actions, from 
which a general process model of corporate greening can be abstracted. The model of 
corporate self-greenewal processes includes the following stages or strategic actions: 
 
1. Strategic threats from regulations and public pressures; 
2. Re-visioning objectives; 
3. Incremental ad hoc strategic programmes; 
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4. Testing competitive benefits; and, 
5. Expansion of organisational systems; institutionalisation and cultural changes 
(Shrivastava [1992], p. 17). 
 
An external threat makes a company start a greening process, first in the form of ad hoc, 
incremental organisational changes responding to the most acute and sensitive environmental 
problems, then gradually, environmental management is integrated and institutionalised 
within the organisational structure and routines. Over time, the heteronomous starting point 
turns into autonomous actions and intrinsic motivation from within the organisation, 
spreading a genuine environmental ethic or responsibility all over the organisation (op. cit., p. 
18). 
It is a distinctive feature of Shrivastava’s model that, in contrast to the interpretations of 
corporate greening as the choice of an environmental strategy which are rationalist and 
planning in nature, changes in the formal organisational systems follow changes in actions 
and forms of behaviour (Räsänen–Meriläinen–Lovio [1995], p. 11). Conscious 
implementation of a rationally planned environmental strategy is not presented here, in a 
prescriptive style, but instead, emerging patterns of a corporate environmental strategy 
moving from uncertain and ad hoc towards more integrated and more conscious processes.  
 
Another general process model of corporate greening was developed by Gray–Walters–
Bebbington–Thompson [1995], based on the model of organisational change developed by 
Laughlin [1991]. The empirical research of Gray and co-authors focused on the role of 
financial accounting and accountants in corporate greening as organisational change. 
In accordance with Shrivastava’s model above [1992], it is assumed that corporate 
greening is initiated by the environmental demands of the general environment of the focal 
organisation: inertia, or the protection of the status quo, is a fundamental characteristic of any 
organisation. The model separates so-called “morphostatic” and “morphogenetic,” or first- 
and second-order, organisational changes.  
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Table 2 Laughlin’s typology of organisational change 
No change Inertia 
First-order change Rebuttal 
(Morphostatic) Reorientation 
Second-order change Colonisation 
(Morphogenetic) Evolution 
Source: Gray–Walters–Bebbington–Thompson [1995], p. 216 
 
Summarising empirical surveys, Gray and co-authors point out that the majority of 
British firms (at least 85 percent of large companies) recognise the significance of 
environmental problems and their relevance to business practice, and 60–70 percent claim to 
have taken steps towards possible solutions. At the same time, it is in general difficult to 
separate “inertia” and “rebuttal” as corporate environmental strategies (Gray et al. [1995], p. 
223). Companies following a “reorientation” environmental strategy explain their greening 
efforts by direct business considerations; that is, the main reason cited for corporate greening 
is organisational survival (op. cit., p. 225). However, the firms characterised by either a 
“colonisation” or “evolution” environmental strategy do not demonstrate straightforward 
signs of second-order changes as the original model of Laughlin would describe, or if there 
are any second-order change processes they seem to be mixed with first-order ones (op cit., p. 
226).  
Gray and co-authors therefore broadened the above model with the terms “first-order 
colonisation” and “first-order evolution.” First-order colonisation as an environmental 
strategy is primarily motivated by indirect business reasons; fundamentally, by a sense of 
threat. Threats can be posed by regulatory procedures, public critique or distrust, and/or 
accidents and negative influences upon the work morale of employees. A first-order 
colonisation strategy does not demonstrate deep and widespread changes in business-as-usual 
management, in contrast to first-order evolution. First-order evolution is motivated by 
personal or social reasons, such as taking responsibility for local community interests and 
values, the personal commitment of managers and/or employees or claiming greening as a 
natural implication of organisational culture (Gray et al. [1995], p. 227). The following two 
interview citations are telling in this respect: 
 
“There is a personal concern for environmental issues by the management of [name of 
company]. Management are beginning to undertake new thinking. Beginning to 
recognise that average was not good enough. A major element of our PR is to increase 
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the amount of debate with the greens, to raise the level of the debate and to influence 
the political and public agenda.” Corporate Development Manager, large, diversified 
company 
 
“I know we are not sustainable – but what the hell do I tell my fellow directors and 
my shareholders? We should shut up shop? That may the right answer but it isn’t 
going to be accepted you know!” Environmental Director, multinational chemical 
company (op. cit., p. 227 – emphases added) 
 
Gray and co-authors point out that the signs of a second-order organisational change are 
very rare and typically characterised by those companies that have either suffered frequent 
civic pressure for a long time, or are smaller and decentralised, operating in a well-defined 
local community. 
 
“The involvement with the local community as a factor for change was fairly subtle 
and seemed to us to be related to the transparency of the organization and a weakening 
of the traditional separation of business versus personal (community) ethics through 
which the environmental disturbances – whether environmentalists action or the more 
general jolts discussed above – could flow.” (Gray et al. [1995], p. 228) 
 
Nonetheless – as the authors emphasise – there are a few firms with the potential for 
morphogenetic change, although only very few of these have started to reconsider their 
business-as-usual from an environmental point of view.  
 
3.1. CORPORATE GREENING AS A CHANGE IN STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Many authors (see Roome [1992], among others) refer to aspects of environmental 
management that require changes in the process of strategic management. Moreover, there are 
models of corporate greening that change traditional models of strategic management by 
reconsidering them from an environmental point of view. Smith [1992] presents quite a 
substantial revision of the process of strategic management: 
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Figure 3 Process of Strategic Management 
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(Source: Smith [1992], p. 3) 
 
Resource analysis aims at assessing the efficiency of materials and energy input use as 
well as the resulting environmental impact. The Porterian ‘value chain’ can be linked with an 
environmental audit in order to uncover those business functions that contribute substantially 
to the “pollution portfolio” of the company in question. Ideally, the prices of all products and 
services should include external pollution costs as well. The greening of value chain analysis 
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may result in competitive advantage over the dimension of corporate environmental 
performance since it systematically expands the horizon of environmental management from 
marketing to the management of materials processes. Defining environmental externalities as 
loss of productive efficiency reveals that improving on the efficient use of production inputs 
constitutes a “win-win” strategy (reduction in production costs as well as environmental 
impacts). 
Environmental and resource analysis constitute the first phases of the process of strategic 
management; the next phases are strategy formulation and implementation. Smith [1992] 
emphasises the role of factors in corporate greening, such as the limits to technical expertise, 
short-term time horizons and the nature of competition in the sector. Any attempt to “green” 
strategic management substantively cannot neglect the ecological fact that a number of 
pollutants have delayed effects: pollutants accumulating in the biosphere may show no sign of 
harmful effects over the short term, yet manifest themselves much later, in the form of 
harmful human health impacts or ecosystem collapse. Due to these delayed effects and the 
widespread uncertainty with regard to cause and effect relationships and irreversible damages, 
a technocratic approach has inherent constraints and, therefore, should be complemented with 
an organisational culture open to broad and equal stakeholder dialogues. Consequently, a 
stakeholder perspective on the potential beneficial and harmful effects of business activities 
should be developed and cultivated, which necessarily leads to the democratisation of the 
process of strategic management, in the sense of broad stakeholder involvement. According to 
Smith [1992], only these sorts of radical and substantive changes might assure that the 
greening of strategic management in particular – and business operations in general – will 
move beyond rhetoric towards real commitment and achievement.  
 
Starik–Throop–Doody–Joyce [1996] aim to answer the question of how to integrate 
environmental considerations into business policy and operations, by changing the process of 
strategic management. Three stages of the strategic management process are separated, 
expressed by the acronym, MOSAIC (Mission, Objective, Strategic orientation, Action plan, 
Implementation and Controls). The first stage involves reconsideration of the existing 
corporate mission, objectives, strategic position, strategic action and implementation plans, 
and control mechanisms with regard to their environmental relevance. The second stage 
requires a thorough analysis of the ecological trends and forecasts of the potential corporate–
environment interactions. The third stage is in fact a combination of the previous two stages, 
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through effective implementation and control (op. cit., p. 15). 
The first step of greening strategic management is the specification of environmental 
commitment in the organisation’s mission statement. Measurable environmental objectives 
should then be defined, in order to enable the measurement of corporate environmental 
performance. Next, the analysis of strategic position is ordered with the help of the following 
framework: 
 
Figure 4 Types of Environmental Strategic Postures 
Value Creation Approach 
 
  Benefit enhancement 
 
Cost reduction 
 
Change Orientation 
Proactive Green product  innovation 
(major modification) 
Pollution prevention 
beyond compliance 
 Accommodative Green product 
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(minor modification) 
Pollution prevention 
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(Source: Starik et al. [1996], p. 17) 
 
The strategic position of any firm depends upon the path of value creation for 
environmentally conscious customers (value creation approach) and the attitude towards 
change (change orientation). For developing action plans, McKinsey’s 7S approach to 
organisational excellence is offered by Starik and co-authors. Implementation involves the 
introduction and launch of environmental programmes, policies, and procedures, while 
control requires the development and operation of an environmental information and 
monitoring system. 
The second step of strategic management as depicted above is environmental analysis. 
Besides the requirement of stakeholder involvement, Starik and co-authors emphasise the 
importance of treating nature as a “supra-stakeholder.” The third step is intended to underline 
the dynamism of strategic management; that is, the necessity of a continuous adaptation of the 
elements of MOSAIC to the changing general (external) environment and changing 
environmental expectations and organisational (internal) capabilities. 
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3.2. Corporate Greening as Organisational Learning 
 
Recently, the concept of organisational learning has been experiencing a revival, partly 
due to technological changes which have given rise to such concepts as “knowledge 
workers,” “knowledge intensive firms,” “learning company,” etc. (see Blackler [1995]), and 
partly due to the concept of “core competence” as the basis for competitive advantage 
(Prahalad–Hamel [1990]), as well as for a new theoretical approach to organisations, the so-
called resource-based theory of the firm (see Edmondson–Moingeon [1996], Spender [1996a 
and 1996b]). 
Many of the most influential and popular work in this vein was done with 
“interventionist purposes.” Chris Argyris’s well-known cognitive psychology approach 
represents one type of interventionist research with the individual as the unit of analysis 
(Argyris–Schön [1978], Argyris [1992 and 1996]). Argyris–Schön [1978] developed the 
influential concepts of “single- and double-loop learning.” Single-loop learning involves the 
detection and correction of an error without forcing the organisation to change its present 
policies or its present objectives; double-loop learning occurs when an error is detected and 
corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organisation’s underlying norms, 
policies and objectives.  
Another influential account of organisational learning was developed by Stanford’s 
leading organisational researcher, James March (Lewitt–March [1988], March [1991], 
Levinthal–March [1993]). In contrast to Argyris’s research, March’s work represents a 
descriptive approach at the organisational level. Explanations of organisational behaviour are 
based on organisational routines such as forms, rules, procedures, strategies, norms and 
beliefs, all of which are primarily constituted by the interpretations of past organisational 
actions and events, rather than by future strategies and visions. All kinds of organisational 
experiences are, over time, encoded in organisational routines and, as such, become 
independent from the knowledge and experience of particular organisational members and 
therefore, also appropriable by new members of a given organisation. These routines direct 
the behaviour of organisational members and the whole organisation in question. Thus, March 
conceptualises organisational learning as an adaptive process which basically has two distinct 
forms: “exploitation” of old certainties and “exploration” of new possibilities. 
 
“The essence of exploitation is the refinement and extension of existing competencies, 
technologies and paradigms. Its returns are positive, proximate, and predictable. The 
 53
essence of exploration is experimentation with new alternatives. Its returns are 
uncertain, distant and often negative.” (March [1991], p. 85) 
 
Consequently, adaptive processes typically improve exploitation more quickly than 
exploration; and the tendency of favouring exploitation over exploration, in the long run, may 
be potentially self-destructive.  Thus, maintaining a balance between the two forms of 
adaptive processes is essential for the survival of an organisation (March [1991]). 
 
There seems to be quite a natural theoretical connection between the approach of 
organisational learning and the interpretation of corporate greening as organisational change. 
Particularly, the approaches to organisational learning represented by Argyris and March are 
well-tuned to be fruitfully transferred to the substantive research theme of corporate greening 
(see Post–Altman [1994], Neale [1997], Banerjee [1998], Vickers–Cordey-Hayes [1999]). 
The “Post–Altman corporate greening model” (Post–Altman [1994]) depicts three phases 
or stages of organisational change and learning in a developmental order: 
 
1. Adjustment, 
2. Adaptation and Anticipation; and 
3. Innovation. 
 
Companies in the first phase of adjustment are compliance-oriented and organisational change 
is reactive and incremental: primarily single-loop learning takes place. In the transition phase 
from adjustment to the second developmental stage of adaptation/anticipation, firms are 
“getting on the learning curve” (p. 72), begin to question “old assumptions” and 
organisational learning is more and more double-loop in character. Very few companies have 
reached the third stage of environmental progress; that is, innovation. Organisations in this 
last phase have undergone a thorough re-evaluation of their structure, culture, and core 
business activities with regard to the ideal of sustainable development, and have also 
institutionalised environmental concerns in all parts of the firm. Ultimately, corporate 
greening results in a culture change, according to Post–Altman [1994], since “sound 
environmental management affects assumptions about basic business practices” (p. 77). 
However, transitions on the “corporate greening curve” are made difficult by industry as well 
as organisational barriers to change (including, for example, capital costs, regulatory 
constraints, technical knowledge as well as attitudes of personnel, quality of communication, 
etc. – op. cit., pp. 66–69). 
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Banerjee [1998] presents a model of environmental learning process: 
 
“a process by which organizations learn to integrate environmental issues with their 
business activity.” (p. 150) 
 
An environmental learning process may be triggered by several inputs, such as top 
management commitment, legislation, public concern, and/or need for competitive advantage 
(pp. 150–154). Organisational actions characterising an environmental learning process can 
differ in the sense that they are either single-loop or double-loop in character. Banerjee 
provides a dichotomy of actions entailing either single- or double-loop learning (such as short 
term versus long term goal setting, compliance versus anticipation, functional focus versus 
integration, compartmentalization versus boundary-spanning, maintenance versus 
transformatory support, or limited training versus organization-wide training) (pp. 154–158). 
The dichotomy runs through the consequences of environmental learning, in the sense that 
single-loop organisational actions may result in no significant competitive advantage, little 
change in corporate image, no building of cooperative alliances, and no substantive change in 
organisational culture. In contrast, double-loop environmental learning processes might lead 
to enhanced competitive advantage and corporate image, the building of cooperative alliances 
with stakeholders, and, due to “unlearning” previously established organisational routines, a 
change in organisational culture: 
 
“Thus, in the double-loop environmental learning case, environmentalism tends to be 
embedded in organisational memory rather than in individual or group memory, which 
would be the case in a single-loop context.” (Banerjee [1998], p. 160) 
 
In this sense, many of the often cited success stories of corporate greening seem to 
involve only single-loop learning lacking any ecologically radical re-valuation and re-
direction of core business activities. Take as an example, the case of McDonald’s Corporation 
and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) (Prince–Denison [1992]). In 1990, EDF and 
McDonald’s launched a collaborative project to search for ways to reduce the company’s 
solid waste. Their joint task force managed to institutionalise a new corporate-wide 
environmental policy with a focus on waste reduction and action plans targeting all levels of 
the company (42 initiatives in the areas of source reduction, reuse, recycling and composting). 
The waste reduction efforts during 1991 and 1992 resulted in cutting the waste at McDonald’s 
8,500 restaurants by more than 80 percent. Obviously, McDonald’s made a great step in 
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integrating waste reduction criteria into its standard operating procedures, into its day-to-day 
business practices. As the case is described by Prince and Denison, however, it seems at least 
controversial to depict these changes as a form of double-loop learning by institutionalising a 
new environmental ethic. It may be less disputable to interpret this case as one where, faced 
with increasing external (in this case, consumer) pressure towards greening, the company 
realised that to be considered responsive does not require fundamental changes in its core 
activities nor a fundamental reflection on them. Moreover, while as a leader in its industry, 
McDonald’s consciousness about waste problems might have a positive spill-over effect, it 
seems also clear that it hardly questions the existing ‘industry recipe’ (interpretive 
framework) of the fast-food industry. In other words, while the image of McDonald’s may 
well have changed positively, its identity, on the contrary, seems to remain unchanged (cf. 
Dutton–Dukerich [1991]). 
Nevertheless, it would be very misleading to stop here in the analysis. There are some 
interesting or even striking features in the McDonald’s case. If we can speak about learning to 
be more environmentally friendly in the case of McDonald’s, it would not be a simple case of 
internal exploitative or single-loop learning because the learning process involved and built 
upon the cooperation of an outside organisation, in this case an environmental NGO. It can be 
argued that organisational learning is not only the business of or challenge for a single 
organisation, but the entire institutional environment. Shifting environmental management 
paradigms via questioning both the “why and how” of business activities can only be 
understood by taking into account contextual/situational factors, such as the potential roles of 
different stakeholders, managerial perceptions and attitudes, and the possible influence of the 
immediate as well as the broader economic and social environment (see among others Halme 
[1996], Neale [1997]). 
In this sense, Neale argues that the capacity of learning is not enough on its own to help 
an organisation to become more ecologically sustainable.  
 
“Inwardly focused organisational learning ... can generate environmental innovation, 
but there is the danger of groupthink, and options which require collaboration with 
other organisations, or sensitivity to wider concerns, may be rejected.” (Neale [1997], 
p. 95 – emphasis added) 
 
Neale establishes his point by analysing the case of Brent Spar, where Shell UK’s “defensive 
routines,” i.e. its insensitivity to issues wider than pure technological and engineering ones, 
and beyond the UK context, lead to a remarkable loss for the Shell Group. For double-loop 
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learning to be realised, political processes played a central and facilitating role in the form of 
NGO and peer pressure, and consumer boycotts.3 Consequently, organisational learning is not 
only an internal concern for a given organisation, but for a whole institutional environment. 
 
However, it is striking that while organisational learning concepts have become very 
popular in the field of corporate environmental management, the majority of analyses do not 
employ the full range of arguments, terms, and techniques available. Particularly, the 
concepts related to failures and “dead-ends” of learning developed by Argyris as well as 
March are surprisingly missing from the research tradition of corporate greening.  
Argyris’s research and consultancy work in companies demonstrated the great 
difficulties of double-loop learning: individuals usually demonstrate a firm defensive stance 
(reasoning) against questioning the underlying premises of their actions. Individuals espouse 
a theory of action which is different from their tacit “theory-in-use,” rooted in and supported 
by organisational and/or societal cultures; and, in almost all cases these theories-in-use are 
counterproductive for double-loop learning (Argyris–Schön [1978]). At worst, this may result 
in individuals’ “skilled incompetence” (Argyris [1996]): in a turbulent business environment 
they use routine behaviour (skill) to produce what they do not intend (incompetence) and 
“leave organisations paralysed by ‘defensive routines’ ” (Edmondson [1996]). 
Levinthal–March [1993] underline the fact that “[l]earning has its own traps:” the short 
run is privileged over the long run (“temporal myopia”); there is a tendency to ignore the 
larger picture (“spatial myopia”); and, a tendency to overlook failures and learn only from 
organisational successes (“failure myopia”). Thus, there will be less incentive for 
experimenting with new technologies and paradigms. It is also noteworthy for our purposes 
here, that Levinthal and March point out another source of inflexibility and failure to learn; 
namely, that the processes of interpreting organisational experience and history and of 
encoding them into organisational routines are inherently political – these are processes by 
which organisational politics is being institutionalised. 
In order to avoid being captured by defensive routines and the self-destructiveness of 
exploitation of old routines, some “unlearning” may well be needed on the part of both 
individuals and organisations. 
 
“Knowledge grows, and simultaneously it becomes obsolete as reality changes. 
                                                          
3 See Simmons–Wynne [1993] for a similar finding in the case of the chemical sector’s Responsible Care 
programme. 
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Understanding involves both learning new knowledge and discarding obsolete and 
misleading knowledge. The discarding activity – unlearning – is as important a part of 
understanding as is adding new knowledge. In fact, it seems as if slow unlearning is a 
crucial weakness of many organizations.” (Hedberg [1981] cited in Dodgson [1993], 
p. 385–386) 
 
All of the above mentioned theorists seem to argue that new learning is rare since 
organisations are overwhelmingly characterised by the dominance of single-loop learning, the 
strive for efficient exploitation of existing knowledge and competencies (Hendry [1996]). 
Moreover, forgetting or unlearning existing interpretive frameworks seems to be a crucial step 
towards true learning which is, eventually, disruptive and stands in contrast with organising, 
affirming the oxymoron-like nature of organisational learning (Weick–Westley [1996]). 
 
There is another line of reasoning within organisational learning literature which might 
be applied fruitfully to corporate environmental issues: inter-organisational learning or the 
spread of environmental learning throughout an organisational field. Levitt–March [1988] 
emphasises the possibilities of learning from the experience of others; that is, inter-
organisational learning. Applying a metaphor from the epidemiology of disease, they separate 
three mechanisms for knowledge diffusion which basically correspond to the coercive, 
mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures operating in organisational fields as described 
by DiMaggio and Powell [1983]. Organisational examples, respectively, can include best 
available technology (BAT) rules promulgated by government environmental agencies; the 
ISO 14001 environmental management standard diffused mainly by environmental consulting 
firms and by buyer-supplier contacts among organisations; and, professional codes of conduct 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce’s sustainability principles. 
If inter-organisational learning is possible, isomorphic pressures are not only manifested 
in organisational structures and standard procedures but at the level of cognitive structures as 
well. Organisations populating an organisational field, will therefore tend to apply the same 
“industry recipe” (Spender [1989]) to a given problem and even competing organisations will 
belong to the same “cognitive community” (Porac–Howard–Baden-Fuller [1989]). 
Consequently, the myopia of learning, a defensive stance, as well as the absence of double-
loop learning can also be detected at the sectoral level. 
 
Finally, the empirical research and theoretical implications presented by Vickers and 
Cordey-Hayes [1999] seems to be of high relevance. Based on their field work with thirteen 
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British manufacturing companies, they analyse the character, strengths and limitations of 
organisational learning towards implementing cleaner production. Four key drivers of 
learning to adopt cleaner technologies are isolated: regulation, green market pressures (“green 
consumers”), quality and technical efficiency considerations, and organisational culture and 
values. Their understanding of the concept of learning has two key features: learning is an 
interactive (i.e., social) and practice-based process. Vickers and Cordey-Hayes differentiate 
four types of learning effects: 
 
• “Learning by doing as a result of optimization of the production process; 
• Learning by interacting as a result of contacts between supplier and 
contractor, or other external sources of knowledge and expertise; 
• Learning by using as a result of feedback from users; and 
• Learning by learning where organizations develop the ability to be reflexive” 
(op. cit., p. 77 – emphasis in original) 
 
Note that the relatively richer concept of learning employed by Vickers–Cordey-Hayes 
[1999] directs attention beyond firm-based organisational learning to the need for a wider 
process of social learning. Firm-based organisational learning is inevitably linked, or interacts 
with, results and processes of social learning embedded in environmental regulation as well as 
policy-making and learning on the demand side, to change consumption patterns which 
involve excessive material and energy throughput and, therefore, environmental disruption. 
The dangers in primarily inwardly focused (i.e., firm-based) organisational learning are 
explored and pointed out by the authors with regard to the popular concepts and practices of 
lean production and total quality management (TQM). Their field research demonstrates that, 
in contrast to the alleged “philosophy’” of these techniques, no real increase in employee 
empowerment and involvement – that is, a participatory organisation-wide environmental 
learning – usually takes place.  Rather, one finds growing managerial (top-down) control and 
sometimes even worsening worker health and safety conditions (op. cit., p. 85).  It should also 
be emphasised that lean production as well as TQM (or TQEM) do not involve a re-
evaluation of basic technologies and products (i. e. double-loop learning), but instead focus 
on improving the efficiency of existing systems (single-loop learning).  
A practice-based and social/interactive concept of learning moves the analysis beyond 
the theories of organisational learning mentioned above (that of Argyris and March) and links 
corporate greening with other streams of organisational learning literature. This different 
research stream seeks to classify different types of organisational knowledge and knowledge-
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creating processes; consequently, complementing and pointing to some limitations of that 
given above.  From this perspective, it is obvious that for instance, Argyris only deals with 
“embrained knowledge,” knowledge that is dependent on conceptual skills and cognitive 
abilities (abstract or propositional knowledge; “knowledge what”), while March’s research 
features “embedded knowledge,” which resides in organisational routines.4 This line of 
research conceptualises learning as a socially constructed understanding emerging from social 
practice (Brown-Duguid [1991], Lave [1993], Lave–Wenger [1993], Spender [1996], Tsoukas 
[1996]). Since learning is featured as a dimension of social practice, it is situated in time, 
space and a particular context; constructed and constantly developing, therefore, is 
provisional; becomes connected with language and technology as mediators of knowledge;  is 
connected with the object of activities; and, is infused by relations of power and domination 
(Blackler [1995]). This conceptualisation of organisational learning moves beyond 
interpreting corporate greening as organisational change and extends its perspective to wider 
issues of social-political change (a theme of the next chapter of interpreting corporate 
greening as institutional change). 
 
3.3. Corporate Greening as Technological Change 
 
To the question of what is changing by corporate greening, one widely held response is 
technology, since the choice of technology constitutes a strategic variable that fundamentally 
changes environmental impacts, risks and production costs for industrial firms. In other 
words, corporate greening may be interpreted as technological change. 
Shrivastava [1995b] separates five “environmental technology themes:” 
 
1. Design for disassembly; 
2. Manufacturing for the environment; 
3. Total quality environmental management; 
4. Industrial ecosystems; and, 
5. Technology assessment (p. 186). 
 
 
In the spirit of Porter’s win-win perspective, he argues that the development and application 
                                                          
4 Reviewing the literature, Blackler [1995] separates three other images of organisational knowledge: “embodied 
knowledge,” which is action oriented and likely to be partly explicit (‘knowledge how’); “encultured 
knowledge,” referring to the process of achieving shared understandings; and “encoded knowledge,” which is 
information conveyed by signs and symbols.  
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of any of the environmental technologies above are beneficial to the value chain and, thus, 
provide sustainable competitive advantage. 
Florida [1996] reports the analysis of a survey among U. S. manufacturing firms. It is 
argued that environmental leaders apply so-called bundles of environmental and industrial 
technologies (i.e., advanced manufacturing techniques, green design, etc.) and integrate 
environmental considerations into technology development and modernisation. Moreover, 
Florida takes issue with Porter’s perspective on the ‘environment–competitiveness’ debate 
(Porter [1991], Porter–van der Linde [1995a] and [1995b]): 
 
“In contrast to the win-win perspective, the rather straightforward hypothesis 
presented here is that firms that are innovative and adopt advanced manufacturing 
practices can simultaneously realize improvements in productivity and environmental 
performance. In other words, environmental improvements to some extent flow from 
broader corporate efforts to innovate and implement new and more efficient 
manufacturing systems and practices.” (Florida [1996], p. 81) 
 
The fundamental argument advanced here is that industrial firms adopting advanced 
manufacturing techniques will enjoy positive spill-over effects in terms of environmental 
improvement. In contrast to Porter’s reasoning, Florida [1996] seems to be persuaded that 
some “autonomous mechanisms” of technological development lead in the direction of less 
environmental pollution. The possibility of technological development implying more 
environmental burden is not even considered. 
Perhaps the most radical and promising approach to corporate greening as technological 
change is industrial ecology (see Richards–Allenby–Frost [1994],  Erkman [1997], Den Hond 
[2000], among others). There is no unified theoretical model underlying the approach of 
industrial ecology, though it is possible to find its core message.5 According to industrial 
ecology, future industrial systems should change the currently dominating linear production 
and operations systems to ones with closed material cycles which imitate the functioning of 
ecosystems. Consequently, there should be a move from end-of-pipe environmental 
management toward pollution prevention that includes a holistic approach (in contrast to a 
reductionist approach which treats different environmental media separately). The basic 
components of industrial ecology are as follows: 
 
1. Improving metabolic pathways (see Ayres [1994]) for materials use and industrial 
                                                          
5 Den Hond [2000] presents a detailed analysis of industrial ecology as a vision for a sustainable future, as an 
emerging interdisciplinary research field and as a source of inspiration for practical work. 
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processes  (materials and energy efficiency); 
2. Creating loop-closing industrial practices (zero waste); 
3. Dematerialising industrial output; 
4. Systematising patterns of energy use;  
5. Balancing industrial input and output to natural ecosystem capacity;  
6. Aligning policy to conform with long-term industrial system evolution; and, 
7. Creating new action-coordinating structures, communicative linkages, and 
information (O’Rourke–Connelly–Koshland [1996], pp. 3–4). 
 
The often cited, almost “paradigmatic” example of industrial ecology is the industrial 
symbiosis of Kalundborg, Denmark. A group of companies cooperates in order to eliminate 
industrial wastes by using each others’ waste flows as inputs for production processes. At the 
centre of this industrial ecology experiment is the coal-fired Asnaes power plant. The used 
steam of the power plant is bought by an enzyme plant and an oil refinery; surplus heat is 
supplied to the city and a fishery; fly ash is sold to a cement factory and high-sulphur gas 
emissions constitute a useful input to the operations of a sulphuric acid plant. Pollutants rich 
in limestone residue removed from the smokestacks of the power plant are sold to a wallboard 
plant. The oil refinery, in turn, provides the power plant with treated wastewater for cooling 
and also supplies desulphurised gas to burn, saving thousands of tons of coal. Local farms use 
wastes from the fishery and enzyme plant as fertilizers. The whole system optimises and 
reduces materials and energy use as well as pollution emissions, while economising on 
production costs for all companies involved in this network of industrial ecology (see 
Shrivastava [1995a], pp. 127–129 and [1995b], p. 188). 
So far there is no clearcut evidence as to whether industrial ecology will be able to 
radically transform standard industrial systems, or if it will only contribute to improving the 
efficiency of materials and energy use. O’Rourke and co-authors [1996] argue that the current 
theory (as well as the limited practice) of industrial ecology mainly focuses upon the 
adjustment of information and price distortions; that is, the internalisation of externalities. 
The “paradigmatic” tool for taking environmental information into account is design for 
environment (DfE – see Allenby [1994]).  Emphasising “the right prices” is of course the 
well-known logic of standard economic theory (see Kerekes [1993]). O’Rourke et al. [1996] 
persuasively argue that the transformative nature of industrial ecology is weakened by 
arguments based on “right prices” and “complete information.”  Neither the application of 
DfE, nor the approach of internalising externalities, set the problem at the level of 
technological regimes; rather, they focus on the level of single technologies or techniques. To 
put it more sharply: industrial ecology seems to suffer from too narrow a technological 
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approach, leaving intact the social and political embeddedness of technological decisions. The 
bundle of techniques of industrial ecology should be deployed or evaluated within a broader 
perspective (the one later herein called a “co-evolutionary” approach; see next chapter). 
Without taking seriously the socio-political element, industrial ecology might support the 
status quo by freezing relatively less polluting technologies at one point in time and, 
simultaneously blocking the way for more radical innovations in the longer term. O’Rourke 
and co-authors warn us against the possibility – not excluded by an industrial ecology 
approach – of a materially closed, ‘super-ecoefficient’ but still throw-away civilisation (op. 
cit., p. 19). In order to avoid this, industrial ecology should thoroughly examine the socio-
political embeddedness of technological options.  
 
3.4. Corporate Greening as Cultural Change 
 
Another approach applied widely by researchers of corporate greening considers the 
process as a substantive change in organisational culture. Some authors also express the need 
for a society-wide value change towards environmental consciousness or responsibility. For 
example, Shrivastava [1995a] points out that the “management paradigm” valid for a post-
industrial society is different from the one dominant today: our “risk society” requires an 
“eco-centric management paradigm.” According to Shrivastava, the dominant management 
paradigm has castrated the natural environment from organisation studies and, therefore, it is 
unsuitable to help corporate greening in practice, as well as in theory. The problem with the 
dominant management paradigm lies in its promoting unlimited increase in production and 
consumption, its myopic and narrow financial perspective, and its extremely anthropocentric 
ideology and value orientation (Shrivastava [1995a], pp. 125–127). 
There seems to be widespread agreement within the approach to corporate greening as 
cultural change that organisational culture constitutes the deepest level of strategy, structure, 
and procedures (Dodge [1997], p. 107), and that greening organisational culture is a third-
order (or discontinuous) change (Jones–Welford [1997], p. 130). An environmentally 
conscious organisational culture serves as “glue” which sticks the different elements and 
mechanisms of corporate greening together (Dodge [1997], p. 109). 
But how does cultural change start and what sorts of processes are set in motion? Halme 
[1997] presents the following substantive elements and phases of an environmental culture 
change: 
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1. Internal or external trigger for change; 
2. Resistance to, denial or rejection of environmental demands; 
3. Hesitancy, distrust in prevailing procedures; 
4. Unfreezing of old assumptions which exclude environmental considerations from 
business decision-making and operations; 
5. Unlearning old knowledge and assumptions and learning new ones; 
6. Competition between old and newly emerging knowledge regarding the 
environment and business; 
7. Illumination: new understanding concerning the business-environment 
relationship becomes acceptable; and, 
8. Consolidation of the environmental principles and practices into the organisational 
culture (Halme [1997], p. 85). 
 
All the authors in this research tradition agree upon the need for a planned change in 
organisational culture. A ‘green culture change programme’ should cover and spread all 
levels of organisational culture from the most tangible elements, structure, processes and 
symbols, to espoused values as well as tacit basic assumptions. Starting change requires an 
external trigger which, at the same time, should meet an internal (organisational) demand as 
well as capability for implementation. Processes of change – as Halme [1997] explains – do 
not start in parallel and flow all over the organisation (p. 82). There are core actors in a 
change process who start and initiate it throughout the organisation. This person or group of 
persons becomes “the champion of greening” (change agent) within the organisation in 
question. 
Most of the commentators argue that a change agent should reside in top position where 
s/he may be able to start the change process and manage and implement it by assuming a 
“cultural engineering” role. Top managers have the responsibility to develop and carry out a 
planned programme of organisational culture change and, by implication, environmentally 
sound attitudes and values ‘trickle down’ from the top to the bottom of the organisational 
hierarchy, fully permeating the whole organisation as well as all employees. The desired 
result is a “strong” environmentally conscious organisational culture that leads to competitive 
advantage, as the “excellence” literature on business management would predict and 
prescribe.  
Other authors, including Halme [1997], assert that a change agent of corporate greening 
might belong to middle or lower management, but everyone agrees that a culture change 
programme would only be successful if it gains the moral and financial support of top 
management.  For a change agent to be effective, s/he must have a formal organisational 
position with authority, but will also need professional and political skills for persuading 
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other organisational members to take her/his side (or follow her/his lead). The only way to 
reach “greening” goals is to engage others (the majority) by particular actions and emotions, 
providing for opportunities for others to gain their own experience. This is of particular 
importance to legitimise greening within the day-to-day organisational discourse, where 
symbols and organisational history play key roles. If elements or events of organisational 
history might be used to justify greening, powerful arguments are constructed against the 
opposition of change. Any efforts toward greening are obviously destined to fail if they 
require organisational members to perceive all actions and routines of the past as having been 
completely wrong for environmental reasons (Halme [1997], p. 88). 
Researchers arguing for corporate greening as a cultural change agree that hierarchical, 
mechanistic organisational structures are badly suited for greening in comparison to flatter 
organisational hierarchies (Halme [1997]; Jones–Welford [1997]). Furthermore, Jones and 
Welford underline the need for a democratic, egalitarian, creative and participatory cultural 
programme for organisational greening that influences all the core elements and 
characteristics of an organisation (op. cit., p. 128). 
 
Crane [1995] presents a well-argued critique of the “cultural engineering” approach 
presented above and that is dominant in the interpretation of corporate greening as cultural 
change. The main problem lies in the view of organisational culture being unified and 
homogeneous in nature (in Martin [1992]’s terms: an integrationist perspective). There is no 
place in the above analysis for differing subcultures overlapping each other within the 
organisation that are typically partly in harmony and partly in conflict with each other (i.e., a 
fragmented organisational culture).  Avoidance of the fragmented nature of organisational 
culture leads to analytical blindness of extant power relations, which at worst results in not 
recognising within a planned “green” culture change programme that is initiated from the top 
of the hierarchy, a danger of dominance and “mind control” that clearly hurts individual 
moral integrity. Crane – following Smircich [1983] and Martin [1992] – instead 
conceptualises organisations as culture or a particular cultural phenomenon (instead of 
speaking of organisations having culture). This change in theoretical perspective means that 
corporate greening is interpreted as an institutional change; that is, the analysis will be 
sensitive to the embeddedness of a particular organisation under review in wider cultural 
phenomena or institutions. The main issue then becomes the nature of interactions through 
which organisational members, organisations, and their institutional environment construct 
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the problem and understanding of corporate greening. However, this belongs to the theme of 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CORPORATE GREENING AS INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 
 
4.1. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACHES TO CORPORATE 
GREENING 
 
Describing the process that greening of business entails, one should not loose sight of the 
importance of external factors nor the dynamic interrelatedness of external and internal ones. 
If one would like to account for these factors and processes, it is necessary to move towards 
the view of learning as embedded in activity systems and knowledge, or knowing, as practice. 
One of the first problems that one confronts would be the problem of the relationship between 
(pro-environmental) attitudes and behaviour. In Argyris’s [1992] terms: are our espoused 
theories are in line with our theories-in-use? Bebbington–Gray–Thomson–Walters’ [1994] 
study on the attitudes and practices of corporate accountants provides a good example of the 
importance of this issue. Based on extensive empirical research, they found that, while 
accounting professionals in general express a positive attitude towards environmental 
stewardship, the knowledge of environmental accounting is widely available and senior 
accountants are usually to be found as part of the senior management team of a corporation 
(that is, they seem to have enough organisational power to initiate experiments in 
environmental accounting), the majority of accountants are not responding to the 
environmental agenda, the level of their involvement is not high. The survey method only 
allowed them to draw the ambiguous conclusion that 
 
“… accountants themselves are somehow unable to respond to the environmental 
agenda despite their apparent willingness to do so.” (op. cit., p. 116) 
 
These findings highlight the importance of studying the internal dynamics of corporate 
greening as determined by the attitudes, emotions, values, perceptions, and knowledge of 
internal stakeholders (managers as well as employees). This line of enquiry has recently taken 
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up by some researchers. Minette Drumwright pioneered a study on firms characterised by 
socially (environmentally) responsible purchasing policy (Drumwright [1994]). She attempted 
to develop a framework for categorising and describing the organisational contexts within 
which socially responsible buying initiatives occurred (op. cit., p. 4). Two types of 
organisational players were identified – “policy entrepreneurs” and “converters” – who had a 
role in initiating, diffusing and maintaining the establishment of non-economic, 
environmentally conscious, buying criteria for conducting purchasing policy. Drumwright’s 
policy entrepreneurs have striking similarities to Everett–Mack–Oresick’s [1993] “principled 
risk taker” executives: they both demonstrate self-consistency and personal efficacy. They are 
characterised by “harmony between personal values and business behaviour” (Everett et al., 
op. cit., p. 67), consciously refusing double-standards, and “bringing up uncomfortable issues 
that pricked the corporate social conscience and often irritated superiors and co-workers” 
(Drumwright, op. cit., p. 4). Policy entrepreneurs show high personal commitment and justify 
their decision by complex moral reasoning and invoking universal values, framing the 
problems and opportunities with regard to purchasing decisions as ethical dilemmas. Policy 
entrepreneurs are characterised by a highly developed sense of personal efficacy, of their 
personal power to affect matters. Their high degree of agency enables them “to diffuse their 
conviction and efforts throughout the organisation” and to cope with resisters and overcome 
operational problems (Drumwright, op. cit., p. 5). 
Beside policy entrepreneurs, the other typical players in the process of greening 
purchasing policy were converters, who initially felt “little if any affinity for the social 
dimensions” and they engaged in pro-environmental efforts mostly “because someone in 
authority made them to do so;” however, over time a new responsible behaviour “took,” and 
this change subsequently implied a change in attitudes and beliefs, which in turn “extended 
into the realm of moral reasoning and conviction,” as reported by the converters themselves 
(Drumwright, op. cit., p. 6). Policy entrepreneurs acted as “prime influencers,” not as 
decision-makers, and only through a collaborative problem-solving process, supported by 
their expert power and astute political skills, could they overcome the defensive mindsets and 
routines prevailing among relevant decision-makers.  
The other important findings of the study concern the context dependence of greening. 
Drumwright observed that greening proceeds more smoothly if it can be embedded in the 
historical context of the organisation (“founder’s ideals”), if it is supported by an existing 
participative management style and “a climate conducive to risk taking,” where there is a 
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possibility to fail without severe repercussions concerning ones career (op. cit., p. 14). If these 
supportive, internal contextual elements were partly or entirely lacking, pro-environmental 
changes tended to be incremental and issue-based, with few emotional connotations. 
Moreover, instead of framing environmentally conscious behaviour in explicit ethical terms, it 
was typically linked to the company’s success – at best, as “symbolic of the company’s good 
citizenship,” – forced by intense public scrutiny or regulation, or to “whatever their customer 
perceived it to mean” (op. cit., p. 8, 10). These cases reflected organisational cultures where 
every effort was evaluated from a strictly business perspective, i.e. translated to the bottom-
line, and requiring members to keep their personal convictions out of business decisions. 
Stephen Fineman’s series of studies (Fineman [1996] and [1997], Fineman–Clarke 
[1996]) further explore the emotional meanings attached by key organisational members to 
the process of greening, the narrative framing of environmental problems, and the managerial 
interpretation of stakeholder pressures towards greening. Reporting on a qualitative study of 
senior managers in six U. K. supermarkets (Fineman [1996]), it is striking to recognise the 
prevalence of the psychological mechanisms, as described by Albert Bandura [1991], by 
which managers disengage themselves from ordinary moral constraints advocated by green 
pressure groups. Among the eight mechanisms of moral disengagement identified by Bandura 
[1991], at least three are apparent in the managerial narratives of environmental issues. 
 
“… the ‘working’, or normative, ethics of these managers reflected a mixture of free 
market economics and utilitarian morality… the customer was reified as an 
unquestionable standard of correctness.” (Fineman [1996], p. 489) 
 
By invoking values (such as free economic enterprise and satisfaction of autonomous 
consumer desires) that carry a genuine moral force, managers are engaging in the process of 
moral justification, whereby their environmentally detrimental business conduct is made 
personally and socially acceptable. 
The morally disengaging mechanism of advantageous comparison is widespread among 
managers. Fineman cites many examples of managers’ comparing their own objective, 
scientific approach based on facts, with the campaigners’ “commercial naivety” and “too 
emotional” argumentation, characterised by “lack of balance” and “distortions,” because 
“they just don't know their facts” (Fineman–Clarke [1996], p. 719). Interpreting the activities 
of green pressure groups this way makes managers able and comfortable to question the 
capability and eventually the legitimacy of this stakeholder group to engage in any sensible 
 69
dialogue whatsoever. 
Managers also tend to disregard or distort the consequences of their companies’ poor 
environmental performance, electing to avoid facing the harms they cause or by minimising 
them, for example, with statements like  
 
“… there aren’t millions of dolphins being killed across the world....” (Fineman–
Clarke, op. cit., p. 719)  
 
Astonishingly, Fineman’s reporting that amongst the managers of the least green 
companies some were “raging against the green groups, diminishing them” and constructing 
“a self-protective meaning system which demonises those who challenge their right not to be 
green...” (Fineman [1996], p. 492). This demonstrates that managers can dangerously 
approach the moral disengagement mechanisms of dehumanisation. 
Another important theoretical contribution of Fineman’s studies is his analysis of the 
emotional embeddedness not only of greening in general but of its ethical foundations in 
particular, which, of course, is in line with the claims of feminist ethics (see Gilligan [1982]) 
and some of the psychological accounts of moral behaviour (see Hoffman [1995]). In this 
respect, Fineman found that the green commitment enacted by managers, even in the greenest 
companies, was a result of “corporate cultural engineering” rather than “a substantive sense of 
care or concern for others” (Fineman [1996]; cf. Crane [1995]). Beyond the narratives and 
rhetoric provided by organisational culture, managers approached environmental issues first 
by “re-framing and de-emotionalising” them and second, eventually translating them into 
“safe business language.”  More positively, Fineman and Clarke [1996] also observed that 
managers –  particularly in the chemical and power industries –  felt alongside their fears and 
foreboding of threats, admiration and respect towards green pressure groups that scrutinised 
their environmental performance. This interpretation legitimises environmental pressure 
groups acting as a “surrogate conscience,” voicing those feelings and moral considerations 
that would otherwise be absent within the world of business pragmatism that accommodates 
only the ethics of enlightened self-interest. In this sense, Fineman suggests  
 
“… the constructed moral culture in the greener companies is essentially a refinement 
of the traditional business one, not a transformation to a ‘true’ ecocentric one.” 
(Fineman [1996], p. 490) 
 
His studies provide us with an understanding of an important dimension, or criterion, of 
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greening business; namely, that it is necessary that 
 
“… actors have a ‘conscience’ with respect to their work actions; a felt sense of 
responsibility, triggered by guilt or shame, for the consequences of their actions.” 
(Fineman [1996], p. 480) 
 
Andrew Crane [1995] and [1997] seems to strengthen and add further contributions to 
the insights of Drumwright and Fineman. In his case study on a U.K. manufacturing and 
retailing firm (Crane [1997]), he focused on the construction of ethical meanings with regard 
to “marketing green,” yet one again confronts the prevalence of some of the above-mentioned 
moral disengagement mechanisms. Managers practice euphemistic labeling of 
environmentalists (in Crane’s terms, “distancing” themselves), coining expressions such as 
“the beads and braids brigade,” “the beard and sandals lot,” “the cranks” (Crane [1997], p. 
568). 
Managers continually compare themselves advantageously with environmentalists, 
contrasting their own “sober and professional, businesslike appearance and manner” and 
“rational, technical arguments” with the greens’ emotive and ethical ones. Crane [1997] 
depicts these mechanisms as image making constituting one type of management’s micro-
political manoeuvres in the process of confronting stakeholders’ environmental claims. 
Furthermore, as another micro-political manoeuvre, managers tend to avoid moral reflection 
and enact “a moral frame that effectively castrates the environment from ethical meanings” 
(op. cit., p. 570) Crane also points to managers’ reframing environmental problems as 
“normal” management issues demanding technical solutions (moral framing) and to their 
narrative tactics to normalise the greening process; for example, as a familiar total quality 
concern (narrative surfing). What is really manifest here is managerial efforts to preserve or 
manipulate existing power relations by de-moralising and commoditising the environment 
and/or “surfing” “various narratives as it is appropriate given the particular contextual and 
political exigencies of the situation” (op. cit., p. 572). 
In sum, it should be evident from the above studies, especially those of Drumwright, 
Fineman and Crane, that any attempts to understand and explain the process of learning to be 
a green business cannot take the individual organisation, or its key members, as the unit of 
analysis. Rather, if an analysis aims to capture the dynamics of agents and structures, as 
mutually constituting each other and embedded in socio-cultural practice, it should focus on 
the “socially-distributed activity systems,” (Egeström, cited in Blackler [1995]) or the 
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“institutionalised logic of managerial activity systems” (Räsänen–Meriläinen–Lovio [1995]) 
as its unit of analysis. This way, learning is accounted for as a dimension of every social 
practice, historically and culturally situated, involving power relations and infused with 
values, while knowledge is understood as a relational concept. The above studies, by 
reflecting in each case the socio-cultural (systemic) embeddedness of 
managerial/organisational actions therefore demonstrate the importance of picturing the 
whole person as an agent as well as a “person-in-community,” acting in and with the world 
(Lave–Wengers [1993]). 
 
4.2. Co-evolutionary Approaches to Corporate Greening 
 
The interpretation of corporate greening as technological change is blind to the socially 
constructed nature and institutional embeddedness of technological choices and technology 
itself.  As Kenneth Green and Ian Miles remind us:  
 
“[t]echnology does not stand outside society; it is the result of social choices 
concerning what knowledge should be developed [and t]he way in which technologies 
themselves are applied ... If technologies are ... a combination of things, human skills 
and organised knowledge, they involve an intimate intermingling of the physical 
world and the social world.” (Green–Miles [1996], p. 105) 
 
What does this more precisely mean? The concept of a “technological regime,” coined 
originally by Nelson and Winter [1982], is helpful in this context. Kemp–Schot–Hoogma 
[1998], in analysing which factors impede a shift to more sustainable transport technologies, 
define a technological regime as encompassing both a prevailing interpretative framework 
(the paradigmatic framework shared by a community of technological, economic and even 
political actors) and the embedding of technology in production and operations practices, 
plants, organisational routines, institutions and infrastructure (“the selection environment of 
technology”). Or, as Green and Miles phrase it: 
 
“... an industry’s technological regime is an institution … and it is not only a technical 
resource but a social, organisational, and knowledge resource as well.” (Green–Miles 
[1996], p. 132) 
 
Within a technological regime, engineers’ problem-solving activities are, thus, pre-
structured.  This structure does enable some technological improvements, for example, 
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different types of eco-efficiency-driven technological advances; however, it also constrains 
certain more radical changes, from the viewpoint of the core technological framework. 
On the part of technological and economic actors, Dosi [1988] points to the powerful 
operation of an “exclusion effect,” that is, “the efforts and the technological imagination of 
engineers or of organisations are focused in rather precise directions and blind with respect of 
other technological possibilities” (cited by Kemp et al. [1998], p. 176). These actors share a 
model for development, manifest in the so-called “dominant design,” which serves as a 
starting point for product and process improvements, and beliefs as to what consumers want 
(cf. Anderson–Tushman [1990]). 
Furthermore, in a series of papers presenting the history of wind and wave power 
research, development and demonstration (R,D&D) in Britain, as well as the exploitation of 
oil in the North Sea, Genus [1992], [1993a] and [1993b] unravels the extent to which 
technological regimes are also politically constructed. One of the main barriers preventing the 
progress in utilising renewable energy sources was, and still is, “pessimistic or subjective 
assessment” and perception manifest in “a number of myths” concerning the technical and 
economic potential of wind and wave power (such as that they are too costly, unreliable, are a 
small resource, the lack of commercial development proves the case against them, etc.). The 
prevailing interpretative scheme of the public administration machinery is well summarised 
by Genus: 
 
“Decision-makers... having got used to the large-scale developments of North Sea oil 
and nuclear energy, have located the technical issues with wind [and wave] energy 
within this dominant paradigm, thus marginalising its potential for smaller scale 
energy provision.” (Genus [1993a], p. 30) 
 
Clearly, these enacted pictures of a socio-politically constructed reality tend to “distort 
decision-makers capacity to learn about the improved construction of technology” (Genus, op. 
cit., p. 26) and “become a prison into which we are locked” (Westenholz [1993], p. 39). Or, as 
Argyris and Schön and March have long argued, only within the existing frame of reference 
can individuals and organisations learn (single-loop or exploitative learning). and they can 
hardly challenge the limits of these frameworks. Even when they can, let’s say, “think green” 
(i.e. they have ecologically informed “espoused theories”), it is by no means taken for granted 
that they will “act green” as well (i.e. develop ecologically conscious “theories-in-use”).  
Much too often, there is a gap between de-framing (unlearning) the previous frame of 
reference and organisational action (see Bebbington et al. [1994]; Drumwright [1994]; 
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Heiskanen–Pantzar [1997]; and Scherhorn [1993]). This problem is never discussed in the so-
called “cultural fix” approaches: they seem to assume a smooth and unhindered path from 
changes in value commitments, attitudes and thinking to changes in the course of actions 
taken.6 
Moreover, any analysis would be dangerously ignorant, and, unfortunately, an 
overwhelming segment of the organisational learning literature can be so characterised (cf. 
Blackler [1995]), if it cannot capture the politics of knowledge and knowing (Clegg–Palmer 
[1996]. A technological regime is inherently political in nature, since each innovation takes 
place in a “social niche” and not just a purely technological one: a social network emerges 
around a certain technological alternative (Verheul–Vergragt [1995]). This formation of a 
constituency behind a technology can, paradoxically, lead to serious constraints to as well as 
opportunities for the development and diffusion of more sustainable technologies. 
As to the barriers, for example, in British energy policy, the constituency of 
multinational firms, nuclear energy experts and public administrators has, as Genus [1993a] 
forcefully argues, promoted centralised, inflexible decision-making processes which excluded 
other relevant actors espousing more critical views. This resulted in the dominance of 
inflexible technologies that possess large unit size, require a long lead time, are highly capital 
intensive, dependent upon specialised infrastructure and, in the absence of some actors 
(stakeholders) with different commitments, favoured “groupthink” (cf. Neale [1997]). A 
similar phenomenon of exclusion was detected by Kristin Schrader-Frechette [1995] in the 
case of Yucca Mountain, where an “iron triangle” of industry, government and 
contractors/subcontractors promoted the siting of the world’s first permanent geological 
repository for high-level nuclear waste and spent fuel. The industry-government-contractor 
triad (“of co-operation, influence, persuasion, and money that is beyond the control of 
existing laws”), effectively dominated the public discourse and left “little room for 
consideration of ethical issues related to public safety, environmental welfare, and citizen 
consent to risk” (Schrader-Frechette op. cit., p. 754). The case of CFC phase-out is usually 
cited as a success story of international environmental cooperation involving multinational 
corporations, the analysis by Östlund and Larsson [1994] sheds some light on the pressures 
and processes operating within a tight industrial network towards institutionalising and 
legitimising minimal environmental compliance. Important emphasis should be placed on 
                                                          
6 See the environmental excellence literature in Chapter 2 and the interpretation of corporate greening as culture 
change in Chapter 3. 
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their finding that it is not necessarily conspiracy but rather an emergent systemic effect of 
individually rational firms attempting to reduce uncertainty and maximise profits, that 
eventually converged into a minimum effort level. In a tight industrial network, they pointed 
to the isomorphic pressures of coercion (by market/network dominating multinational 
corporations and government agencies) and imitation which hindered firms from finding 
solutions outside the established network and reinforced the institutionalisation of a 
homogeneous solution for substituting CFCs. Not surprisingly, providing an alternative 
technological option was taken by the initiative of an environmental NGO 
(Greenpeace/Germany) in collaboration with an academic institute and a firm standing at the 
edge of bankruptcy (Verheul–Vergragt [1995], pp. 316–317) – but this leads us to the 
“brighter” side of the issue. 
As to the opportunities for developing and diffusing more sustainable technologies, 
Verheul and Vergragt [1995] cites some examples of the processes of niche formation against 
the backdrop of existing technological regimes, such as the Greenfreeze refrigerator in 
Germany; small-scale wastewater treatment in Flanders; and, windmill co-operation in the 
Netherlands (see also Irwin–Georg–Vergragt [1994]) – to which we can surely add the so-
called “Community Shared Agriculture” (CSA) experiments (see Dyck [1994]). Verheul and 
Vergragt [1995] coined the term “social experiment” to conceptualise those kinds of bottom-
up environmental innovations which are taken not by industrial firms or government 
institutions but by different forms of civil self-organisation (citizen groups and environmental 
NGOs) on a smaller scale (op. cit., p. 315). In analysing these social expeiments, it becomes 
clear that something other than the market or bureaucratic institutional logic play a part.  As 
Verheul and Vergragt state,  
 
“… traditional market relations are not suitable for consumers to articulate this 
demand, or for producers to perceive it and adequately react to it.” (op. cit., p. 320)  
 
Furthermore, in these kind of social experiments 
 
“… traditional market relations are blurred, since products are developed or 
implemented in reaction to the needs of the network itself, and not a perceived 
opportunity on the market.” (op. cit., p. 320) 
 
The success of the Greenfreeze or of many CSA initiatives shows that a social 
experiment of developing more sustainable technologies can have a “catalytic function” for 
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broader adoption by responding to a demand latently existing in large parts of society. The 
initiators of these social experiments are typically taking the lead because of their value 
commitments. Indeed, as Verheul and Vergragt [1995] point out, social niches need some 
protection from the selection environment, in which a dominant technology is embedded; this 
protection, while in a typical industrial setting is made up on a cognitive level by expectations 
concerning the future profitability potential of the new technology, in these cases of 
sustainable technologies is based on the environmental awareness and value commitment of 
the actors involved. Though the role of individual value orientation is very important, its 
importance is inextricably linked to that of institutionalising a non-market and non-
bureaucratic logic of action. This enactment of a new institutional logic, in these cases a kind 
of civil self-organisation, requires changes in the social fabric; it also entails a process of 
institutional transformation as instilling with values (see Selznick [1996] and Scott [1987]), as 
well as empowering certain societal groups. However, the “cultural fix” argument has nothing 
to say about this inherent politic; the problem of domination and subordination in the 
currently “institutionalised logic of managerial action” (Räsänen–Meriläinen–Lovio [1995]) 
is not problematised at all. 
The problem of institutional embeddedness relates to the detailed discussion by Kemp, 
Schot, and Hoogma of a number of extra barriers to the utilisation of more sustainable 
technological alternatives (Kemp et al. [1998], pp. 177–180). There are technological factors, 
such as the existence of an infrastructure into which the new technology does not well fit; 
change may be required in a whole series of inter-related technologies; and, further 
development is needed in terms of user needs which, of course, requires actual use on a larger 
scale. Some economic factors also play a role, such as sunk investment costs in existing 
infrastructure and the problem of economies of scale, which make low-scale production 
relatively expensive as well as contribute to the problem of investment threshold value in 
infrastructure development. Cognitive factors may constitute quite strong barriers, such as the 
existence of a core technological framework restricting firms’ technological horizons and 
vision for focusing on problems posed by existing products and processes; prevailing 
uncertainty, often exacerbated by regulatory frameworks that do not evince a clear vision of 
the future and unfamiliarity of alternatives, which leaves consumers and producers unsure 
about what to expect and makes scepticism widespread beforehand. The new technology is 
judged on the basis of the characteristics of the dominant one, i.e. they “stay within their 
existing frame of reference and choose the environmental responses that confirm this frame of 
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reference” (Westenholz [1993], p. 38). Cultural factors are also at play, since the production 
and consumption of goods and services involve “the consumer and his or her social relations,” 
and “goods are not merely service-producing machines” but “also needs-producing machines” 
(Heiskanen–Pantzar [1997], p. 425); commodities may become “icons of modern life-styles 
or expression of social status;” and, “they influence the constitution of individual and social 
identities” (Kemp et al. [1998], p. 178). 
 
“These factors are interrelated and often reinforce each other.  What we have is... a 
structure of interrelated factors that feed back upon one another, the combined 
influence of which gives rise to inertia and specific patterns in the direction of 
technological change.” (Kemp et al. op. cit., p. 181) 
 
Hence, as the concept of technological regimes points out, the cognitive structure of a 
technological paradigm is embedded in broader technical systems, in established production 
practises and routines, supplier-user relationships, consumption patterns and institutional 
arrangements infused with values. Therefore, it is necessary to add a societal (or institutional) 
dimension to these cognitive structures operating at the individual, organisational as well as 
sectoral levels (Whittington [1992]). There is a process of institutionalisation that moves from 
cognition to taken for granted “templates of organising” (Greenwood–Hinings [1996]), to 
which it is typical that in the  
 
“... processes of technological innovation ... decisions about start, direction, branching 
and termination were taken in groups or networks that shared a certain common 
problem definition. These networks and these common problem definitions define 
each other... networks develop over time, responding to certain requirements relating 
to phases in the innovative processes. Networks grow, become more complex and 
eventually become latent structures that support an existing technology.” (Vergragt–
van Noort [1996], p. 172) 
 
Clearly, the implicit assumption of the “eco-efficiency argument” that technological 
development has something like an autonomous logic which determines what society can and 
cannot do, has far reaching consequences.7 This view restricts the possibility of double-loop 
learning (Argyris [1992]), or a cognitive paradoxical process (Westenholz [1993]) facilitated 
by the encounter of a plurality of perspectives, for bringing about change in the technological 
trajectories which we are locked in. Since this kind of “technological fix” approach has 
nothing to say about the institutional embeddedness of technological options, it consequently 
hides the social, ethical and political issues inherent in our ecological problems. Not 
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addressing this aspect of technology contributes to the widespread exclusion of other 
perspectives with a more critical stance. Hence, the development of collective learning 
capabilities are again severely constrained since learning will tend to be inwardly focused, 
leaving the organisation or sector/network vulnerable to groupthink. The problematic of 
organisational greening is thus inherently social and political in nature. 
 
4.3. Corporate Greening as Political-economic Change  
 
Levy and Rothenberg [1999], employing a case study approach, investigated the 
environmental strategies of two American and two European car manufacturing companies, 
with regard to how they are responding to the challenges posed by global climate change. 
Their analysis – in an institutionalist spirit – also covered other actors and processes of the 
particular organisational field (regulatory authorities, trade associations and scientific 
institutes, among others). The qualitative research they presented draws a rich and dynamic 
picture of the processes involved in environmental strategy-making and in constructing the 
problem of climate change and corporate responses to it. The authors point to some 
differences in corporate environmental strategies that are due to some salient features of the 
national organisational fields in question.  
Three theoretical perspectives inform the arguments advanced by Levy and Rothenberg 
[1999]: institutional organisational theory, an evolutionary perspective on technological 
development and the concept of integrated strategy expanded by a neo-Gramscian approach 
to socio-technical regimes (see pp. 3–4). Their concept of corporate environmental strategy is 
therefore significantly different from those discussed in Chapter 2. Based on institutionalist 
organisational studies, corporate strategy is conceptualised as embedded in institutional 
environments: 
 
“… strategic decisions are premised upon perceptions of economic interest which are 
constructed in an institutional context.” (Levy-Rothenberg [1999], p. 3) 
 
The second theoretical stream applied is the one discussed in this chapter above, as a co-
evolutionary perspective on corporate greening which: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
7 See the interpretation of corporate greening as technological change in Chapter 3. 
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“... locates corporate strategic decision-making in the context of complex social-
technological systems.” (Levy-Rothenberg [1999], p. 3) 
 
The third theoretical stream advances or radicalises the concept of integrated strategy as 
developed by Baron [1995], by emphasising the interaction of corporate political and product 
strategies, drawing from the neo-Gramscian literature. The latter argues that dominant and 
stable social-technological regimes rest on three pillars: 
 
1. “the economic and material base of profitable production and sales; 
2. the network of organisations operating within the system; and 
3. the discursive structure of meaning and symbolism, both cognitive and normative, 
that guides behavior and lends legitimacy to organisations and practices within the 
system.” (Levy-Rothenberg [1999],  p. 4) 
 
Thus, corporate strategy is integrated insofar as it rests on the three pillars above. This implies 
that corporate strategies focus not only on protecting specific products or markets, but also on 
a wider social-technological regime. A regime provides particular systematic advantages to 
the proper corporate strategies and, in this sense, every corporate strategy, including 
environmental strategy, is political. 
Scientific and (international) political debates with regard to global climate change have 
had an influence upon specific economic sectors, including automobile manufacturing. In the 
United States and Europe, institutional environments and corporate strategies as well as 
dynamic interactions differ in some respects, to a great extent, though they also influence 
each other. American automobile companies firstly employed a discursive strategy in the 
global climate change debate that involved a frontal attack on the science of climate change. 
This was by no means an accident since – as Levy–Rothenberg [1999] points out – a strategic 
reference to rigorous or objective science has always been a basic element of the “cognitive 
frame” of the American car industry. Climate change simulations fraught with contradictory, 
complex relations and inherently sensitive assumptions seemed to be an easy target in the 
eyes of American corporate managers. Soon, they established their lobbying organisation, the 
Global Climate Coalition (GCC), which joined forces with other business lobby groups in the 
debates over climate science. Their main rival or target in those debates has been an 
international association of climate scientists, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC). Levy and Rothenberg [1999] note that although active engagement in the scientific 
discussions was a strategic choice of the corporate lobby, this approach itself has been 
institutionalised and integrated into the value as well as meaning structure of the American 
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car industry (op. cit., p. 5). 
In contrast, managers of European automobile manufacturing firms argued that the 
strategy employed by the Americans could not even be considered as an option, since it 
would immediately de-legitimise all their interests in the EU. A manager of one European 
subsidiary of a US-based automobile firm recalled the difficulties in convincing his boss in 
Detroit not to attempt to debate the question of climate change science with EU officials: 
 
“It was an education process to get them on board. We had to explain that it’s not 
constructive to challenge the science in Europe, and if we want to influence the debate 
we cannot move back. Here, the IPCC reports are accepted without question by 
policymakers. We would be thrown out of the room if we challenged them.” (cited by 
Levy–Rothenberg [1999], p. 10) 
 
In Europe, strategic lobbying actions may be directed to regulatory bargaining in order to 
influence the timing and extent of emissions reductions legally required, by setting voluntary 
environmental improvement objectives. Consequently, European corporations have had no 
reason to employ legions of privately financed scientists to advance their interests like their 
American counterparts who have institutionalised this within their organisational field.  
One should further note the strategic importance of the difference on the demand side 
between these two geographical regions. Low fuel prices have acquired a taboo-like position 
in the US, thought to constitute part of “the American way of life” (i.e., extensive individual 
mobility). In contrast, European car manufacturers have been accustomed to regulatory forces 
and incentives, and to civil pressures and consumer demand toward developing and marketing 
more fuel-efficient automobiles of a smaller size. They have, consequently, gained 
competitive advantage in those markets.  
In the US, a “discursive coalition” was soon established – although not a lasting one – 
among the fossil fuel industry, climate change sceptic scientists and some key Republican 
Congresspersons (op. cit., p. 7).  At that time, the Republican-dominated U.S. Congress had 
constrained federal funding for climate research, which contributed to the prevalence of 
scientific uncertainties. Moreover, the Congress was also successful in limiting to a great 
extent the room for possible strategic undertakings by the Clinton administration, in relation 
to the Kyoto process. 
The Rio conference in 1992 was recalled as a milestone for the automobile industry by 
Levy and Rothenberg’s interviewees (op. cit. [1999]). It has established climate change as a 
strategic issue for the industry as a whole. At that time, new scientific results were published 
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that weakened the positions of climate change sceptics; many representative companies of 
other industries (such as the oil and chemical industries) have since announced that they 
accept the fact of global climate change induced by human economic activities and its 
relevance to the business sector. 
Returning to the issue of marketing low-emission vehicles, one notes a particular 
difference between the two geographic regions, North America and Europe, which has to do 
with their past experiences with research and development, as well as marketing efforts. One 
also notes that developing so-called eco-efficient (or zero emissions) automobiles amounts to 
investing in, or creating, future markets (as Hart [1997] discusses). US-based car 
manufacturers have experienced great failures (like that of the “electronic supercar” 
developed by General Motors). Levy–Rothenberg [1999] argue that product development for 
those future markets cannot be determined by an “objective” assessment of organisational 
strengths and weaknesses and current market position, but rather the institutional 
embeddedness of the firm in question (op. cit., p. 13).  The “cognitive map” of managers in 
the American automobile industry has proven to be much more ethnocentric than that of their 
European subsidiaries and competitors. This is manifest in the communication problem 
between Americans and Europeans mentioned above. 
At the same time, on the demand side, one might recognise the issue of social 
embeddedness of technological decisions discussed above by employing co-evolutionary 
approaches. According to market research done by car manufacturing companies, consumers 
were afraid of the limited range of electric vehicles compared to the range of gasoline-
powered cars. The market failure of VW Umwelt was an often-cited example of the 
importance of consumer expectations and driving habits. Volkswagen developed and 
attempted to introduce a car designed specifically for urban transport that was fuel efficient – 
in the sense that the engine automatically cuts in and out when the driver stops at a red sign 
and accelerates when it turns to green. However, as a marketing manager explained the failure 
of this design: 
 
“… customers didn’t like it because their heart stops beating when the engine stops.” (cited in 
Levy–Rothenberg [1999], p. 15) 
 
This new design characteristic was unfamiliar to consumers; it differed from the ‘dominant 
design’ to which they were accustomed; the cognitive limits posed by the habituated usage 
patterns hindered the learning of the new driving style; and, learning by using was not 
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practicable, because the design was so radically upsetting driving patterns. 
Levy–Rothenberg [1999] pointed out a significant difference between the cognitive map 
of the American and European automobile industry. American car manufacturing companies 
concentrate on consumers’ expectations – treating them as given – while their European 
counterparts claim that consumer demand might be changed; for example, consumers should 
be educated to accept and accommodate themselves to environmentally sound vehicles (op. 
cit., p. 15). The American automobile industry perceives and interprets the problem of 
emissions reduction as a question of technology development and does not even consider that 
a sustainable transportation system, as well as the development of cars in the future, might 
also require changes in mobility patterns, transport infrastructure, and the current social status 
or picture of the automobile (Levy–Rothenberg [1999]). 
After the international environmental agreements and negotiations in Rio (1992) and 
Kyoto (1997), the institutional context of climate change issues as they relate to industry has 
been significantly transformed. The fossil fuel industry has experienced a remarkable shift in 
the position of a number of corporations on the climate issue. One of the major signs of a 
different industrial approach was a speech by the CEO of British Petroleum at Stanford 
University, California, 19 May, 1997. In his speech, entitled Our Common Journey, John 
Browne advocated a precautionary approach to climate issues: 
 
“The time to consider the policy dimensions of climate change is not when the link 
between greenhouse gases and climate change is conclusively proven but when the 
possibility cannot be discounted, and is taken seriously by society… BP accepts that it 
has a responsibility to act.” (Browne [1997], pp. 19–20 – emphasis in original) 
 
The discursive coalition of climate change sceptics was disrupted. Another organisation, the 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change, has entered the scene to represent the interests of 
companies dissenting from the mainstream fossil fuel industry’s adversarial position toward 
the science of climate change (represented by GCC). The emergence of agents in the 
organisational field accepting and supporting the need for some precautionary action on 
greenhouse emissions has provided legitimacy and encouragement for automobile companies 
leaning in this direction (Levy–Rothenberg [1999], p. 19). 
Furthermore, the competitive dynamic of innovation has proved to also be influential in 
disrupting discursive coalitions. Levy and Rothenberg cite the commercial launch of Toyota’s 
hybrid electric–gasoline engine car in the Japanese market in 1998 and Daimler’s investment 
in a Canadian fuel cell company, as factors pushing other automobile companies to follow 
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their lead. These strategic moves by some of the competitors, “confer[s] legitimacy on the 
technology and creates pressure on the others to copy it” (Levy–Rothenberg [1999], p. 21). 
The turbulence in the organisational field due to the strategic challenge of climate issues also 
motivates corporate managers to take strategic moves in order to reduce uncertainty. 
Therefore, “discursive coalitions are incomplete, unstable and contingent affairs” (op. cit., p. 
19) and there is room for strategic actions, influencing the dominant socio-technological 
regime and, ultimately, change it. 
 
A number of critical analysis were published with regard to the greening of the chemical 
industry (see among others Simmons–Wynne [1993]; Tombs [1993]; and Hoffman [1999]). 
Tombs [1993] investigates environmental strategies prevalent in the British chemical sector, 
while Simmons and Wynne [1993] analyse the operation and implementation of the world-
wide voluntary environmental initiative of the global chemical industry, called Responsible 
Care and, perhaps surprisingly, both of them reach similar conclusions. The main issue, from 
the point of view of the global chemical industry, is to regain and maintain public trust and 
legitimacy. However, chemical firms employ different self-protective techniques embedded in 
the sectoral cognitive frame that hinder the development of a dialogue between equals; that is, 
between the companies and stakeholders who perceive themselves as suffering, to some 
extent, from pollution caused by the industry. Chemical firms typically refuse to accept the 
harmfulness or toxicity of pollutants emitted, claiming to be in control of environmental 
performance. The problem instead, as the firms see it, lies in the ignorance of the lay public, 
including environmentalists, with regard to the scientific “facts” of pollution performance. 
The chemical sector treats the issue of legitimacy or credibility as a rational, i. e. scientific, 
discourse, as opposed to an emotionally loaded one. They argue that since the public is 
incapable of comprehending the science of chemistry, public perception and judgement of the 
chemical sector as environmentally harmful and risky are unfair and unfounded. Tombs 
[1993] can therefore separate a typical environmental strategy posture among chemical 
companies whose essence or logic is “blaming the victim.” For example, managers of 
chemical firms typically reject responsibility for toxic spills or industrial accidents, by 
blaming some employees or customers of ignoring detailed plant safety regulations or user 
directions. The problem, they argue, always lies with the so-called “human factor,” not with 
the inherently risky operations of a chemical production system. Therefore, chemical firms 
typically argue for solutions to educate the public technically and scientifically, and to 
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provide them with more technical information about chemical operations and possible risks 
(op. cit., pp. 135–137). As Simmons–Wynne [1993] aptly put it: 
 
“… the [chemical sector] is viewing the problem as one of misunderstanding due to a 
lack of familiarity with the knowledge, methods, and processes on which its 
operations are based, when instead it may reflect a different understanding, and 
grounded mistrust, of the institutional system of organization and control within which 
the industry’s operations are embedded. This perception of the problem has its roots in 
the culture of the industry …” (pp. 213–214 – emphases in original) 
 
In this sense – as Simmons and Wynne [1993] persuasively point out – environmental 
strategies pursued by chemical firms tend to de-politicise issues of corporate greening. By 
labelling the public in general and environmentalists in particular, as lay people ignorant of 
scientific facts and relationships, representatives of the chemical industry employ a discursive 
strategy that aims to exclude many stakeholders from dialogues related to environmental 
policy-making. Their intention is to restrict the subject matter of environmental policy 
discourses to “rigorous” science and/or technical issues related to pollution standards or 
compliance. It might then be argued that environmental strategies of chemical firms are 
inherently political and attempt to protect not only particular products but a particular 
institutional setting, as well. The political and the cognitive/cultural dimensions of corporate, 
or sectoral, environmental strategies are intertwined. The dominant cognitive frame of the 
chemical industry seems to be blind to the different perceptions and forms of knowledge, and 
thus cannot see the institutional dimension of trust and legitimacy. Moreover, the strategies 
and arguments typically employed re-construct and maintain the institutional structure in 
which public mistrust is grounded. 
 
It might be worth emphasising here that the approach to corporate greening as 
institutional change claims that organisational capabilities for greening are partly dependent 
upon the broader socio-economic context. In this sense, corporate greening is situated in a 
wider social learning process. Note furthermore that organisational greening which does not 
reflect upon the constraint set by the dominant socio-technological regime cannot be 
considered radical, and may loose its transformative potential.  Corporate greening is, in this 
sense, not a question of individual ecological consciousness and moral integrity, but one of 
effective social action.  
In sum, the substantial arguments of the approach to corporate greening as institutional 
change are the following: 
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• “[T]he process of strategy making is inherently institutionally embedded” (Levy–
Rothenberg [1999], p. 22); 
• Organisational learning is a socially constructed understanding based on social practice; 
• Technological development is path-dependent, due to the cognitive and institutional 
embeddedness of technological options,; 
• “[T]here is no clear distinction between institutional and economic environments, as 
markets and conceptions of economic interests are themselves constructed in social and 
political contexts” (Levy–Rothenberg [1999], p. 22); 
• Institutional environment may be conceptualised as a socio-technological regime; 
• The strategic actions of the different agents in a given organisational field and the 
institutional structure mutually constitute each other (in the sense of Giddens’ 
structuration theory); 
• There is no sense in separating product strategies from non-market (or political) 
strategies; 
• “[T]he relationship among companies is simultaneously political and economic” (but 
there are power differences – Levy–Rothenberg [1999], p. 22); 
• Radical innovations change the technological, economic, social and political 
circumstances; that is, they change the existing socio-technological regime; 
• “[C]ompanies are members of multiple, overlapping fields, and therefore subject to 
different pressures,” thus, there is room for organisational strategic actions (Levy–
Rothenberg [1999], p. 22); 
• “[E]ach company interprets institutional discourses through the lens of its own 
organisational culture, structure, and history” (Levy–Rothenberg [1999], p. 22–23). 
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CHAPTER 5 
VALUES-DRIVEN CORPORATE GREENING: 
THE CASE OF ALTERNATIVE CAPITALISTS 8 
 
This chapter and the one that follows it present two examples of what might be 
considered organisational greening in a radical sense. My intention with introducing these 
examples is to make my theoretical position clearer; that is, the interpretation of corporate 
greening as institutional change offers the richest and most comprehensive description and 
understanding of this phenomenon. This theoretical approach enables one to take into 
thorough consideration the institutional contexts – economic, social and political 
embeddedness – of processes of greening and thereby critically understand and reflect upon 
each single case of corporate greening. Processes of corporate greening take place in the 
“force-field” of different institutional (or structural) logics (such as, e.g., market, bureaucratic 
or civil) that significantly influence those processes (of course, each case of greening may 
influence the field-force by enacting the institutional logics available to differing extents). 
The first case of the so-called “alternative capitalists” is intended to shed more light in 
particular upon the limits of corporate greening that are dominated by free market logic.  
 
5.1. STAKEHOLDER–CAPITALISM 
 
What makes an alternative capitalist? The first substantial, common characteristic is an 
identity of entrepreneurship. Alternative capitalists take pains to differentiate themselves from 
standard corporations, particularly their hierarchical, inflexible structures and planning 
attitudes. An entrepreneurial attitude is considered to be a fundamental element of the 
alternative capitalists’ success, even after growing into a global firm. The entrepreneurial 
attitude is characterised not so much by hard, self-exploiting work, or self-realisation as the 
main motivating force, but by intuition, passion and a continuous search for new and better 
solutions.  
                                                          
8 This chapter is largely based on the introductory chapter of the book, Alternative Capitalists, written and 
 86
The second important feature of alternative capitalism is the acceptance, or sometimes 
even praise, of capitalism, market economy, or free market entrepreneurship, which is, 
nonetheless, complemented by recognition of and a strong emphasis on community. 
Alternative capitalists claim no more and no less than that the raison d’étre of any business 
activity is the betterment of the communities where businesses operate and to which they 
belong.  
 
“… Wherever we traded we were an integral part of that community, with consequent 
responsibilities and duties that could not be ducked. It had always made me angry that 
most businesses, big and small, operated in almost total social isolation from their 
immediate surroundings. I think it is completely immoral for a shop to trade in the 
middle of a community, to take money and make profits from that community and 
then ignore the existence of that community, its needs and problems.” (Roddick–
Miller [1992], p. 150). 
 
“… at the centre of our company… is the spirit, the heart, the feeling that no matter 
how good success and profit may be, no matter how good rational analysis and 
strategies toward those goals may be, the common good is better.” (Chappell [1994], 
pp. 203–204) 
 
As O’Toole [1991] points out, “values-based companies” support the idea of a free 
market. In no sense do they attempt to develop a business activity based on a totally new 
political philosophy than that of a free market economy. Instead, they call for businesses 
which make profit while, at the same time, increase the welfare of the public at large. How 
they think it is possible – or different – from standard business-as-usual? They reject the idea 
that purely self-interested entrepreneurial activities will by themselves, due to the “invisible 
hand,” result in enhanced public welfare. Instead, every business decision and action should 
reflect a commitment and accountability to the public good. Alternative capitalists claim to 
take responsibility towards the prosperity of the communities in which they live and pursue 
their businesses in human or broader ecological communities, be they local or global.  
 
“… [P]rivate aim must be held accountable to the values common to that free society. 
Our common good calls more and more for respecting the dignity of all life, human, 
animals, and the environment.” (Chappell [1994], p. 204) 
 
The essence as well as legitimacy of business lies in its active pursuit of the public good. 
Accordingly, alternative capitalists often refer to the Quaker business norm: “Doing Well by 
Doing Good.” 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
edited by László Radácsi and myself (Pataki–Radácsi [2000]).  
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Living in our present knowledge- and technology-intensive world, one tends to forget the 
basic physical (thermodynamic) fact that all economic activities are linked to a natural 
resource base, providing natural resource flows as inputs or assimilating waste flows, as well 
as providing life-support services. The dependence and embeddedness of the human economy 
upon nature’s services should be institutionally recognised, implying that business activities 
which myopically undermine and destroy the integrity of ecosystems are unquestionably 
illegitimate.  
A minimal demand of all stakeholders – local communities, the state, employees, owners, 
consumers and customers, suppliers, and other business partners – is that the activities of the 
focal organisation do them no harm. However, it is not sufficient to gain legitimacy for free 
enterprise, per se. According to the paradigm of the “corporate counter-culture” (as O’Toole 
[1991] depicts alternative capitalists), the essence of alternative capitalism is to do business in 
a way that contributes to the well-being of all stakeholders. The health of a business 
enterprise is linked to the health of all the communities involved – as it is summarised by the 
slogan, “linked prosperity,” of Ben & Jerry’s (Cohen–Greenfield [1998]). Consequently, it is 
not enough to make a profit – profit should be shared with stakeholders in the spirit of 
“enlightened capitalism.” 
 
5.2. THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF ALTERNATIVE CAPITALISTS 
  
Companies belonging to the mainstream are also expected to improve their 
environmental performance and fulfill “green” requirements to some extent. What is the 
difference between them and the alternative capitalists, then? This question has been analysed 
profoundly by Mirvis [1994]. The first point Mirvis makes is in regard to the relationship of 
the environmental movement and alternative companies. In many cases, these 
“environmentally progressive” firms – a name coined by Mirvis – do not separate business 
from environmental activism. In contrast, business-as-usual is dominated by the very opposite 
approach, where the Greens’ style (in contrast to the “formal” and “conservative” business 
style) and their alleged incompetence (in contrast to scientific “objectivity”) are often subject 
to cynicism and derision. The Body Shop, Ben & Jerry’s, Tom’s of Maine, and other 
companies with similar commitments are recognised as right because they have joined their 
forces with civil organisations (i.e., Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth), in order to increase 
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the environmental awareness of the society and community through their campaigns, and to 
draw attention to specific local or global environmental problems. 
The other main difference between mainstream and alternative capitalists can be captured 
by the significant disparity between image and identity. Almost all of the environmental 
initiatives and achievements of the mainstream are plainly aimed at improving image (eco-
marketing). Most of the companies have never evaluated their core activities and missions in 
terms of ecology. In the majority of cases, their organisational identity is left unchanged by 
environmental management. On the other hand, alternative capitalists put heart and soul into 
questioning their “organisational existence” according to ecological problems.  As Mirvis 
writes, for most of them the use and/or supply of “natural” materials and products are their 
exclusive practice or aim (see the cosmetics of The Body Shop and Tom’s of Maine, Ben & 
Jerry’s commitment to milk of cows not treated with growth hormones, or the practice of 
Esprit and Patagonia to produce garments only from organically grown cotton). Furthermore, 
Patagonia, a Californian specialty outdoor clothing firm, encourages its customers to buy only 
the garments needed – that is, it agitates against consumerism and the unjustified increase of 
sales: 
 
“Our goal is to offer only viable, excellent products that are as multifunctional as 
possible so a customer can consume less but consume better.” (Chouinard [1993]) 
 
Most of these firms clearly acknowledge that there is an intrinsic value to each natural 
being (individual plant or animal, as well as ecosystems), that is independent of the utility any 
living being or system may provide to human beings. There is a huge gap between the 
prevailing anthropocentric ethics and this argument, which represents the philosophical 
position of so-called deep ecology.  Alternative capitalists can therefore be said to have a 
different vision for an economy – a vision respecting nature and the constraints set by nature. 
It is not inaptly called restorative economy by Hawken, the co-founder and owner of Smith & 
Hawken Company (see Hawken [1993]). Looking at the state of the art – the general business 
practice and, moreover, the attitude it conveys – these firms differ very much from the 
mainstream and they do intend to make a difference: 
 
“Perhaps the real good that Patagonia could do was to use the company as a tool for 
social change, as a model to show other companies that a company can do well by 
taking the long view and doing the right thing.” (Chouinard [1993] – emphases added) 
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5.3. CRITICAL ISSUES RELATED TO ALTERNATIVE CAPITALISTS 
 
5.3.1. New Managerial Ethos versus Mind-control 
 
Who defines the social mission of alternative capitalists? This question is raised by 
Mirvis [1994] very seriously. He – as a former organisational development consultant of Ben 
& Jerry’s – illustrates the problem with practical examples. The question also very much fits 
here, because alternative capitalists willingly admit that the company as an institution is not a 
model for democracy. 
Tom Chappell honestly reports that employees called Tom’s of Maine’s mission 
statement “Tom’s mission” for a long time. Employees hardly perceived any relationship 
between their values and the mission statement written by Tom Chappell and other top 
managers of the firm. It took at least two years, a lot of open discussions and a gradual 
institutionalisation of the values expressed by the mission statement, to get most of the 
employees behind the spirit of the mission (Chappell [1994]). 
Very similar difficulties are mentioned by Fred “Chico” Lager, the former CEO of Ben 
& Jerry’s (Lager [1994]). Ben Cohen made the same mistake of composing the mission 
statement on his own, believing that all the employees would eagerly subscribe to it. 
Embracing the values of the mission statement for most of the employees also took a lot of 
time and effort at Ben & Jerry’s. However, the political direction of the company’s social 
mission has never been open to debate. As Lager states and as is also shown by the story of 
Peace Pops ice cream (Mirvis [1994]), the political dimension has always reflected Ben 
Cohen’s prevailing personal commitment.9  
A similar problem was encountered by Anita Roddick (Roddick–Miller [1992]). She and 
her husband were talking with employees in a shop about how to carry out the social mission 
of The Body Shop. Anita Roddick practically berated employees for not introducing a 
communal project to help a local nursing home for elderly people. In the end, Gordon 
Roddick drew his wife’s attention to the possible threat and non-necessity of “emotional 
blackmail” of this kind. 
                                                          
9 The Peace Pops ice cream bars were created and marketed as a protest against the Gulf war, i.e., the U. S. 
attack on Iraq. The price of the product included a contribution to a peace foundation. This straightforward 
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Alternative capitalists – as compared to the mainstream – have done and still do a lot to 
carry the notion of “management by shared values” into effect. However, they also face 
dilemmas raised by the inseparability of the entrepreneur’s personal values and those of the 
company. It is difficult to manoeuvre between finding partners with the same values and 
avoiding the threat of management domination and mind control in organisational hierarchy; 
that is, forcing the values from top-down onto employees.  
 
5.3.2. Dilemmas at the System Level 
 
Dilemmas to be examined in this section have not much to do with the argument that 
says alternative capitalists are only pursuing a “good market strategy” and making good 
bargains on social values. This opinion – drawing comparisons within the conceptual frame of 
the mainstream – reflects a misunderstanding of alternative capitalists’ endeavours. However, 
if the following question is also raised, a very new and important point will be touched upon.  
Is the activity of alternative capitalists good under any circumstances within the operative 
dynamics of the free market system? This is called here a system-level dilemma. In short, it 
means that when these companies step out from their own cultural community and – similarly 
to mainstream companies – engage in global market activities, doing good (that has worked 
well within their native culture) may take a different turn.  
The most cheerless precedent for this is the so-called “rainforest fiasco” of The Body 
Shop and, particularly, Ben & Jerry’s (Entine [1996]). Both companies contacted Cultural 
Survival, an international organisation consisting mainly of anthropologists and aiming at 
saving the lives and cultures of indigenous tribes in the Brazilian rainforests from huge 
companies and entrepreneurs who perceive rainforests only as resources to be exploited. The 
plan – in harmony with the notion of sustainable development – emerged very quickly: 
indigenous people would sell the Brazil nuts of the rainforests – harvested by their own 
traditional methods – to the two afore-mentioned firms for further processing and marketing. 
Evidence of how this “transaction” could be good for business and at the same time good for 
the environment was believed to have been provided to politicians, companies and the public. 
The Body Shop’s product, made from Brazil nut oil, and even more so, Rainforest Crunch ice 
cream of Ben & Jerry’s, were great business successes. The ice cream was advertised as a 
product that helps sustain endangered, indigenous cultures of the Amazonian rainforest. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
espousal divided the managers and employees of the ice cream company. 
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Hence, American consumers driven by environmental awareness provided substantial demand 
for the ice cream. Demand exceeded ecologically sustainable supply, i.e. the production 
capacity of the Kayapo tribe of Brazilian Amazonia. At this point, market forces made Ben & 
Jerry’s look for other suppliers. Under the given circumstances, Ben & Jerry’s did not 
withdraw from contracting with Latin-American agribusiness, notorious for clearing 
rainforests to gain agricultural territory for export cattle ranching and mostly enslaving local 
people as their labour force. Consequently, American consumers could buy their favourite ice 
cream for a long while without suspecting anything.  
Good intentions seem not to be enough: 
 
“Character demonstrated by actions, not by the phantom of good intentions, is the only 
reliable measure of corporate ethics.” (Entine [n. d.], p. 5) 
 
The Body Shop and Ben & Jerry’s have not admitted the tragic failure of their initiative – 
yet. They still voice the slogan of Anita Roddick: “Make the rainforest economically viable!” 
Going beyond most of the critics, it is argued that the rainforest fiasco constitutes a necessary 
tragedy of the institution of a global market economy, i.e., failure of the institutional logic of 
the free market to solve ecological problems. The concept of a free market, focusing on 
material well-being, is characteristic to European and North-American culture. Forcing the 
concept and particularly the practice of free commerce onto other cultures may divert any 
good intentions. Within these cultures, different logics of economic activity have been 
institutionalised which are – especially in the case of indigenous minority cultures – much 
less expansive, if at all, and inevitably succumb to the expanding economic culture that 
globally dictates the rules of the game. For this reason, in many cases The Body Shop’s 
policy, characterised by the principle of “Trade Not Aid” does not administer the ideal in 
practice. It does not help cooperation, working together, or “equal exchange,” but rather 
unwittingly contributes to devastation and the disappearance of biological as well as cultural 
diversity. 
By advocating the beneficent effects of free trade without raising any political question, 
alternative capitalists make at least one serious mistake. Disseminating this opinion about 
trade may not only be wrong but even fatal. Sustaining the rights and cultures of indigenous 
people is first and foremost a political question. These problems cannot be solved exclusively 
by (market) economic methods employed by a beneficent humanity; furthermore, advertising 
such methods may even accelerate the tragic processes of bio- and socio-diversity loss. 
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Building up a global market economy that satisfies the interests of all the cultures and 
communities of the world seems to be an illusion that might not be cherished. The 
progression of a global market is advantageous for our culture first and foremost.  
Furthermore, the institutional logic of a market economy – as Paul Hawken argues (Hawken 
[1993]) – is in many respects irreconcilable with ecology and preservation of nature’s health. 
Alternative capitalists have to face this dilemma, i.e., the socio-political side of ecological 
problems at the system level.   
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CHAPTER 6 
INSTITUTIONALISING A SUSTAINABLE 
AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM: THE CASE OF 
COMMUNITY SUPPORTED AGRICULTURE 
 
This chapter introduces an example of organisational greening as institutional change. 
The organisational example under investigation is related to agriculture and, to some extent, 
departs from the previous theoretical as well as the subsequent empirical chapters, which all 
relate to industry. However, the difference might not be so large, in the sense that the current 
food system, and hence agriculture, operates using the very same industrial and corporate 
logic as other parts of modern, developed market economies. 
A Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) group has been established and successfully 
run for five years in Gödöllő, Hungary. The present author, being a member of the group, 
does not want to be accused of any bias and therefore, the following discussion will be limited 
to a theoretical exposition. It will be argued that a CSA is a social experiment aiming to 
institutionalise an economically viable, socially acceptable, and ecologically sustainable 
farming and food production system. In this sense, a CSA represents an alternative to the 
currently institutionalised food system, which is dominated by the logic of the free market and 
the interests of large corporations.  
 
6.1. WHAT IS COMMUNITY SUPPORTED AGRICULTURE? 
 
Community Supported Agriculture has “taken economics out of the centre” of farming – 
as one CSA farmer had put it straightforwardly (Brookfield Farm, in Groh–McFadden, 
[1997], p. 135). CSA could be claimed to be good economics, indeed. Of course, one who 
thinks of economy in terms of what is taught in standard economics textbooks will be puzzled 
by this assertion. However, there is a lot more to economy than these standard university 
textbooks would allow.  
CSA is good economics not in the sense of – as Karl Polanyi [1977] put it – formal 
economic,s but of substantive economics. Formal economics is only involved with means-
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ends relationships, with solving the problem of optimally allocating given scarce means to 
achieve some pre-determined and fixed ends (preferences), and this allocation problem is 
obviously well-fitted to market logic. Substantive economics, however, concerns different 
modes of institutionalising the economy, i.e., the processes and mechanisms of providing the 
material bases for human living. Furthermore, the CSA so-called “share scheme” represents 
 
“… the potential for decommodified relations in the CSA and stands in marked 
contrast to the usual way of purchasing food, in spot exchanges, whether at farmers’ 
markets or supermarkets.” (Hinrichs, 2000, p. 300) 
 
CSA therefore moves away from treating land as a “fictitious commodity” (Polanyi’s term). 
Clearly, CSAs represent a different institutionalisation of agro-economy than that driven 
by market logic. As one very well knows from economic history and anthropology, non-
market logic of organising agricultural – or any kind of economic – activity does not 
constitute an inferior alternative, not necessarily even in the sense of efficiency. Of course, 
CSAs have nothing to do with allocative efficiency in the Paretean sense (i.e., Pareto-
efficiency), since that belongs to the realm of a market logic driven society. Nevertheless, it 
does have a lot to do with long-term productive efficiency, quality and ecological 
sustainability, all of which are or should be, important performance standards for any human 
economy. 
But what exactly is this so-called non-market logic? What is a CSA? Let’s take a look at 
some definitions provided by the literature on CSAs of which I am aware: 
 
1. “[CSA is] ... a group of city people [who] agree to purchase, in advance, shares of 
a farmer's harvest of food grown in an environmentally-friendly manner.” (Dyck, 
[1994], p. 56) 
2. “CSA is a partnership of mutual commitment between a farm and a community of 
supporters which provides a direct link between the production and consumption 
of food. Supporters cover a farm's yearly operating budget by purchasing a share 
of the season's harvest. CSA members make a commitment to support the farm 
throughout the season, and assume the costs, risks and bounty of growing food 
along with the farmer or grower... In return, the farm provides, to the best of its 
ability, a healthy supply of seasonal fresh produce throughout the growing 
season.” (UMass, [n. d.] p. 1) 
3. “... a CSA [is] where a group of families would pledge together to cover the costs 
of the garden, including a decent living for professional gardeners... 
[S]hareholders... would get a regular supply of fresh, healthful produce during the 
growing season, and the growers would get an assured living. The farmers 
would... be freed from the need to take upon themselves the financial risks 
inherent to farming...” (The Kimberton CSA, in Groh–McFadden, [1997], p. 145) 
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These quoted definitions obviously include characteristics which point to the different 
socio-economic logic of CSA, as compared to a market agro-economy. In the following, I 
would like to expound upon these issues. It will be argued that CSAs represent an experiment 
in developing a socially, economically and ecologically sustainable agriculture, as an 
alternative to the global, market-dominated food system. Though these three dimensions of 
the concept of sustainability cannot be separated, in the sense that, for example, no economic 
or social sustainability can be practised without ecological sustainability, for the sake of 
clarifying the concept and practice of CSAs I will discuss them sequentially. 
 
6.2. ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY IN CSAS 
 
The first quoted definition of CSA refers to the requirement of “environmentally-
friendly” farming practices. Farming should be ecologically conscious, nurturing not only the 
fertility and regenerative capacity of soil but, more comprehensively, the soul of the land. As 
a CSA farmer puts it: 
 
“We have a responsibility towards the way we treat the earth, and only treating the 
earth in as comprehensively good a way as we know how, can we expect it to properly 
nourish us.” (Great Barrington CSA Garden, in Groh–McFadden [1997], p. 124) 
 
Moreover, farming is considered to be not only a craft infused with an ethic towards nature, 
but an art full of spirituality as well. 
 There is indeed a well-developed agricultural concept – as Trauger Groh stated – that 
can guide farming at CSAs (Groh-McFadden, [1997], p. 14). The concept is known as 
biodynamic farming and was theoretically developed by Rudolf Steiner in the 1920s.  At the 
heart of this approach is the idea that the farm is a self-regenerating organism. As an 
organism, that is, a living entity, it should be treated and cultivated with respect for the 
integrity of its inner life as well as the integrity of each of its parts or organs. There is a clear 
association between Steiner’s concept of land and farming and the later thoughts of James 
Lovelock, popularly known as the Gaia Hypothesis (Lovelock, [1979]). However, as one of 
the trustees of the Biodynamic Farmland Conservation Trust in the U.S. pointed out 
 
“… [t]he biodynamic view of the world takes the notion of Gaia... one step further... 
the modern view of Gaia... is expanded in biodynamics to place the earth in its cosmic 
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setting: a living universe... In the biodynamic view of the world, the earth’s biota is far 
more than just a complex set of chemical reactions... There’s more to it. There's a 
spiritual basis to everything that we see on the earth.” (Brookfield Farm, in Groh–
McFadden, [1997], p. 137) 
 
 This concept of land has far-reaching and well-articulated consequences for farming 
practice which are nicely summarised by Groh and McFadden; however, we have no place 
here to state them in detail, except to point to some of the most important ones.  One of these 
is that to respect and remain in the realm of living systems: all farming measures and 
applications will exclude all mineral and synthetic substances for use on plants, the soil, or 
animals. “Life processes can only be generated out of substances already filled with life” 
(Groh–McFadden, [1997], p. 22); to try to do otherwise is nothing less than exploiting life 
itself, for short-term human gain and to the detriment of all those living for the longer term. 
 Another rule is to “buy for the farm as little as possible from the outside world” (op. 
cit., p. 32); for example, herds should be fed from feeds that are grown on the farm itself and 
manure and compost from herds and organic wastes should be employed as the farm’s soil 
amendments. Furthermore, degraded or destroyed natural environments should be restored (p. 
28) with an aim towards great diversity of plants, combined with crop rotation (p. 24). 
 Consciously following the rhythm of life and creating farms for a healthy natural 
environment requires changes in the socio-economic organisation of farming as well. 
 
6.3. SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY IN CSAS 
 
To take as a contrasting starting point, standard economics and its underlying social 
vision, one is tempted to say that while standard economics and a market society rest on an 
atomistic picture of human beings (in its most extreme form, stating “there is no such thing as 
society,” only aggregates of individuals), CSA has a communitarian social ideal at its roots, 
with a concept of humans as social beings, “persons-in-community” (Etzioni, [1988]). 
 The words in the second quoted definition of CSA, i.e., “CSA is a partnership of 
mutual commitment,” refer to a new kind of relationship between farmers and consumers; a 
relationship which is different from the impersonal market relations of shoppers relying on 
supermarkets. It is a relationship which attempts to re-establish and develop a personal 
connection between the consumers and the farmers and, through the farmers, between 
consumers and the land. “Membership in a community farm provides a direct link to food 
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production” for consumers who can “see their vegetables planted, watch them grow and ripen, 
sometimes even get dirt under their fingernails helping in the gardens” (Groh–McFadden, 
[1997], p. 73).  Members may develop an emotional connectedness to the land and feel “the 
farmers face on their food.” 
Community building is an essential element as well as an objective of CSAs. Moreover, 
it can be argued that 
 
“… what distinguishes CSA from other types of direct agricultural markets is its 
special emphasis on creating and building community around the interwoven issues of 
food, land and nature.” (Hinrichs, [2000], p. 299) 
 
To connect consumers to the farm in tangible ways, CSA farms are seeking to organise 
community events, such as “pick your own food” (“U-pick”) arrangements, harvesting 
festivals and exchanges of recipes, and some farms attempt to involve members in 
composting, by placing large compost bins at distribution sites for household food scraps, etc. 
In this sense, people are doing and learning to do something positive together, as a group 
working towards a healthy environment, a healthy future. 
To get people to identify and feel a sense of community is reflected in the organisational 
structure of CSAs. The main organisational objective is “to foster trust and to build socially-
just community.” (Dyck, [1994], p. 57) Responsibilities for farm management many times are 
divided between a few farmers, but always carried out in a collaborative fashion. Though the 
farmers’ autonomy and responsibility concerning farming methods and applications are 
respected and usually every CSA has its own 5-12 member, operative core group, decision-
making processes are participatory, including both farmers and “sharers” (consumers); open 
for dialogue (through members’ meetings and newsletters); and, therefore, characterised by 
transparency and consensus making with a lot of strong, independent voices. (Groh–
McFadden, [1997], p. 100) 
CSAs are small scale social experiments, as they should be if they want to preserve their 
community-building character and promote a diversity that depends on local conditions. Most 
CSA farms have 35–200 members, though there are some larger ones as well. The size of 
farmland, on average 35 acres, and sustainable agricultural methods limit the size of CSAs. 
Co-operative spirit is an important feature and necessity among CSA farms as well, since 
organic farming methods are highly knowledge intensive and knowledge is widely considered 
to be a community possession. Thus, there is a very important educational function of having 
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apprenticeship arrangements at CSA farms. Furthermore, many CSAs are taking very active 
and innovative steps for the inclusion of those people in society, in general, and in the 
neighbourhood, in particular, who are hardest to reach, such as the poor (e.g., food bank 
CSAs) and troubled people (e.g., the homeless). 
  
6.4. ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY IN CSAS 
 
It has already been noted that the economics of CSAs cannot be interpreted in terms of 
standard (formal) economics. Here we will further explicate those points which make the 
economics of CSAs different from a pure market logic. These aspects concern microeconomic 
issues related to the internal economy of CSAs and macroeconomic issues, such as land 
economics and regional economics. 
The first point again refers back to the quoted definitions of CSAs. Both definitions (1) 
and (2) mention the problem of risks in farming. In terms of risks, CSA offers a non-market 
solution, that is, a voluntary risk-sharing between the farmers and the sharers, who as 
consumers pay in advance for the farm’s harvest. 
 
“[The CSA] share symbolises members’ shared acceptance of the risks farmers 
assume in farming and their willingness to subordinate their own economic interests, if 
need be, to support the CSA farmer.” (Hinrichs, [2000], p. 300 – emphasis in the 
original) 
 
It is a rational arrangement from the point of view of farmland preservation and of an 
economically stable farm operation, providing the highest quality and greatest variety of 
produce. It also emphasises the community character of CSAs, as consumers are “not just 
buying vegetables but rather pledging to support the farm” as a whole (Groh–McFadden, 
[1997], p. 112). In a sense, the farmer is freed from pressure to make enough profit to 
compensate for possible future losses (freed from the pressure to be narrowly self-interested). 
This contributes to a long-term perspective where there is no need and place for discounting 
and striving for short-term gain, since the farmer has enough time and economic security to 
concentrate on serving the ends: producing healthy products for a community while 
preserving nature. 
The second distinct point related to the economics of CSAs concerns the process and 
logic of setting a price on the farm’s produce. The logic is, in contrast with the subjective 
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preference based approach of standard economics, a need/cost principle or, as Trauger Groh 
expresses it, “all participants in the economic process try to listen to the needs of all other 
partners in the process.” (Groh–McFadden, [1997], p. 34) The decision-making process with 
regard to setting prices usually follows more or less like this: the farmers with the core group 
draw up a budget reflecting the production costs for the year that includes all salaries, land 
payments, machinery maintenance, distribution costs, investments for seeds or tools, etc. The 
budget is then divided by the number of members and this determines the cost of each share 
of the harvest. One share usually represents the weekly vegetable needs for a family of four 
(UMass, [n. d.], p. 2). Moreover, a crucial part of the process may be the possibility for 
community members to adjust their share purchase according to individual financial 
circumstances; that is, for example, applying a voluntary sliding scale whereby higher income 
households may pay more per share than lower income households. This way CSAs do not 
need to be profit-maximising and, by focusing on the needs of all partners, they replace 
market prices with fair prices fostering and strengthening reciprocity, trust and solidarity 
among members. 
As to the more macroeconomic issues related to the operations of CSAs, the clear 
objective is the empowerment of local people by re-gaining their control over food, over what 
they eat. Directly connecting local farmers to local consumers ensures that food dollars (or 
forints) will be kept in the local community and will contribute to the maintenance and 
establishment of regional food production. This development of a regional food supply 
strengthens the local economy against the well-known tendency of industrial agriculture to 
concentrate agricultural resources into fewer and fewer large corporations. This industrialised, 
corporate agro-economic system puts farmers in the position of being hourly workers and is 
socially not embedded in the local economy, thus lacking any kind of community spirit. Even 
if it were an “industrial organic agriculture,” it would be completely different from CSAs, 
since food would still be considered a commodity, albeit an organic one, and consumers as 
constituting a market to be exploited for profit. However, as McFadden strongly emphasises: 
 
“… [M]arketing is not community, and merchandising is not CSA…” (Groh–
McFadden, [1997], p. 70) 
 
The economic logic of CSA goes against that of standard economics, with regard to its 
treatment of land as well as labour. In standard economics, land and labour are conceptualised 
and handled as commodities, like any tradable good. However, as Polanyi has insightfully 
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pointed out, this is nothing but a fiction: the “commodity fiction” of standard economics 
(Polanyi, [1947]). Land and labour is not produced, sold and used like a commodity. Land 
stands for nature, for all the living beings and systems, ultimately for the entire earth. Labour 
stands for human beings. If they are ‘commoditised’ they are prone to be exploited to the 
extreme and eventually degraded. CSA is committed to take land and labour out of the realm 
of the market. That’s why it is important for CSAs to preserve and nurture the fertility and 
regenerative capacity of land and the autonomy and security of the farmer (the art and craft of 
farming). Nevertheless, how to protect farmland from the development pressure of market 
forces is still a partially resolved issue. It remains a question as to whether private property 
can assure it, or whether other solutions, such as the growing land trust movement in the U.S., 
are needed. 
 
6.5. CONCLUDING NOTES ON CSAS 
 
It was argued that CSA represents a bottom-up social experiment for a socially just, 
economically viable and ecologically sound agriculture and, in this sense, can be considered 
an alternative to the predominant agricultural system. As CSAs are institutionalising a non-
market and non-hierarchical logic of operation, they might be considered the seeds for a civil 
economy in agriculture. In this sense, CSAs may be points of initiation for positive and far-
reaching social change in market society; therefore, they could turn out to be very useful 
social experiments, due to their diversity and local adaptability. CSA might be one of the 
examples, or ways of institutionalising, “civic agriculture,” as Lyson, [1999] defines it: 
 
• Production is oriented toward local markets and customers rather than 
international mass markets; 
• Food production is viewed as an integral part of rural communities, not merely as 
the production of commodities; 
• Producers are more concerned with quality than quantity; 
• Farm level production is less capital intensive; 
• Producers rely on local knowledge, not best management practices; and, 
• Producers forge direct links with consumers. (pp. 8–9) 
 
An attempt was also made above to demonstrate that the prime value for CSA is caring 
for people and nature, respecting the value of their integrity. Therefore, it may be claimed that 
value commitment and ideological reasons are the only sound basis for a committed CSA 
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membership. 
Herein, however, might lie some of the possible weaknesses or problems of a CSA 
system. It is indeed very difficult to maintain CSAs and consider them as a viable alternative 
food system, if Hinrichs [2000] is right in pointing out that: 
 
“… from the average member’s perspective, the demands of membership may begin 
and end with the bag of vegetables.” (p. 300) 
 
Furthermore, the communitarian ideal of CSA is hard to realise if 
 
“… the burden for maintaining the valued community dimension which distinguishes 
CSA fell largely to already overworked CSA farmers. This raises the question of 
social ties that are unbalanced, absent of the reciprocity implicit in the community 
ideal.” (Hinrichs [2000], p. 300) 
 
CSAs have a comparatively short history; therefore, it should not come as a surprise that 
they suffer from many smaller and larger tensions and problems, such as the problems with 
land ownership, farmers’ pensions, membership turnover, involving low income groups, etc. 
Clearly, CSA might only be considered as a social experiment; that is, an exercise in social 
learning about sustainability. In this sense, consumers in a CSA group, for example, may start 
to learn about ecologically sound agriculture, the health of seasonal produce, etc. In other 
words, over the longer term, the operation of CSA might have enduring effects on people’s 
understanding of sustainable food production and sustainable development in general (Stagl 
[2001]). 
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Part II 
Quantitative Empirical Research 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE OF 
HUNGARIAN INDUSTRIAL FIRMS: A 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
7.1. A THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The scientific literature on corporate environmental management or ‘greening business’ 
has no long research tradition despite the fact that public recognition of pollution problems 
and launching of green movements dates back to the 60s. One can immediately recognise this 
state-of-affairs by confronting the weaknesses apparent in the literature in terms of both 
methodology and theory building (Gladwin [1993]). Nevertheless, during the 1990s corporate 
environmental management has become a popular research area attracting students of 
economics as well as organisation studies. Also, in the mid-sixties a very characteristic debate 
emerged that is usually referred to as the “environment–competitiveness” dispute. The 
defining issue is whether environmental management, both at the level of firm as well as 
government regulation, can, at the same time, enhance competitiveness as the so-called ‘win–
win’ argument states, or, at the contrary, hinders it, that is, constituting a necessarily ‘win–
lose’ situation.  
The ‘win-win’ argument was provocatively expressed by one of the contemporary 
gurus of management science, namely Porter [1991]. It attracted a counter reaction by some 
prominent students of environmental economics at the prestigious Washington-based 
institute, Resources for the Future (Palmer–Oates–Portney [1993]) as well as by 
environmental consultants at the McKinsey company (Walley–Whitehead [1994]). The heated 
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debate continued on the pages of the Harvard Business Review (HBR [1994]; Porter–van der 
Linde [1995b]) and that of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Porter–van der Linde 
[1995a]; Palmer–Oates–Portney [1995]).10 
An exhaustive assessment of the ‘environment-competitiveness’ debate reaches 
beyond the scope of the present paper since it ranges from the very definition of pollution to 
the question of scientifically appropriate empirical justification. The present focus will be on 
the different possibilities of empirical testing, at the firm level, of the ‘win–win’ argument, or, 
as elsewhere is referred to, the Porter hypothesis. To put to direct empirical testing of the 
Porter hypothesis is not a straightforwardly easy job due to its generality and multi-level 
reach (from organisational and sectoral to macroeconomic level).11 However, there are 
researchers who, in one way or another, attempted to come up with direct empirical tests. 
Albrecht [n. d.] investigates the relationship between international CFC regulation and 
the export performance of industry branches whose products contain CFC. His conclusion 
was that bilaterally those countries experienced an improved international competitiveness at 
the product level that enacted stricter CFC regulation compared to those with less stringent 
regulatory requirements. Barrett [1992] interpretes the strategy of the world leading CFC 
producer, Du Pont by applying a game theoretic framework and explained how this U. S. 
based multinational could gain competitive advantage over its European rivals by strategic 
pro-activity with regard to environmental investments and regulation. Nehrt [1996] attempts 
to operationalise another point within the ‘win–win’ argument, the so-called first-mover 
advantage. His empirical findings demonstrated a positive relationship between first-mover 
environmental technology investments and profitability among pulp and paper firms, though 
he also found that increasing amounts invested in environmental technology, unless there 
were enough time to reap the benefits of learning-by-doing, negatively affected profit growth. 
(see also Nehrt [1998] for a more thorough theoretical treatment). Arora–Cason [1996] 
attempted to examine the motives of American companies voluntary participation in EPA by 
an econometric model. They concluded that the most probable participating firms were the 
largest polluters and those with a more direct relationship with consumers. 
Testing the Porter hypothesis in a more indirect way has more possibilities. 
Competitiveness is the raison d’etre of company strategy and if environmental management 
                                                          
10 For more arguments, see among others Rothwell [1992], Ashford [1993], Sanchez [1997]. 
11 At the macro level, empirical studies revealed either no significant negative effects on aggregate economic 
variables or some minor positive impacts due to stricter environmental regulation (see Jaffe–Petersson–Portney–
Stavins [1995] recent summary). 
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may improve competitiveness it could be detected by exploring the differences manifest in 
firms’ strategies. Thus, if companies’ strategic actions with regard to the environment can be 
observed, their environmental performance can be operationalised firms’ strategic posture 
towards the environment could be characterised revealing the extent to which they treat 
environmental management as an issue of competitiveness. Some researchers, following this 
line of reasoning, attempted to establish an empirical link between some measure of 
profitability and that of environmental performance. Table 3 below contains the main 
characteristics of some of these types of research. Most of these studies reached the 
conclusion that there is a positive relationship between economic (market or financial) and 
environmental performance at the firm level. Obviously, these research studies cannot provide 
an explanation whether environmental consciousness itself pays or, rather, only companies 
successful in a narrow economic sense can afford (or have an organisational slack to turn to) 
the “luxurious demand” of improving environmental performance as well.  
Another type of research – including the one reported below – aims to develop an 
empirically based typology of company environmental strategies and to separate those firms 
that consider environmental management as a competitive issue. Table 4 below reports some 
of the relevant international research efforts. Generally, these research studies reveal 
considerable differences among firms in terms of environmental consciousness and strategic 
focus in environmental management. Moreover, many research concluded that companies 
with advanced production practice and/or with a general strategic pro-activity are typically 
those with a leading environmental management practice. 
 
Table 4 below reports empirical research with regard to the Hungarian context during 
the 1990s. The main conclusions include that there are indeed differences among Hungary-
based industrial firms concerning environmental performance; though the perceived major 
environmental pressure on firms are exerted by regulatory agencies, the more export-oriented 
companies perceive the relevant EU requirements as a similarly important factor forcing 
environmental performance improvement; and there is a relatively small group of companies 
that reports growing environmental pressure by all (market and non-market) stakeholders. 
Table 3 also records a weakness of Hungarian environmental management studies in theory 
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building and testing.12 
                                                          
12 Brackets are used to indicate that the study in question refers to theoretical models or branches of literature 
but does not constitute an empirical testing of any models.  
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Table 3 Main Characteristics of Empirical Research on Environmental Management 
 JAGGI–FREEDMAN [1992] CORMIER–MAGNAN– 
MORARD [1993] 
KLASSEN–MCLAUGHLIN 
[1996] 
RUSSO–FOUTS [1997] FELTMATE–SCHOFIELD 
[1999] 
Research question The association between pollution 
and economic and market 
performance. 
The relation between market 
valuation of corporate stocks and 
social performance, as measured by 
pollution record. 
Linking environmental management 
within the firm to financial 
performance. 
The economic impacts of 
environmental performance. 
The relationship between 
sustainable development 
performance and share price 
appreciation. 
Sample 
characteristics 
13 U. S. pulp and paper firms with 
81 plant locations 
EPA pollution database 
COMPUSTAT financial data 
74 Canadian pulp and paper, 
chemicals and oil refineries, steel, 
metals and mines firms (Quebec and 
Ontario area) 
NEXIS database for publicly traded 
firms 
 
243 U. S. firms 
Franklin Research Development 
Corporation (FRDC) environmental 
data 
COMPUSTAT financial data 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) 300 
firms 
TSE 100 average versus a portfolio 
of sustainable firms 
Large capitalisation firms 
representing all industries 
Indicators applied Environmental: composite water 
pollution index 
Financial: ROE, ROA, cash flow / 
equity, cash flow / asset, Beta, PE 
ratio 
Environmental: water pollution 
index 
Financial: stock prices 
Environmental: positive 
environmental event (e. g. award) 
and negative environmental event 
(e.g. spill) 
Financial: stock prices 
Environmental: Franklin Research 
Development Corp. rating 
Financial: ROA 
Environmental: Sustainable 
Investment Group Ltd. ranking 
Financial: average annual return of 
stock prices 
Statistical methods 
applied 
Pearson correlation tests 
 
Ordinary and re-weighted least-
squares regression analysis 
Event study methodology Ordinary least-squares regression 
analysis 
(No information) 
Hypothesis tested H1: There is no association between 
pollution and economic 
performance over a short time 
period; H2: There is no association 
between pollution and market 
performance over a short time 
period. 
H1: the worse a firm’s pollution 
record, the greater the amount of the 
potential liability reducing its stock 
market valuation; H2: common 
shares of firms with a positive poll. 
performance sell at a premium 
compared with firms with a 
negative pollution performance. 
H1: environmental performance 
affects positively financial 
performance, and conversely; H2: 
strong environmental performance 
has a stronger positive impact for 
historically clean than for dirty 
industries; H3: strong 
environmental performance is 
increasingly valued by financial 
markets. 
H1: high levels of environmental 
performance will be associated with 
enhanced profitability; H2: the 
greater the industry growth, the 
greater the positive impact of 
environment-al performance on firm 
profitability. 
(No information) 
Main conclusions H1 and H2 rejected; pollution 
performance is negatively 
associated with economic as well as 
with market performance. 
H1 and H2 are weakly supported; a 
firm’s pollution performance is 
interpreted by market participants as 
providing information about its 
environmental liabilities; results 
weakly support the existence of a 
premium in the stock market 
valuation of firms that meet 
environmental regulation. 
H1, H2, H3 are supported; 
environmental awards resulted in a 
significant positive change in 
market valuation; first-time awards 
to firms in historically dirtier 
industries had lower returns; 
significant negative returns were 
documented for environmental 
crises. 
H1 and H2 is supported. TSE 100 annual average = 12.8 % 
and SD firms annual average = 21.7 
% 
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Table 4 Some Typologies of Corporate Environmental Strategies in the Empirical Literature 
 FLORIDA [1996] HASS [1996] HENRIQUES–
SADORSKY [1996] 
ARAGÓN-CORREA 
[1998] 
JUDGE–DOUGLAS 
[1998] 
HENRIQUES–
SADORSKY [1999] 
Research 
question/objective 
Relationship between 
advanced production 
practices and innovative 
approaches to 
environmentally conscious 
manufacturing. 
Develop an empirically 
based theory of 
environmental management. 
Empirically examine the 
determinants of 
environmentally responsive 
firms. 
How do strategically 
proactive firms differ from 
other firms in their 
approaches to the natural 
environment? 
The ability of firms to 
integrate the natural 
environment into the 
strategic planning process. 
Determine whether 
environmentally committed 
firms differ from less 
environmentally committed 
firms in their perceptions of 
the relative importance of 
different stakeholders in 
influencing their 
environmental practices. 
Sample characteristics Stratified random 
450 U. S. manufacturing 
firms 
423 contacted 
256 returned (60..5 % 
response rate) 
8 Norwegian printing and 
food processing firms in the 
Oslo area 
 
750 large Canadian firms 
contacted 
400 returned (53 % response 
rate) 
331 usable 
financial data added 
210 CEOs of mostly large 
Spanish firms of 10 sectors 
112 returned (53 % response 
rate) 
105 usable 
Random 
725 U. S. environmental 
executives 
217 returned (30 % response 
rate) 
196 usable 
The same as in HENRIQUES–
SADORSKY (1996) 
Theoretical 
model/perspective 
(Win-win perspective) Hunt–Auster [1990] stage 
model of environmental 
strategy 
(No information) Roome [1992] stage model 
of environmental strategy 
Resource-based view of the 
firm and strategic planning 
literature 
Roome [1992] and Hunt–
Auster [1990] stage models 
and corporate social 
responsibility literature 
Statistical methods 
applied 
Cluster analysis Cluster analysis Logit regression analysis Factor (PCA) and cluster 
analysis, ANOVA, 
regression analysis 
Structural equation model 
(LISREL) 
(test for non-response bias) 
Factor and cluster analysis, 
ANOVA, MANCOVA, 
ANCOVA 
Main conclusions A significant fraction of 
sample firms are actively 
pursuing a related bundle of 
advanced technological and 
organisational innovations 
associated with advanced 
and environmentally 
conscious manufacturing 
systems. 
An environmental 
management typology based 
on two dimensions: structure 
of environmental 
management system (low-
high) and implementation 
(struggling-successful) 
A firm’s formulation of an 
environmental plan is 
positively influenced by 
customer, shareholder, 
regulatory and community 
pressure but negatively 
influenced by other lobby 
group pressure and a firm’s 
sales-to-asset ratio. 
Higher strategic pro-activity 
is associated with the 
development of 
traditional/regulated and 
modern/voluntary 
environmental approaches. 
The level of integration of 
environmental management 
concerns in the strategic 
planning process was 
positively related to financial 
and environmental 
performance; the greater the 
functional coverage and the 
more resources provided to 
environment-al management, 
the greater the integration of 
environmental issues in the 
planning process. 
There are environment-ally 
proactive firms whose 
managers perceive all 
stakeholders as important 
except the media; and 
environmentally reactive 
firms perceiving no 
stakeholder as important 
except the media. 
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Table 5 Hungarian Empirical Research Projects on Company Environmental Management 
 BODA–PATAKI [1997] PATAKI–Boda–Radácsi–
Hope [1998] 
CSUTORA [1998] PATAKI–TÓTH (1999) KEREKES et al. [2000] 
Research question/objective Exploring the relationship between 
company competitiveness and 
environmental management by 
operationalising environmental 
strategy. 
Applying and re-examining the 
research question of BODA, PATAKI 
(1997) to industrial firms. 
An empirical operationalisation of 
company environmental strategy. 
Environmental Performance 
evaluation of manufacturing firms. 
How do companies 
perceive the environmental 
demand of society and how 
do they react or respond to 
them? 
Sample characteristics 665 contacted 
325 usable returned (49 % response 
rate) 
biased to large and manufacturing 
firms, representative regarding 
geographical location 
The 325 firms sample restricted to 
160 manufacturing and extraction 
industries  
Sample 1: 52 chemical products 
and food products firms (all usable) 
Sample 2: 600 machine equipment 
firms contacted 
88 usable 
biased to large firms 
Random 
350 manufacturing firms 
Representative by manufacturing 
sectors, biased to large firms 
344 usable 
Control sample of firms with ISO 
14001 (n=26) 
152 manufacturing firms, 
representative by sector, 
biased to larger firms 
Theoretical 
model/perspective 
(Environmental strategy and 
performance literature) 
(Environmental strategy and 
performance literature) 
(Environmental strategy literature) (No information) (No information) 
Statistical methods applied Cluster analysis Factor and cluster analysis Multivariate regression, factor and 
principal component analysis, 
ANOVA 
Factor and cluster analysis Descriptive statistical 
analysis 
Main conclusions 4 clusters: innovative, offensive, 
indifferent, and defensive 
environmental strategy 
5 clusters of environmental 
management orientation: leader 
(12.5 %), average (26.3 %), 
marketing-focus (8.8%), 
technology-focus (21.2 %), laggard 
(31.2 %); 
no connection with general strategy 
and operations management 
clusters and a weak but significant 
connection with ethical 
performance clusters 
The main motivation of 
establishing environmental 
management in the machine 
equipment industry is to adapt to 
EU regulations, while in the 
chemical and food products sectors, 
domestic regulation and cost 
reduction potential constitute the 
main pressure; 
5 environmental strategy clusters: 
indifferent, defensive, 
accommodating, offensive, 
innovative conformist 
3 dimensions of environmental 
performance: technology, 
organisational practice, product; 
5 clusters of environmental 
performance: leader (7.6 %), 
product-focus (14.5 %), laggard 
(29.7 %), organisation-focus (11.6), 
technology-focus/average (26.7 %); 
4 clusters of environmental 
pressure: firms under political 
pressure (15.4 %), no pressure 
(34.6), all stakeholder pressure 
(11.3 %), regulatory and 
manager/owner pressure (32.6 %) 
According to the 
environmental managerial 
activities applied, chemical 
firms are the leaders, next 
pulp and paper and wood 
products firms, next firms 
in food products sector, 
and textile and clothing 
firms are the laggards; 
The main pressures 
perceived are those of 
environmental authorities, 
managers and owners 
7.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 13 
 
The initial samples of 1996 and 1999 were limited to industrial firms in order no to 
complicate the analysis with the large differences that inevitably characterise environmental 
management practice in different economic sectors, such as industry, public and other 
services, retail. Since the questionnaire included a relatively small number of questions with 
regard to environmental management it was not possible to address, to a satisfactory extent, 
the sector-specific differences in business environmental practice and most of the questions 
were primarily relevant to industry.14 
The size of the two industrial samples (160 and 204 firms) made the application of 
multivariate statistical analysis possible. The aim was to explore the dimensions of 
environmental performance and separate, if possible, different clusters of companies in terms 
of environmental management orientation. A major difference between the analysis of the two 
samples is that the five dimensions of company environmental performance in the sample of 
1996 are theoretical constructs based on an extensive literature review (see among others 
Vandermerwe–Oliff [1990]; Rice [1993]; Young [1996]) 15, while the four dimensions of the 
sample of 1999 were produced by a factor analysis.16  
A basic assumption of the below analysis is that rating all sample firms on the 
dimensions of environmental performance provides for the possibility of applying cluster 
analysis which groups the sample companies according to overall environmental performance 
revealing different environmental strategy postures or management orientations.  
In the following sections, first environmental management practice of the sampled 
                                                          
13 The quantitative research reported below was conducted within the research project, In Global Competition – 
Microeconomic Factors of Competitiveness of the Hungarian Economy. A focal element of this basically 
empirical resarch programme, initiated and managed by the Department of Business Economics at BUESPA, 
was two questionnaire surveys, completed by 1400 executives of 325 companies in 1996 and 1220 executives of 
319 companies in 1999. The analysis below reports the findings of the survey of 1999 related to environmental 
management. The financial and technical support of the Department is kindly acknowledged. 
14 Environmental management questions appeared in three separate questionnaires of the whole questionnaire 
package: question related to the organisational or managerial aspects were included in the “CEO questionnaire” 
(from No. v103a to v111b); production and technology related questions appeared in the “Production 
questionnaire” (from No. t53 to t62c); and ‘green marketing’ questions were included in the “Sales-Marketing 
questionnaire” (from No. k15a  to k15e). Due to differences in missing data among the three questionnaires, 
missing answers accumulated that resulted in a sample of 281 companies. The final industrial sample under 
investigation contained 204 manufacturing and mining firms. (See the Appendix for detailed sample 
characteristics.) 
15 The five dimensions of environmental performance in the sample of 1996: environmental practice, 
investment, innovation, marketing, and voluntary information provision (see Pataki–Boda–Radácsi–Hope 
[1998]). 
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Hungarian industrial firms will be described by frequency results17 and, keeping in mind the 
differences between the samples of 1996 and 1999, the relevant data of 1996 will also be 
referred to.18 The next two sections will present the multivariate statistical analysis of the 
sample of 1999, first company environmental performance dimensions resulted from factor 
analysis, then the three groups of environmental management orientation resulted from cluster 
analysis. At the end of this paper some conclusions will be drawn. 
 
7.3. CHARACTERISING COMPANY ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The relevance of environmental issues for the majority of the sampled Hungarian 
industrial firms is evident from the fact that 72 percent is obliged to provide annual 
environmental report to the regional environmental agency (the respective data in the sample 
of 1996 was 75 percent). Moreover, most of the sampled industrial firms claim to have an 
employee responsible for environmental affairs (the relevant data for 1996 and 1999 
respectively are: 85 and 77 percent).19 In contrast, only 16 companies (8 percent) claimed to 
operate an environmental committee that provides an opportunity for functional managers to 
frequently discuss and co-ordinate environmental management issues or actions.20 The picture 
becomes more sober with respect to environmental training. Only 12 percent of the sampled 
companies provide some sort of environmental training for all employees which offers no 
great promises in terms of environmental awareness at every organisational level. It seems 
that environmental training is more functionally focused, that is, to the employees responsible 
for managing environmental affairs: 36 percent of the sampled firms provides this type of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16 An analysis for the sample of 281 firms was presented in Pataki [2001]. 
17 A questionnaire survey does not allow for gathering physical data of company pollution performance. All the 
studies mentioned in Table 3 and 4 could gain this information from different sort of pollution databases, 
however, in Hungary such data are not readily available. Questions with regard to financial data, such as for 
example the annual amount of environmental penalties charged, were also omitted due to limited space in the 
questionnaires for environmental questions. In accordance with the general structure of the questionaire 
package, environmental questions were mainly eithor-or type and, to a lesser extent, five-scale attitude-type 
questions.  
18 Note that the sample of 1996 and that of 1999 may be compared only to a very limited extent mainly due to 
their distributional differences in terms of industrial sectors and company size. Therefore, no tendencies can be 
reported. Nevertheless, respective data of 1996 will be indicated below. 
19 20 % of the sampled firms of 1999 reported no position with environmental task assigned (missing answers 
were 3 %). 
20 89 % answered negatively to this question, while 3 % of the answers were missing. The respecitve data for 
the sample of 1996 are 8 % affirmative answer, 92 % negative. 
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training.21 These data suggest a possible weakness of environmental management practice in 
terms of continuous improvement, knowledge and skill accumulation and upgrading that can, 
in the longer run, seriously restrict company environmental performance. 
 A more integrated approach to environmental management would require, at least 
formally, environmental issues be part of strategic planning. 26 percent of the sampled firms 
claimed to have environmental considerations integrated into its strategic plan, in contrast to 
33 percent negative answers, and 35 percent reported to have no such plan.22 A value chain 
approach to environmental issues would also contribute to a more integrated environmental 
management. 32.5 percent of the sampled industrial firms claimed to check suppliers’ 
environmental performance (the respective data in 1996 was 33 percent) and 23 percent 
established a formal procedure for that purpose. At a five-graded scale, the average 
importance attributed to environmental issues in procurement decisions was 2.98 (variance: 
1.20), and 36 percent of companies rated environmental issues “important” or “very 
important” in purchasing policy, in contrast to 34 percent who claimed them “insignificant” 
(data for 1996 were 37 and 28 percent respectively). 
 A comprehensive tool for systematising and institutionalising environmental 
management is the ISO 14001 standard. Out of the sample of 204 industrial firms, 14 have 
operated an EMS, while at 27 companies it was under construction.23 One fifth of the sampled 
industrial firms may claim to take steps toward a more systematic environmental management 
which might offer the possibility for raising environmental awareness throughout the 
organisation despite the obvious fact that an EMS by itself is no guarantee for environmental 
performance improvement of business organisations towards sustainability.  
 Obviously, effective environmental management inevitably requires major changes in 
investment, technological and research and development decisions of industrial organisations. 
Firms in the sample of 1999, in general, score better on the technological dimension of 
environmental performance than on any other. 40 percent of the sampled companies reported 
environmental investments implemented in the previous three years. (the respective data for 
1996 is 43 percent).24 The main motivating factors in carrying out environmental investments, 
                                                          
21 All data is quite similar to those of 1996 where environmental training for specialists was reported by 40 
percent, for all employees by 7.5 percent. 
22 In the sample of 1996, affirmative answers amounted to 44 percent, while 17 percent answered in the 
negative. 
23 This question was not included in the questionnaire of 1996. 
24 The majority of environmental investments implemented were targeted to reduction in emissions to air (25 
%); investments in the reduction in waste water, solid waste and noise pollution amounted to 16, 16 and 12 %, 
while reduction in soil contamination 6 percent. 
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similarly to data of 1996, were environmental regulation in Hungary (the respective means on 
a five scale: 1996: 3.7; 1999: 3.7) and improving corporate image (respectively 3.7 and 4.0); 
stricter regulation expected in the future was attributed a smaller pressure (respectively 3.2 
and 3.5) and public pressure (respectively 2.3 and 2.5). A technological improvement may 
yield additional environmental benefits despite being primarily of an environmental 
investment: 41 percent of the sampled industrial firms claimed to reap environmental benefits 
by general technological changes. The majority of them (34 percent) reported changes in 
basic technology and a smaller group (12 percent) changes in product line as the primary 
investment purpose that additionally resulted in environmental performance improvement. It 
is by no accident that data for 1996 demonstrated a higher rate of changes in technology and 
product lines (respectively 57 and 32.5 percent) since the first survey covered an earlier 
period of the so-called economic transformation process (1992–1995). 
To purchase environmental products and services is an alternative or complementary 
to own technology development activities aiming at improved environmental performance. 
More than half of the sampled industrial firms (1996: 60, 1999: 53 percent) claimed to 
purchase specialised environmental products and services. Both surveys revealed that 
Hungarian industrial companies do not put much effort in environmental research and 
development. ‘Greening’ technology R+D seems more widespread among the sampled firms 
than ‘greening’ product R+D: the respective data for 1999 were 27 and 8 percent.25 Probably 
due to lack of information surprisingly few answered the question whether there were any 
market success stemming from environmental R+D activities: 12 percent claimed to reap 
economic benefits, while 14 percent experienced no market gain. Attitudes toward the 
importance of environmental considerations in technology and product development were 
also investigated: 32 percent of the sampled industrial firms rated environmental issues 
‘important’ or ‘very important’ in technology development decisions, in contrast to 21 percent 
who consider them “unimportant” (data for 1996 were 30 and 22 percent respectively); for 
product development decisions, environmental considerations were judged to be “important” 
or “very important” by 30 percent and “unimportant” by 22 percent (data for 1996 were 26 
and 23 percent respectively).26 Since environmental R+D can hardly be considered as a 
widespread practice of the sampled industrial firms, it is not surprising that only 12 percent 
                                                          
25 The questionnaire of 1996 did not separate technology and product R+D. There was 33 % affirmative answer; 
the respective data for 1999 was 30 %. 
26 Means and variances on the five scale for 1999 are the following: for product development 3.1 and 1.4, for 
technology development 3.2 and 1.3. Means for 1996 were 2.9 and 3.1 respectively. Note that missing values 
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reported sales of environmental products and services developed by the organisation itself.  
A separate but no less significant dimension of company environmental performance 
is communication. Ideally, firms should provide and share environmental information with 
external stakeholders in order, on the one hand, to enable rational decisions and reactions on 
the part of its constituency and, on the other hand, to learn and increase organisational 
capabilities for dealing with environmental issues through a dialogue with external 
stakeholders. Company environmental communication may be separated to environmental 
marketing (targeting market stakeholders), obligatory environmental reporting to regulatory 
authorities (required by law), and voluntary environmental information provision mainly to 
non-market stakeholders. There some industrial sectors whose products are subjected to 
regulations requiring information provision to customers, for example, about the proper and 
safe product use, including environmental information. Not surprisingly, the most frequently 
claimed environmental communication among the sampled industrial firms was information 
provision to customers about environmental risks in product use: 39 percent answered 
affirmatively. Among the possible means of ‘green marketing’ most of the sampled 
companies (30 percent) applies some sort of environmental signs on product packaging.27 
Environmental attributes appear in company advertising of 25.5 percent and in product 
advertising of 22 percent of the sampled industrial firms.28 The data presented so far describes 
those environmental communication efforts that are typically of a one-way nature; sending 
intended messages from the company to its market stakeholders. Unfortunately, forms and 
means of environmental communication based on dialogue between companies and their 
stakeholders – which, at the same time, are the ways of establishing and maintaining trust as 
well as that of environmental learning – are hardly applied by the sampled industrial firms. 
Out of the 204 companies, only 22 (11 percent) reported the publishing of an annual 
environmental report distributed among stakeholder groups and 14 firms (7 percent) organise 
frequently public hearings on environmental issues.29 In sum, as few as 27 industrial firms (13 
percent of the sample) provide voluntarily information about its environmental performance 
to its wider constituency.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
were relatively high for both surveys (e. g. in 1999 33 and 28 % respectively). 
27 It should be kept in mind, however, that in Hungary many companies apply environmental signs or logos 
(such as, e. g., logos for recyclability) that have nothing to do with the real performance of the product in 
question, that is, those firms misinform their consumers.  
28 ‘Green marketing’ data for 1996 were 37; 22.5 and 22.5 % respectively. 
29 Data for 1996 were 14 and 4 % respectively. 
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7.4. DIMENSIONS OF COMPANY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: 
FACTOR ANALYSIS  
 
A major aim of the present empirical analysis is to define dimensions of company 
environmental performance based on the answers of the sampled industrial firms to the 
environmental management questions included in the questionnaire package. Therefore, 
factor analysis was applied in order to uncover, if it is possible, a hidden structure of company 
environmental performance.30 Table 4 shows the resulted three dimensions of company 
environmental performance.31 
 
Table 6 Result of Factor Analysis: Dimensions of Company Environmental Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables: 
Factor 1: 
Envtal 
Practice and 
Stake-
holder 
Communi-
cation 
Factor 2: 
Techno-
logy 
Factor 3: 
Marketing 
Environmental considerations in supplier selection 0.77   
Environmental training for environmental staff 0.72   
Environmental information provision to customers 0.58   
Voluntary information provision (hearings, envtal report) 0.58   
Environmental training for all employees 0.53   
Environmental R+D  0.71  
Investment in environmental technologies  0.67  
Purchase of environmental products and services  0.64  
Establish an environmental manager position  0.62  
Environmental aspects in product advertisements   0.86 
Environmental aspects in company advertisements   0.83 
Eigenvalue 3.41 1.45 1.14 
Variance explained (%) 30.96 13.16 10.35 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax (with Kaiser-normalisation) 
 
Questions relating to organisational environmental practices and stakeholder inclusion 
or communication have higher loadings on factor 1. For example, environmental performance 
                                                          
30 The questions answered affirmatively by less than 10 % of the sampled firms were omitted from factor 
analysis (e. g. environmental committee) or, where it was appropriate, a composite variable were produced out 
of them (such as the variable of voluntary environmental information provision from the variables of 
environmental report and public hearings). The questions where answers seemed particularly untrustful were 
also omitted (e. g. environmental information on product packaging). 
31 The methodological validity of the factor analysis presented is underlined by the value of the KMO-measure 
(0.76) and the statistically significant Bartlett-test. Following the ‘eigenvalue = 1’ rule the three factor result 
explains 54.46 % of vairance which seems quite reasonable considering the exploratory nature of the present 
inquiry. 
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requirements integrated in supplier selection have their importance, on the other hand, in 
institutionalising environmental practices and, on the other, in their communication potential 
(since they may form a base for subsequent dialogue and co-operation through the value 
chain). Environmental training for employees may have this same “double character”. Also, 
variables directly applying to (non-market) stakeholder communication have relatively high 
loadings on factor 1.  
Factor 2 is unambiguously determined by variables related to environmental 
technology, such as environmental investments, purchase of environmental products and 
services as well as environmental R+D. Factor 2 includes, though with a relatively small 
factor loading, the variable of established environmental manager position.  
The two variables of ‘green marketing’ constitute factor 3. Thus, it is evident that 
voluntary (non-market) environmental communication and market-oriented communication 
(that is, marketing) define separate dimensions of company environmental performance.  
In the industrial sample of 1999 three dimensions of company environmental 
performance were distinguished (as a latent structure of the answers): (1) environmental 
practice and stakeholder communication, (2) technology, and (3) marketing. By using the 
scores of all sampled firms on these dimensions, a cluster analysis can be conducted to 
uncover whether there are different groups of companies. The results are introduced and 
interpreted in the next section. 
 
7.4. CLUSTERS OF COMPANY ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 
 
All firms were scored on the three dimensions of environmental performance and then 
grouped according to the similarities of their measured performance. Table 5 shows the result 
of the cluster analysis:32 
 
                                                          
32 The methodological validity of the cluster analysis was checked in different ways. First, a hierarchical cluster 
analysis was conducted, measuring distance by the so-called Ward-method. The dendogram produced suggested 
a three cluster solution. Next, a non-hierarchical, so-called K-means cluster analysis was conducted. The 
produced three cluster solution was appropriate for substantive interpretation. Then, the sample was randomly 
divided into two sub-samples and K-means cluster analyses were run separately – all of them produced similar 
three cluster solutions.  
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Table 7 Result of Cluster Analysis: Three Groups of Company Environmental Performance 
 
 
 
Dimensions of environmental performance: 
Cluster 1: 
Inward 
looking 
technolog
y oriented 
Cluster 2: 
Laggard 
Cluster 3: 
Outward 
looking 
practice 
oriented 
 
 
 
F-test* 
Envtal practice and stakeholder-communication - 0.10 - 0.73 1.13 60.15 
Technology 0.54 - 0.93 0.33 43.59 
Marketing - 0.73 0.34 0.84 47.72 
Number of firms (%) 56 (42.8) 40 (30.5) 35 (26.7) – 
* p= 0.000 
Number of firms: 131; Number of missing cases (% of the total sample): 73 (35.8%). 
 
The cluster analysis produced three groups of companies that demonstrate significant 
differences in their environmental performance. The environmental management of 
companies of cluster 1 focuses primarily upon the technology dimension and, at the same 
time, demonstrate a very weak performance on, or indifference to, the other dimensions of 
environmental marketing and practice/stakeholder communication. If this latter dimension is 
further examined it turns out that cluster 1 companies perform better on the variables of 
environmental practice (they demonstrate an average performance on environmental practice; 
better performance than cluster 2, but worse than cluster 3) and their performance on 
stakeholder communication is as weak as those of companies of cluster 2. Overall, their 
environmental management is characterised by an inward focus (lack of communication to 
external constituency) and relatively well-developed over the technology dimension. 
Companies of cluster 2 perform poorly in every dimension of environmental 
management relative to the other two clusters. Neither the technology nor the environmental 
practice dimensions show significant environmental efforts of cluster 2 firms. Therefore, as 
industrial firms, they demonstrate a surprising indifference towards environmental issues – 
they may be considered as laggards in environmental performance.  
Companies of cluster 3 demonstrate the best performance on all but one dimension of 
environmental management. The relatively most apparent feature of their environmental 
management is its focus upon the practice/stakeholder communication and marketing 
dimensions – a stronger outward focus compared to the other two clusters. Their performance 
on the technology dimension lags behind that of cluster 1. Cluster 3 firms show a relatively 
balanced environmental performance therefore one might risk to term them as environmental 
leaders. Overall, their environmental management approach is characterised by an outward 
looking practice orientation.  
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The substantive validity of the above three clusters solution was also examined by 
cross-tabulations between cluster membership and other environmental variables not included 
in the factor analysis. This analysis re-affirmed the three clusters solution.  
Cluster 3 companies scored best on the other environmental variables. “Outward 
looking environmental practice oriented” industrial firms perform significantly better on all 
other practice related variables than cluster 1, the “inward looking technology oriented” firms. 
They typically include environmental consideration into their strategic plans; operate an 
environmental management system (half of the companies among the sampled industrial firms 
which operate an EMS belong to cluster 3); and 64 percent of those companies that 
established an environmental committee belong to cluster 3. 
Perceived environmental demands of stakeholders also differentiate between the three 
clusters. Regulatory pressure is perceived by cluster 1 and 3 firms of a similar importance (the 
cluster means were 3.89 and 3.88 respectively, with a variance of 1.12 for both), contrary to 
the “laggards” (cluster 2) (mean: 2.80; variance: 1.16). Perceived environmental demands of 
organisational stakeholders separate the three clusters: owner or shareholder pressure 
perceived to have a relatively weaker importance for cluster 1 than 3 firms (mean: 3.00; 
variance: 1.43 and mean: 3.62; variance: 1.28 respectively) as well as managers/employees’ 
environmental demands (mean: 3.04; variance: 1.07 and mean: 3.71; variance: 0.94).33 The 
most striking differences appear, as expected, in the case of external stakeholders. For market 
stakeholders: consumers’ environmental demands are perceived significantly stronger by 
industrial firms with an “outward looking practice oriented” environmental management 
approach (cluster 3) than companies with an “inward looking technology oriented 
environmental management posture (mean: 3.41; variance: 1.26 and mean: 2.50; variance: 
1.18 respectively); this is also the case as to the environmental pressure of business 
partners/suppliers (mean: 3.29; variance: 1.00 and mean: 2.58; variance: 1.20 respectively).34 
As to the non-market stakeholders: perceived pressure by political pressure groups is 
generally low and makes no statistically significant difference between the three clusters; in 
contrast to pressure from local population which is perceived significantly stronger by cluster 
3 firms than the other two clusters (mean: 3.23; variance: 1.40; data for the other two clusters 
were 2.40 as mean and a relatively smaller variance than for the relevant data for cluster 3). 
                                                          
33 Data for cluster 2, the “environmental laggards” were: mean of owner pressure 2.48; variance 1.34; mean of 
manager/employee pressure 2.40; variance 1.22. 
34 Data for environmental laggards were: mean of consumer pressure 1.97, variance 1.03; mean of business 
partner/supplier pressure 1.90, variance 1.01. 
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Overall, perceived importance of stakeholders’ environmental demands re-affirm the 
three clusters solution for the sampled industrial firms.35 Laggards in environmental 
management hardly perceive any environmental requirements; firms with an “inward looking 
technology oriented” environmental management perceive relatively stronger environmental 
pressure from regulatory and organisational stakeholders; and companies with an “outward 
looking practice oriented” environmental management focus typically report relatively 
stronger environmental expectations by all stakeholder groups, market and non-market 
included.36  
 
The relationship between cluster membership and independent variables were also 
investigated. 57 percent of the large industrial firms, measured by the number of employees, 
belonged to the cluster of “outward looking practice oriented” environmental management – 
this cluster was over-represented among the largest industrial firms (No. of employees over 
500). 41 percent of the cluster of “inward looking technology oriented” environmental 
management was a small firm (having less than 99 employees). Similarly, 41 percent of 
“environmental laggards” belonged to the smallest firms and 39 percent of them to the 
middle-sized firms (having 100–249 employees).37 
There was no statistically significant relationship between industrial sectors and 
cluster membership, mainly due to the relatively small number of firms in each industrial sub-
                                                          
35 Controlling for company size does not eliminate the statistically significant relationship.  
36 The relationship between environmental performance and perceived stakeholder pressure was analysed in 
another way as well. A factor analysis was conducted over the variables of stakeholder pressure producing 
methodologically as well as substantively interpretable result (KMO-measure: 0.85 and significant Bartlett-test). 
Though the ‘eigenvalue = 1’ rule produced only a one factor solution (53.5 % of variance was explained), the 
scree-plot and our substantive interpretation suggested a three factors solution (explaining 78.2 % of variance). 
Factor 1 included stakeholder pressure from manager/employee, business partner/supplier, and owners; political 
pressure groups, local population and consumer environmetal pressure had a high loadings on factor 2; while 
perceived regulatory pressure constituted factor 3. A non-hierarchical cluster analysis produced a dendogram 
that suggested a four clusters solution. Out of the 204 firms, 181 provided usable answers for this analysis. 17.2 
percent of the 181 companies (that is, 35 firms) constituted a cluster that typically reports no perceived 
environmental pressure; 39.2 % of firms experience environmental demands from all stakeholder groups (that is, 
80 firms); 13.7 % (28 companies) reports pressure typically from organisational stakeholders and business 
partners; and 18.6 % (38 firms) perceive environmental demands only from regulatory stakeholders. The two 
cluster analyses demonstrate a statistically significant relationship: 42.5 % of environmental laggards belongs to 
the group which experience no stakeholder pressure toward environmental management (laggards constitute 68 
% of the cluster reporting no pressure); companies with an “inward looking technology oriented” environmental 
management were over-represented in the cluster of regulatory pressure (they constitute the 61 % of the cluster 
of regulatory pressure); the typical firm of the cluster of “outward looking practice oriented” environmental 
management focus belongs either to the cluster of all-stakeholder pressure (69 % of the “practice oriented” 
cluster) or to the cluster of organisational and business partners’ pressure (22 %). It seems that the 
environmental performance of the sampled industrial firms demonstrate a strong relationship with the perceived 
environmental demands of different stakeholder groups. 
37 p = 98 %  
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sector. However, some over- or under-representation might be noted. 54 percent of the 
sampled food, beverages, and tobacco companies (that is, only 7 firms), 60 percent of firms in 
the metal industry (9 companies) and 83 percent of mining companies (5 firms) belonged to 
the cluster of “inward looking technology oriented” environmental practice. 60 percent of 
textile and clothing firms (6 companies) and 50 percent of firms in the machines, equipment 
industry (7 companies) were characterised as “environmental laggards”. 60 percent of 
chemical firms (6 companies) belonged to the cluster of “outward looking practice oriented” 
environmental management. 
 
There was no statistically significant relationship between any variables characterising 
the general business strategy of the sampled industrial firms  and environmental cluster 
membership. The case was similar for the analysis of the survey of 1996. Environmental 
management posture showed any kind of relationship  neither with general business strategy 
nor with general production management practice. The only relationship that emerged was the 
one between the clusters or variables of ethical/social performance and environmental 
clusters. Though the statistical significance of this relationship could be attributed to the 
variable of company size: those larger firms that established ethical institutions within their 
organisational structure belonged to the cluster of “outward looking practice oriented” 
environmental management. 
Despite of this impact of company size, it might be argued that a generally well-
developed stakeholder orientation is characteristic to the companies with “environmental 
leadership” in the sense of demonstrating a relatively “outward looking practice oriented”. 
This is underlined by the statistically significant relationship between the variable of whose 
interests count in company decisions (among the stakeholders) and environmental clusters. 
Again, the three environmental clusters were separated along the perceived importance of 
non-market, external stakeholders’ interests: companies with an “outward looking practice 
oriented” environmental management attributed relatively greater importance of taking into 
account the interests of trade unions, local population, media, and the natural environment in 
company decisions than the other two environmental clusters.38 
 
                                                          
38 Controlling for company size did eliminate the relationship in the case of trade unions and the media, but not 
in the case of the local population and the natural environment. 
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7.5. CONCLUDING NOTES 
 
A general conclusion drawn from the two empirical studies of the research program, 
“In Global Competition” in particular and from other empirical studies in general concerning 
industrial firms’ environmental management in Hungary is that the majority of companies 
attempt to improve, in some way, its environmental performance, though about one third of 
this population demonstrate complete indifference towards the environment. A majority of the 
companies trying to improve their environmental performance treat environmental issues as 
primarily of a technological nature – the environmental management of these industrial firms 
is technology oriented. It is a further characteristic of these firms that their environmental 
approach is “inwardly focusing” in the sense of lacking environmental communication and of 
those organisational practices and institutions which further stakeholders’ inclusion and 
dialogue. It seems obvious that this type of environmental management posture perceives its 
main motivational force by regulatory compliance – this environmental strategy is termed as 
compliance-based or defensive (see Roome [1992], Steger [1993], Kerekes–Kindler [1995]). 
This environmental management approach characterised some of the smallest firms in the 
sample. 
The dominance of the largest firms in the environmental management cluster of 
“outward looking practice oriented” firms may be not surprising. A survey type of method 
does not allow for the possibility to explain whether the firms constituting this environmental 
cluster are ab ovo environmentally more conscious or, because they are large companies, they 
inevitably experience stronger pressure from all stakeholders. Obviously, these two 
explanations or factors may together constitute a better or more comprehensive explanation. 
Empirical studies also revealed that Hungarian industrial firms tend to treat 
environmental issues rather as technological problems than challenges to existing 
organisational routines or governance structures. The weakest aspect of company 
environmental management in Hungary is, however, communication. Among the applied 
‘green communication’ tools, market orientation (marketing) is dominating over the more 
voluntary information provisions to the wider constituency. The neglect of these latter type of 
communication tools may pose problems of credibility and trust since market (competitive) 
strategy and non-market strategy should reinforce each other in an “integrated strategy” (cf. 
Schot [1992], Maxwell et al. [1997], Reinhardt [1998]). If this is not the case (that is, without 
the synergy between market and non-market strategies) the effectiveness of environmental 
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performance improvements are undermined in the long run and even the charge of ‘green 
washing’ cannot easily be refused (see Welford [1997a]). 
A common finding of the empirical studies in Hungary is that there is a relationship 
between the environmental performance of industrial firms and the perceived environmental 
pressures of different groups of stakeholders. In the case of the environmental clusters 
emerged from the analysis of the sample of 1999, the firms poorly performing on all 
dimensions of environmental management (that is, “environmental laggards”) typically 
perceive no environmental pressure; the firms with an “inward looking technology oriented” 
environmental management posture perceive stronger environmental requirements from 
regulatory stakeholders; and the industrial firms characterised by an “outward looking 
practice oriented” environmental management approach tend to attribute relatively strong 
pressure to all stakeholders. 
The only trend that might be seen to emerge between the two surveys of 1996 and 
1999 is the trend of increasing stakeholders’ environmental demands perceived by industrial 
firms. It might be argued that the difference between the two samples may even emphasise 
this trend since the sample of 1999 consists of more small firms than that of 1996 and, as 
many studies including this one showed, larger companies demonstrate on average relatively 
better environmental performance (of course, partly due to the bias of the whole practice and 
theory of environmental management). It is of a particular interest that the environmental 
pressure of regulatory stakeholders were not perceived as increasing during this period 
(though the average strength of this stakeholder is the greatest in comparison to the others; 
that is, 3.6). All the other stakeholder groups were perceived to inflict increasing 
environmental demands on industrial firms during the period of 1996–1999. Of course, it 
should be noted that the increased environmental pressure started from a relatively low level. 
Nevertheless, this trend and some of the findings reported above might hopefully serve as 
sensible lessons for all actors in the environmental management field in Hungary.  
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Part III 
Corporate Greening in Hungary during the 1990s: 
A Qualitative Empirical Research 39 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
 
The objective of qualitative inquiry was to understand the meaning of corporate greening 
in Hungary during the 1990s (after the regime change). How do managers of Hungarian large 
industrial firms intepret environmental issues? In what ways do they speak of corporate 
greening? What kind of discourses dominate in the business sphere with regard to ecological 
issues? How is the reality of environmental issues constructed by corporations in Hungary? 
How might this reality be characterised? What kind of opportunities and obstacles are 
provided by, or inherent to, these constructions of reality and their realisation through actual 
business behaviour? What are the most salient and influential elements of the institutional 
context which corporate greening is embedded in? 
 
The results of explorative survey research have demonstrated that business 
environmental management in Hungary is diverse. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect 
valuable findings from a qualitative research that is designed to gain a deeper and more 
dynamic understanding of corporate greening in the Hungarian context after the regime 
change. The particular methodology of qualitative research was chosen in order to enable the 
researcher to smoothly move from idiosyncratic characterisitcs to general conclusions. 
 
                                                          
39 The research was financed by an OTKA (National Scientific and Research Fund) grant (No. F29121) between 
1999 and 2000. The author kindly acknowledges this support. Six colleagues worked with the present author on 
this qualitative enquiry. I wish to thank Zsolt Boda, Zsófia Hajnal, Attila Harkai, Réka Matolay, Zsuzsa Molnár, 
and Richárd Szántó for their excellent contributions. No one of them is responsible for possible deficiencies of 
the analysis presented in this dissertation. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Is it possible though to infer general findings from particular cases, or even reach any 
level of theory building? A few qualitative methodologies were designed to fulfill just this 
purpose. The research reported here builds upon three methodological approaches: grounded 
theory developed by Glaser and Strauss [1967] (see moreover Strauss–Corbin [1990] and 
[1994]); the case study methodology of Yin [1994]; and, the elements of qualitative data 
analysis offered by Miles and Huberman [1994].  
 
Seven large industrial firms, based in Hungary, were chosen as subject matters of case 
studies.40 Selection rested on several different theoretical and pragmatical considerations. By 
the very first criterion, companies included in the sample had to be known by their 
environmental efforts. Thus, all the firms involved in the sample have been from among 
companies that were, under Hungarian circumstances, leaders in greening. This criterion 
stemmed right from the research question. The aim was to understand what corporate 
greening means to companies. This could be answered genuinely only by firms that had been 
making efforts in this field for a long time: only they possesses detailed and rich experience. 
All the seven companies in the sample are large corporations by annual sales and, except 
one of them, by number of employees, too. This has partly resulted from the intention to find 
firms for case studies that were already well-known for their environmental efforts. 
Information about small- and medium-sized companies is relatively more difficult to access, 
and even in the international arena, there are very few environmental management research 
efforts directed to firms of this size. Experience drawn from our quantitative research 
experience also backed the sampling of large corporations: several classical environmental 
management questions and problems arise and can be examined with regard to these 
companies, compared to small- and medium-size firms. 
Another important consideration for sampling was to choose companies that would be 
willing to participate relatively easily. This was a precondition for conducting succesfull and 
penetrating case studies. Experience drawn from previous conferences or seminars by 
listening to different corporate environmental presentations helped a lot in this process. Thus, 
personal acquaintance, relationship and knowledge were important aspects of selection. Apart 
                                                          
40 Altogether seven case studies were conducted applying the same methodology, but only three stories of 
corporate greening will be reported in detail below. However, the analysis presented in Chapter 10 below is 
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from these considerations, the following facets played important roles in the sampling 
process: in order to examine the possible impact of sector membership, companies from 
different sectors were needed; companies belonging to sectors usually judged to have high 
environmental pollution burden (chemical and cement industry) were decidedly looked for; 
and to have the opportunity for comparison, firms from sectors of low environmental 
pollution (R&D oriented companies in electronics) were also chosen; corporations in serious 
(past or present) conflicts with local communities or green organisations because of 
environmental problems were important to include, just as firms that have no adversarial 
public relations; the sample involved companies set up by greenfield investments and also 
firms privatised through the stock exchange or by professional investors (acquisitions through 
privatisation); there are companies in the sample with rather fragmented ownership structure 
and also subsidiaries of multinationals. The following table summarizes the ground for 
sampling in the present research, compared to the theoretically possible reasons summarised 
by Miles–Huberman [1994]: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
based on all the seven case studies, as might later be evident from the interviews cited. 
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Table 8  Possible Sampling Strategies in Qualitative Inquiry and the Actual Ones Applied by the Present 
Research 
Type of sampling Purpose Present research 
Maximum variation Documents diverse variations and 
identifies important common 
patterns 
Diversity in industrial sector, 
ownership structure, organisational 
history, environmental burden, 
environmental risks 
Homogeneous Focuses, reduces, simplifies, 
facilitates group interviewing 
Large companies well-known of 
their environmental management 
efforts 
Critical case Permits logical generaliztion and 
maximum pplication of information 
to other cases 
One of the firms is a frequent target 
of a green NGO; while two other 
have successfully managed conflicts 
with green NGOs  
Theory based Finding examples of a theoretical 
construct and thereby elaborate and 
examine it 
– 
Confirming and disconfirming cases Elaborating initial analysis, seeking 
exceptions, looking for variation 
Looking for variations of corporate 
greening in Hungary 
Snowball or chain Identifies cases of interest from 
people who know what cases are 
information-rich 
– 
Extreme or deviant case Learning from highly unusual 
manifestations of the phenomenon 
of interest 
– 
Typical case Highlights what is normal or 
average 
– 
Intensity Information-rich cases that manifest 
the phenomenon intensely, but not 
extremely 
By doing archival research in 
newspaper databases first, well-
publicised cases of corporate 
environmental management were 
looked for 
Politically important cases Attracts desired attention or avoids 
attracting undesired attention 
A desire to present relatively 
positive examples of corporate 
greening 
Random purposeful Adds credibility to sample when 
potential purposeful sample is too 
large 
– 
Stratified purposeful Illustrates subgroups; facilitates 
comparisons 
Two chemical and two electronic 
firms were selected 
Criterion All cases that meet some criterion; 
useful for quality asurance 
A main precondition was to have a 
longer history of corporte 
environmental management 
Opportunistic Following new leads; taking 
advantage of the unexpected 
– 
Combination or mixed Triangulation, flexibility, meets 
multiple interests and needs 
Firms sampled in previous 
environmental management survey 
research  
Convenience Save time, money, and effort, but at 
the expense of information and 
credibility 
Relatively easy access through prior 
personal contacts  
(Based on Miles–Huberman [1994], p. 28) 
 
Overall 56 interviews were conducted between February and December 2000. All the 
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interviews were taped and then transcribed word by word. The next step was coding the texts. 
First the most detailed and demanding coding method was used. Progressing row by row in 
the text, we put the most important words and expressions (either verbs, nouns, or adjectives) 
used by the interviewees at the end of each row as codes. Then, another coding method was 
applied. The main content of the rows or interview sections were marked in the text, and 
concepts covering their sublect matters were put down on paper next to the given part. This 
was also made by a relatively “thick” coding: several codes might designate each section, 
since more than one significant environmental issue or subject matter could have emerged. 
These codes were like the following: “Greens,” “local community,” etc. (that is, actors of 
greening), or, “environmental policy,” “environmental organisation,” “technology,” etc. (that 
is, issues of corporate environmental management), or, “location,” “leadership style,” etc. 
(general attributes of company operations).  
Analysis went on as follows. The first interview was regularly made with the 
environmental manager of the company. (The only exception to this rule was the case of the 
cement factory presented below, Chapter 8. Here, the first interviewee was the environmental 
officer of the city’s local government.) One of the important tasks of the first interview(s) was 
to map the organisational field: persons and organisations inside and outside the company that 
had played some role in the history of corporate greening under investigation. That is, efforts 
were made to select the most important agents of corporate greening in each case. Moreover, 
during the first interviews (usually the first 3–4 interviews) we insisted on applying the 
recommendation of grounded theory to influence the interviewees with questions the least. 
First, general and open questions were posed in order to be able to understand gradually how 
they perceived the history of corporate greening, what sort of words, expressions, images they 
used and formulated. The ability and willingness to speak, of course, were different among 
the interviewees. Interviewers were always prepared with certian general questions with 
regard to corporate environmental management, such as to clarify the structural position of 
environmental tasks and responsibilites within the organisation under investigation, or how 
the environmental management system was implemented, etc. In the meantime, more and 
more questions were generated as a result of coding and analysing the interviews done 
already. Gradually, topics or themes of greening – mentioned by all (or most of) the 
interviewees or by only one of them but with a great emphasis put on it – emerged, and 
demanded further “questioning” during interviews with other persons. (Not to impel any 
interpretative frame on to interviewees by researchers, direct questions were, of course, 
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avoided in these cases, too.) These issues or concepts were put in the category of “themes” 
and included codes such as “awareness,” “discipline,” “profit and ecology,” etc. 
Certainly, the other main part of our coding (analysing) procedure was the “combination” 
of the two coding methods. Furthermore, combination meant the assignation of most frequent 
words and expressions shown up in the sections marked by the “themes” to the “themes” 
themselves. Consequently, the number of themes could be decreased, and connections among 
them (irreducible to each other) were explored according to words, expressions used by 
different interviewees when speaking about different themes during the interviews. By its 
logic, the procedure applied here is similar to the coding mechanisms of grounded theory. 
Practically, we, too, attempted to create categories, to explore the relationship among the 
categories and to segregate the most important categories emerging from within the interview 
texts.  
Each corporate case was examined profoundly by two researchers. One of them was, of 
course, the researcher who made the interviews, and the other was always the present author. 
Coding was always done by the present author, and then – in most of the cases – “real life” 
field experience of the researcher was discussed and recorded. During these conversations, 
each researcher spoke of his/her impressions, observations about the interviewee, the place 
and the process of the interview itself. We also shared our views about and discussed what the 
interview “seemed to be about,” what we learned about the story of greening in question, and 
where “dark spots,” deficits, and uncertainties are with regard to its details. This way, a 
shared picture was formulated about each case study. Whenever four-five interviews at a 
company was made, a groupmeeting was arranged, where researchers presented their 
findings, initial analyses, and further research needs. Group meetings were arranged in a 
semi-structured way, participating researchers had to follow some instructions regarding how 
to present their own cases.  
The next stage of interviews was conducted in a more structured way. It was designed to 
test initial hypotheses, explore the blank points or details of a given story of greening. 
Significant efforts were made to involve agents outside the focal organisation in order to 
reduce the possibility of uncritically accepting biased perspectives of organisational 
stakeholders. (Obviously, the cross-checking of data gained from the interviews with 
company and other documents was also pursued.) 
 
The next three chapters will introduce three stories of corporate greening in Hungary 
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during the 1990s. These three cases involve altogether 25 interviews, as it is shown by Table 
9 below: 
 
Table 9  Number of Interviews Conducted 
 Number of Interviews 
Within company: (19) 
• top management 6 
• middle management directly reporting to the top 10 
• lower middle management 3 
• shop-floor 1 
Outside company: (5) 
• local government 2 
• trade association 2 
• environmental NGO 1 
Total 25 
 
Out of the seven case studies prepared, the three introduced below seem to represent the 
major tenets or features of the opportunities as well as limits to corporate greening in Hungary 
during the transformation period. The first story of greening of a cement plant is, in a sense, a  
paradigmatic example of turning the threats of public and regulatory pressures into 
opportunities set by the regime change and the process of privatisation. The story of the 
cement plant resonates very much with the more comprehensive issue of social-political 
development of the country towards joining the European Union: the road to become 
“civilised” and “greener.” The second story has its peculiar feature of being perceived as a 
continuous process of greening, despite of the social, political, and economic transformation 
surrounding. A sense of excellence dominates the organisational discourses of greening in this 
case. The chemical firm under question demonstrates a relatively well integrated 
environmental management approach, even targeting the fusion of industrial culture with 
ecology. The third case of a packaging firm has its special feature of being a greenfield 
investment of a multinational firm dominating its sector globally. In a sense, the story is about 
the issue of transferring the technological, organisational knowledge and practice, as well as 
the corresponding ideal of a consumer society of the highly developed nations to Hungary. It 
is no accident that this story strikingly reveals the inherent contradictions of greening a 
consumer society.  
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CHAPTER 8 
A STORY OF REBIRTH: CORPORATE 
GREENING AS NON-MARKET STRATEGY 
 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This is a story about the greening of a cement factory in northern Hungary. The first 
encounter with the corporation in question was through a newspaper article which reported an 
unusually good image and, in particular, a high level of respect for corporate environmental 
performance among local citizens. Having no prior contact with the corporation in question, 
the relevant officials of the local government were first approached. The interview with the 
environmental officer of the municipality revealed this to be an interesting case and one worth 
including among the sample cases in this study. Later, it turned out that in contrast to the 
other corporations in the sample, the cement firm has no specific position for an 
environmental officer and operates without an environmental management system, though 
this has not constituted a limiting factor in greening at all.  
Throughout the case study, extensive archival research was done by analysing documents 
supplied by the company under investigation and by the trade association of the cement sector 
(Hungarian Cement Association – HCA), as well as by reviewing relevant articles in the mass 
media. Overall seven, on average 40–45 minute-long, interviews were conducted, along with 
a short, 10 minute, conversation with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the cement 
company.41 The first two interviews were done with the environmental officer and the 
Chairperson of the Committee for Urban Development and Environmental Protection of the 
local government. Four interviews were conducted with employees of the cement factory, 
respectively: the public relations (PR) manager, the work safety manager, a shop floor worker 
(a part-time electrician who is reported by the press to be the guardian of the hill where the 
mines used by the factory are located), as well as a longer interview with the CEO. The then-
                                                          
41 The interviews were conducted and the archival research was done by Attila Harkai. 
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CEO42 and then-President of HCA, who is currently doing consultancy for HCA, was also 
interviewed. 
The table below summarises the interviews conducted: 
 
Table 10 Interviews for Story 1 
 Number of Interviews 
Within the corporation: (4) 
• τop management 1 
• Middle management directly reporting to the top 1 
• Lower middle management 1 
• Shop-floor 1 
Outside the corporation: (3) 
• Local government 2 
• Trade association 1 
Total: 7 
 
8.2. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
Since after World War II, the existing production capacity of the Hungarian cement 
industry could not satisfy increased construction demand, the Economic Committee of the 
Communist Party issued a decree in 1949 to establish a new cement factory of 1 million tons 
capacity, annually. It was the birth of the cement factory of this story of corporate greening. 
Though construction of the plant started in 1959, production could only begin in 1963. 
Limestone, the primary input of the factory, was mined in the nearby hill and transported by 
open rope-way cars to the storehouse of the plant. Technology was based on five ball and tube 
mills of a dry milling type, three so-called Lepol-furnaces (each with an 850 ton/hour clinker 
production performance) and six cement mills. From the very beginning, however, the factory 
could not operate in the way it was expected:  
 
“There was a lot of trouble... with this cement complex manufactured in the former 
German Democratic Republic...” (then-CEO) 
 
“The technology could not come up to the expectations at all.” (PR Manager)  
 
The most problematic dimension of the technology was its environmental performance: 
 
                                                          
42 The person called then-CEO was the top manager of the cement factory from the very beginning of operations 
till the first year of the regime change. 
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“Primarily, because of environmental reasons, lots of relevant critiques were 
addressed towards the plant. We paid enormous amounts of environmental penalties 
both to the state and to private persons. … when five times more dust was officially 
measured falling down to town in a month, there was no room for protest on our part.” 
(then-CEO) 
 
As the cement factory was established during the times of so-called extensive 
industrialisation in Hungary, the main concern was the size of production capacity and, 
therefore, ecological considerations lagged behind which, consequently, lead to an “under-
design” of filters compared to production capacity, inevitably resulting in serious air 
pollution: 
 
“Cement production released a significant amount of dust through the three chimneys, 
approximately 17,000 ton/year.” (Manager of work safety) 
 
Furthermore, plant location should in particular have required a serious consideration of 
ecological impacts in the design phase since the cement factory was located in the direction of 
wind and consequently, all air pollutants emitted overlaid the nearby town altogether. The 
other serious ecological impact of the cement plant related to its input sourcing: mining 
considerably reduced the value of the hill as a “favourite beauty spot” of local people and 
other tourists from the country. Plant location has, of course, its own economic rationality: 
being close to the main input supply and at the crossroads of different modes of transportation 
infrastructure (water, rail, road), it contributed to the low-cost position of cement production. 
Another advantage of this geographical situation is the relative proximity (30 km) of the plant 
to the capital city; that is, an arm’s-length distance from the country’s largest market for 
construction materials. Lastly, the supplementary input materials for cement production can 
be found in the neighbourhood of the plant.  
As a well-documented outcome of communist industrial and town planning and 
development, life in town and the factory were tightly connected to each other. The cement 
plant, being the largest company in town, was not only the biggest employer but also the main 
contributor to a better quality of life in many respects.  The factory built a block of estates for 
its employees, a school, sports ground, cultural centre and surgery; it also built and 
maintained a public park and contributed to the upgrading of energy supply utilities. The 
prevailing opinion in the factory is as follows: 
 
“We have given a lot of things to the town.” (PR manager) 
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The cement factory had not only dominated the economic situation in the town but 
typically, exerted power over local politics as well. The interviewees recalled that “many 
cadres from the factory achieved high positions in the municipal government,” or “there were 
no decision taken without the consent of the management of the cement plant.” National 
politics, local politics and economy were typically tightly connected during those times in the 
history of Hungary. Not surprisingly, central (state) production plans had a dominance over 
any other interests.  
Despite all the political influence and social contributions of the cement factory, a sort of 
“spontaneous green movement and discontent” had started in the 70s against the polluting 
operations of the plant. The environmental officer of the local government, who arrived in the 
town at the beginning of political transformation, viewed local people suffering from an 
“inferiority complex” because  
 
“… the entire townscape looked like an industrial plant... the cement plant ejected 
dust all over the town...” (environmental officer at local government) 
 
Cement dust was everywhere and its visual affect was widespread: 
 
“… cement dust deposited on parking automobiles... and it could only be removed by 
chemicals.” (environmental officer at local government) 
 
The wonderful natural scenery of the hill and sharp bend of Hungary’s largest river were 
responsible for a resort area being developed nearby, whose owners suffered a lot from air 
pollution that inhibited, for example, fruit growing.  The cement dust deposited on roof tiles 
constituted a thick layer that over time further thickened, resulting in a shorter lifetime of tiles 
and additional costs to the residents.  
 
“In general, the cement factory paid compensation, so it took the harms its operations 
caused seriously.” (environmental officer at local government) 
 
The “unbearable dust emissions” were not significantly reduced after the first 
technological reconstruction that was made possible by the so-called new era of economic 
order (from 1968 on), which was exemplified by more openess to western trade relations and 
domestic entrepreneurial activities (the so-called second economy has developed this way).  
From its western exports, the cement factory had also earned some “hard currency” that could 
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be used to import more up-to-date, western production equipment: 
 
“In 1968 there had already been an opportunity to start to build a new line of furnace 
that was western by origin and we also had resources for starting the reconstruction of 
the technology made in the former GDR.” (then-CEO) 
 
In 1970, a Dopol rotary furnace was put into operation, by which production capacity 
reached well beyond 1M tons annually. Centrally determined production planning was shortly 
re-established by political and economic centralisation regaining its strength and support and, 
at the cement factory, this resulted in reducing in rank the then-CEO. Later, due to another 
political current with a more open political climate, he was able to obtain the top position of 
the Cement and Lime Works, established in 1980 as the sector-wide, state-owned company of 
which individual cement factories were subsidiaries. Besides having the top-ranked position 
in the cement sector, he also increased his political influence by becoming a member of 
parliament (MP) for three consecutive periods, until the regime change. From these positions, 
he had opportunities to pull every string to get compensation or resources for the town, in 
exchange for the pollution it suffered from the cement plant. Before the regime change 
enough resources were then available from the central government and the sector to start a 
more comprehensive reconstruction of existing cement technology. It was a relief for the 
town as well as the factory that the three old, irreparable Lepol-furnaces could finally be 
turned off in 1990 and different types of filters were applied to the remaining large sources of 
air pollution. 
These were all positive changes on the technological side, but environmental protection 
has something to do with the so-called “human factor” as well. One former employee of the 
cement factory saw other problems than those related to outdated technological equipment: 
 
“Human factors had a crucial role to play; hence, we experienced that surprisingly, the 
factory emitted much more dust during the night… the sack-filters should have been 
emptied, since they worked like the sack of a vacuum cleaner - from time to time they 
needed to be emptied… and when the worker in a night shift was in a bad mood… 
instead of emptying the filled sack, he simply cut it through with his pocket-knife.” 
(President of the Committee for Urban Development and Environmental Protection at 
local government) 
 
Local people spoke of the phenomenon as “the factory was blown up.”  
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8.3. CHANGES IN THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC REGIME (POLITICAL 
TRANSFORMATION AND PRIVATISATION) 
 
Regime change in Hungary (and in the CEE region) has created a new situation 
regarding the relationship between the town and the cement factory. Politics was again in the 
forefront but in a new role:  
 
“Politics separated the economy from local politics. Regime change really brought 
uncertainty and, at the same time, new opportunities for environmental protection: we 
could strike the iron while it was hot and we had more opportunities to do so.” 
(environmental officer at local government) 
 
“Approaching the regime change, we were getting more fearless...” (President of 
Committee for Urban Development and Environmental Protection at local 
government) 
 
The broader context was very conducive to green issues; without exception every new 
party put ecological issues among the priorities of its political agenda. According to some 
commentators, under the flag of ecology every kind of political interest unified and expressed 
its discontent with the communist regime: it was a time of national environmental protest. 
Amongst the most notable of these was the protest against a proposed dam on the Danube, 
which resulted in significant domestic political struggles throughout the first half of the 90s, 
as well as in an international conflict with the newly independent Slovakia (ultimately heard 
at The Hague).  Tensions in the case study town were also growing high: 
 
“We had civil actions such as the washing of cement trucks… We blocked the gates 
of the cement factory and let only those loaded trucks out which were washed inside... 
police were on our side during these actions, and a policeman was always standing 
there with us so as to prevent the truck drivers from chasing us away with a steel 
wheel-loosener…” (President of Committee for Urban Development and 
Environmental Protection at local government) 
 
It should also be mentioned that, in those times, every truck was covered in dust and, 
according to observers, at least half a sack of cement dust could be swept off each cement 
truck – undoubtedly, this had a lot to do with the human factor. 
The most important effect of regime change with regard to economic institutions was 
obviously privatisation. The process of privatisation has turned out to be important for the 
cement sector in general and the factory in question in particular. The then-CEO has 
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described the events in detail: 
 
“It began with us... that we exported to Western Europe... Frequently, there were hot 
discussions with the foreign cement sector because... they wanted to impede our 
exports since price systems, even in the second half of the 80s, allowed us to export 
economically on a price level which they considered to be dumping.... we were in 
constant struggle with them... [T]hey objected that... ‘You don’t have to pay for 
environmental protection!’... Consequently, we were not exactly in market 
competition with each other... and, during one of the discussions the idea emerged that 
‘Sirs, we, of course, want to change our environmental protection... ‘Sirs, let’s invest 
in the Hungarian cement industry!’ ” (then-CEO) 
 
New economic laws were introduced at the time to open up the Hungarian market for foreign 
investors. First as a joint venture (from January 1, 1990), then, with gradually growing 
foreign ownership, the privatisation of the Hungarian cement industry finished in the middle 
of 1994 when western European companies had obtained a 100 percent ownership of the 
entire Hungarian cement sector.  
Western European investors brought an environmental attitude, as well as financial 
resources, to the cement firm – all our interviewees agreed on this. The opportunities for 
greening were favourable: the new owner, as a leading cement company in Europe, 
established the same expectations towards its Hungarian subsidiary as existed towards the 
factories in its home country (whose citizens are often cited as having a high level of 
environmental awareness).  
 
“The owners have ab ovo had a European attitude... They have demanded us... and 
required us the standards that are taken for granted in their home country.” (Manager 
of work safety)  
 
Financial resources were provided by not repatriating profits but reinvesting them into 
the plant, according to the Hungarian CEO of the cement factory. Nevertheless, the foreign 
company was careful and committed enough, before privatisation, to invite a group of 
Hungarian stakeholders, consisting of representatives of local government and civil 
(including green) organisations to visit one of the factories in its home country. One of the 
visitors recalls her/his experience as follows: 
 
“We did expect that no old, tumble-down factories could be seen, but to tell the truth 
our faces fell… [W]e saw their cement trucks painted black that makes any dirt be 
better noticed and those trucks were absolutely clean… [T]hey showed us how to 
rehabilitate a wound in the mountainscape… [T]he owner assured us that ‘I would like 
to make my investment on a longer time horizon and it is at least 150 years.  I consider 
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it not only as a source of livelihood for myself but for my great grandchildren, too, 
and as soon as my new investment turns to be profitable I will invest not only in the 
plant but in the town as well.’ ” (President of Committee for Urban Development and 
Environmental Protection at local government) 
 
After privatisation, technological reconstruction was accomplished. All dimensions of 
production technology were renewed and computer-aided operations and management 
systems were introduced. Internal and external emissions were reduced below prescribed 
environmental standards in Hungary; a closed clinker-storehouse was built; filters, cement 
silos, and internal materials storehouses were all modernised; a closed assembly line was built 
for transferring limestones from mines; and cement filling stations were also reconstructed to 
be hermetically sealed. The recultivation and rehabilitation activities in closed mines were 
redoubled. By the end of the summer of 1996, the plant was certified according to an ISO 
9002 quality standard. Though a few sources of emissions charged to undercompliance still 
exist (at points of in-road cement loading), the general opinion among stakeholders is that 
“now dust emission in town is only caused by secondary sources;” that is, previously 
sedimented emissions activated by increased road transportation. The environmental officer at 
the local government summarises the environmental achievements of the cement plant: 
 
“Currently, there is not any place in town where emissions are registered as above 
standards.” (environmental officer at local government) 
 
To the great satisfaction of the president of the committee for urban development and 
environmental protection at the local government: 
 
“… today the pocket-knife of the worker in night shift has no role anymore because 
the current technology excludes it.” (President of Committee for Urban Development 
and Environmental Protection at local government) 
 
At the same time, senior and middle management are not oversatisfied with the results 
reached so far and emphasise the need for further and continuous development in 
environmental performance. One source of environmental pollution that still exists and awaits 
a quick solution is the noise pollution in the transhipments port.  As the Manager of work 
safety explains: 
 
 
“… in the beautiful [name of landscape] we do not want to generate any nuisance…” 
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(Manager of work safety) 
 
Privatisation has also resulted in an economic rejuvenation of the cement firm.  In 
contrast to many other examples of privatised, formerly large, state-owned companies, the 
number of employees at the cement firm has steadily been rising, with a horizontal expansion 
of production activities to include a mortar and plaster plant. Moreover, the company has 
started a wave of acquisitions by vertically integrating different kinds of primary input 
producing businesses.  
 
8.4. AND THE CHIMNEYS FALL DOWN… (THE COMMUNICATION 
AND AESTHETICS OF GREENING) 
 
In October 1997, a symbolic event brought a showy conclusion to the polluting past of 
the cement firm, as well as to the membership of the town among the “dirty dozen.” Three 
chimney stacks, each more than 100 meters high, (the remaining parts of the previously 
employed Lepol-furnaces) were demolished. According to interviewees, the chimneys were 
symbols: 
 
“The three chimneys became a symbol, a beloved and hated symbol.” (then-CEO) 
 
The chimneys had been included in the arms of the town during the communist regime, 
symbolising symbiosis of factory and town (and of course, industrial development, too). 
Though they were erased from the arms in the post-communist years, the chimneys 
themselves were still standing and could be seen as a torso of the past from every segment of 
the town. Their detonation was a striking final event in the abolition of the past for local 
people: 
 
“… the town could breathe freely again, the very last sign disappeared.” (shop-floor 
worker of the firm and native inhabitant in town) 
 
The disappearance of the chimneys symbolised the disappearance of pollution, as well as 
a new era of development in the history of the town. A company newsletter speaks about the 
event as follows: 
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“The three chimneys were symbols of the factory as well as the town – for a long time 
they were even included in the arms of [name of town] which brought negative 
associations up. Their shut down and demolition are obviously of a symbolic 
significance, since their disappearance symbolises the unhampered development of the 
factory, the pulling down of out-dated equipment, and a new direction for 
development.”  
 
Organizing the event involved a conscious PR strategy on the part of the cement 
company, through which they intended “to explode all the negative associations regarding the 
plant,” relegating them to the past. They believed that the shadows of the past had to be 
effectively chased away – a perception that is underlined by a story the PR Manager told 
about a popular radio cabaret show in which the following joke was shared: 
 
“I saw small grey people around [name of town]. I don’t know whether UFOs has 
arrived there or there has been a day-shift in the cement factory.” 
 
According to the PR Manager, negative associations are indeed strengthened by the fact 
that the main product of the company is “grey” and “dust-like,” and therefore, has no prestige 
value and to which associations such as “dirtiness” and “good for nothing” are easily 
attached. It is thus not surprising that company leaflets and other promotional materials have 
been visually renewed to be “more colourful,” “cleaner” and “more natural;” the grey cement 
(stone) is matched with green ivy (picturing a wall of a house partly hidden under the ivy). 
Green ivy is intended to refer to the naturalness of stone (cement) in order to build a new set 
of associations with the product and the firm. 
The collapse of the chimneys symbolically initiated a new chapter in the relationship 
between the town and the firm: a peaceful, harmonious, “mutual life together.”  It is perceived 
as such not only by the managers of the cement company, but by local residents in general 
and local government in particular. The two local officials interviewed have emphasised that 
today there is “a trustful, good relation” between the town and the factory which can be 
considered as a model. A recent survey commissioned by a market research firm further 
supports a positive judgement by local citizenry upon improving corporate environmental 
performance. The survey demonstrates an unusually high popular respect for the 
environmental efforts of the factory and an appreciation of good corporate citizenship. The 
PR manager proudly states: 
 
 
“Those people who before emphasised negative things based on previous facts [now] 
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see, recognise, perceive, and speak about it [i.e., environmental efforts of the firm]…” 
(PR Manager) 
 
Change is so striking that the interviewees were lavish with aesthetically rich 
descriptions. The aesthetic contrast between present and past emerging from the words and 
expressions they used could not have been greater. The previously enormous air pollution 
made roof tiles “grey instead of red;” “grey dust was deposited on window sills and 
automobiles;” or “walking on the grass made one’s feet as grey as cement dust” in the 
gardens of the resort area; and, the spoils of mines made a striking presence by “a devastating 
mountainscape,” “a disrupted hill,” or “beauty defects” on the hillside. In contrast, today 
“green” areas, “nature’s beauty,” and “nature’s harmony” dominate all the descriptions:  
 
“In the courtyard which was before covered with cement dust now green grass is 
growing… it has become a factory with flowers everywhere.” (shop-floor worker) 
 
“We are proud since we ourselves experience that not only our environment became 
more beautiful but our workplace became much more beautiful… now circumstances 
[are] civilised.” (PR Manager) 
 
“… from an aesthetic point of view [the factory] looks now as modern, except a few 
small things, as at any of the modern cement factories in Western Europe.” (then-
CEO) 
 
“Today the factory concentrates its efforts upon building up an aesthetic appearance 
which suggests that the environment is intended to be harmed as minimally as is 
feasible.” (President of Committee for Urban Development and Environmental 
Protection at local government) 
 
The factory and the town together emerged out of “greyness” and now seem to be 
associated with green and colourful flowers – the aesthetic aspect of rebirth. 
  
8.5. LEADERSHIP 
 
The present CEO has played a key role in the greening of the cement factory.  His role is 
praised by the then-CEO as well: 
 
“This [corporate greening] is partly, or mostly, due to Mr. [name of CEO] and his 
team.” (then-CEO) 
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Context and person have merged43 and the CEO – by virtue of his professional skills, 
leadership style and commitment – could become the “leader of rebirth.” Most of the 
interviewees underlined his role: “he successfully took over the torch passed on;” “his 
dynamic and purposeful functioning” provides employees with a strong motivation; he 
spreads over and forces commitment and attitude change (“he sped up events”); and, in his 
role of making and maintaining external connections with stakeholders, he is the primary 
messenger or representative of the greening of the cement company. 
There is no leader without followers – and the CEO seems to be aware of this fact: 
 
“An environment cannot be managed by one’s will, it can be done so by motivation 
and the set of motivations include actions to make the internal [i.e., organisational] 
environment more beautiful from the social conditions of workers to working-
clothes… [I]t starts from those things and then they will believe that the big goals 
work on the right lines, too.” (CEO) 
 
Thus, “positive motivation,” and “winning workers over to a cause” become a possibility and 
the internal, or organisational, credibility of a leader can be established and maintained. 
According to the CEO, it is not enough for a leader to set a good personal example. The task 
of leadership is built out of “a number of motivational elements,” of which “the most 
significant” is to “regard the other as a human being,” and if s/he “makes a critical remark” it 
is “worth reflecting upon it.” 
Effective leadership might partly explain why the lack of an environmental manager 
position has not seemed to hinder environmental performance improvement. Though 
officially, standard environmental management tasks are assigned to the unit of work safety, 
this is mainly because of regulatory requirements:  
 
“… to really emphasise its importance [i.e., environmental management] related tasks 
and responsibilities were, on the one hand, assigned to projects in the previous period 
and, on the other, to communication. A matrix-type organising of environmental 
responsibilities work better in a cement factory. Clearly, the principal responsibiltiy 
lies therefore… with top management, who delegate them down through the 
hierarchy. But it is always clear with whom responsibility lies; thus, who is 
responsible when it is related to regulation or communication… as routines are 
established, these tasks should be delegated down from the top, and top management 
should only deal with those issues – according to the principle of managing by 
exception – which concern that level, slowly… we get to this state-of-affairs.” (CEO) 
                                                          
43 The present CEO was previously the top manager of the other cement factory the western European cement 
corporation bought during privatisation. In 1997 the two factories were unified and the headquarters were 
located in the town of our story. The top manager at that time in the factory of our story soon retired and then 
this manager has stepped to the top. 
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8.6. CREDIBILITY 
 
Another key category in interpreting the greening of the cement factory, beside that of 
leadership, is credibility.  
 
“These are indeed not unnecessary investments [technological reconstruction], and 
these should be implemented with the greatest commitment and effectiveness, so as 
our activities to be accepted by our environment; and to be increasingly felt that we 
really want to change them [i.e., operations]. It is in our best interest, too…” (CEO) 
 
Yet what process to follow in building up legitimacy? 
 
“It works by the principle of putting together the large and small steps one takes. First, 
big issues should be put in order so as to be able to deal with the smaller ones… 
without a fundamental technological renewal and while dust is emitted by chimneys, 
while storage facilities are open and contribute to dust emission… there is no sense of 
talking about environmental protection with regard to a cement factory. This was the 
first step to take… The second one was smaller and was related partly to smaller 
technological changes and partly to the whole issue of motivation… A cement factory, 
I think, cannot let anyone entering the plant see no green areas at all… There are such 
small things as… protecting the shape of the buildings, providing a pleasant look of 
the office rooms, operating social facilities for workers in a more pleasant and 
environmentally friendly way. If it is not put together in such a way it is not credible 
and, without it, all the other economic objectives can hardly be achieved… We will be 
more credible in our environment, we will be more credible in the eyes of our partners 
and this will suggest to our customers that the products we offer can safely be used…” 
(CEO) 
 
One could hardly expect a more straightforward expression of the so-called integrated 
strategy, referred to in the literature review of Part I. An integrated environmental strategy is 
characterised by a synergy between the elements of a “green” competitive strategy and those 
of a “green” non-market strategy. This is a way to establish the credibility of corporate 
environmental efforts and claims in the eyes of internal (i.e., organisational) as well as 
external stakeholders. It is not enough to publish an environmental mission statement, 
however excellently written,44 and it is not enough to make a few aspects of corporate 
operations “greener,” the whole organisation should be positioned strategically as 
environmentally conscious or sound. 
                                                          
44 Indeed, given the case of this cement factory, it might not even be a necessary requirement. The factory has 
no stand-alone environmental policy statement, though its quality assurance policy statement includes 
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This story of the cement factory greening is one of regaining local community legitimacy 
or re-establishing good corporate citizenship. The emphasis was therefore on the non-market 
elements of environmental strategy.45 Conscious efforts and resources were targeted: first, 
towards comprehensive technological reconstruction in order to significantly reduce 
environmental pollution, and next, to environmental communication.  Not restricted to a one-
sided standard marketing or PR campaign, this latter included elements of a more open 
dialogue. Of course, the non-market communication strategy was to a great extent built upon 
symbolic actions such as the demolition of the three chimneys (an act of irrelevance in terms 
of pollution performance).46 
Regained trust and legitimacy were manifest in the interviews with organisational as well 
as external stakeholders.  
 
“This [greening] is good and right as it is and as it is done now... We see that 
everybody does his/her bit in order to reduce polluting emissions of the plant as much 
as possible...” (shop-floor worker) 
 
“Now we have reached that, if the factory wants to change something, they first come 
to us [local government] to discuss it... thus we are not confronted things done after 
the fact.” (President of Committee for Urban Development and Environmental 
Protection) 
 
It should be noted that, in achieving and maintaining internal and external credibility, the 
main role is that of the leader who – as far as it is possible to judge – is aware of and 
cultivates this credibility. 
 
 
 
8.7. EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS AS AGENTS IN CORPORATE 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
environmental concerns, too. 
45 An evidence of environmental awareness can be found in the following citation from the interview with the 
present CEO, in which he clearly expressed his awareness of the special environmental risks arising from plant 
operations: “… when [name of factory] is located on the border of the town, it constitutes a different 
environmental factor or condition, and by taking into account public opinion … the sensitivity of communicative 
reactions is different…” The type of environmental risk under consideration here is termed by Kerekes–Kindler 
[1995] as the social element of exogenous risks. 
46 The then-CEO of the cement factory also emphasised that a major differentiating characteristic of this case of 
corporate greening within the cement sector is the very active role of marketing and PR. This fact is partly due 
to the foreign owner, since – as he also mentioned – its operations all over the world share this characteristic 
compared to competitors. 
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GREENING 
 
It is undoubtedly striking that institutional changes (such as regime change and 
privatisation) constituted, at the same time a threat and an opportunity for the greening of the 
cement factory. It was pointed out that, as the past regime dissolved and the factory lost its 
exclusive dominance over the economic and political life of the town, the cement firm found 
itself threatened by spontaneous environmental protests of the local civil population. The 
environmental pressure of the local community gained an additional political prominence 
from the support of the freely elected local government. The local political context has 
changed radically. This point is well expressed by a sort of self-assessment of the 
environmental officer at the local government: 
 
“I have come to [name of town] for ten years… I was invited first and foremost not 
because of my expertise but rather because the town was in need of an environmental 
engineer who was not yet eaten. Who did eat environmental professionals in town?  
Well, the cement factory, indeed…” (environmental officer at local government) 
 
As to the opportunities, the role of the new owner has already been discussed and it was 
pointed out that the under-capitalised cement company has benefited financially as well as 
technologically from privatisation. Furthermore, it was also mentioned above that the new 
European owner has brought along a well-established professional and organisational culture 
including an environmental management attitude that takes for granted dialogue with external 
stakeholders (even green organisations). Of course, there might not have been a strong 
influence without the sense of activity of the employees of the Hungarian plant nor without 
the environmental policy of the local government: however strict, it was always willing to 
reach a compromise. The latter is evident in the following citation: 
 
“I did always try to reach a compromise and to take the issues accordingly. Thus, 
entering into negotiation with the management of [name of factory] about how things 
can better be handled, negotiations started with... a search for actions to make things 
better for all involved... I tried to support positive solutions... [since] it is always easier 
to produce a radical critique over something... than to further the object in a positive 
direction...” (President of Committee for Urban Development and Environmental 
Protection at local government) 
 
The supportive stance of the local government was acknowledged by the then-CEO as well: 
 
“After they [local government] experienced that something has started [at the factory] 
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the relationship continually improved and they in fact tried to help in every aspect 
with it [i.e., greening]… they could, to some extent, attribute the achievements to their 
own efforts.” (then-CEO) 
 
Factors attributable to the cement sector also played their part in the greening of the plant 
in question. On one hand, the “cognitive community” of the cement sector is relatively strong. 
Among other things, this is evident from the dedication to a sector-wide professional culture – 
a primary example of it being the popularity of the annual “Days of the Cement Sector.” 
Furthermore, one of our interviewees, referred to as “then-CEO,” can in many respects be 
considered the “founding father” of the Hungarian cement industry. The interview with him 
revealed a continuity in the ranks of top management of Hungarian cement firms after the 
regime change and the process of privatisation.  
On the other hand, special care was taken during the privatisation process to preserve the 
previously established research and development capacities of the cement sector. The existing 
research laboratories and institutes were put under the direction of the Hungarian Cement 
Association (HCA), and still today provide services that include environmental research and 
consulting, for all cement factories in Hungary. The HCA has joined the European Cement 
Association and the information and knowledge flow from the European partners concerning 
environmental management issues benefits much of the Hungarian cement sector – as some 
interviewees emphasised. The HCA employs a full-time environmental expert and has 
operated an environmental committee for years. Relatively soon after the regime change, all 
of the cement plants succeeded in certifying their operations according to the ISO 9001 
quality standards and in Hungary the first company certified by an environmental 
management system, BS 7750, was one of the five cement factories in 1996. Taken together, 
these facts suggest a supportive sector-wide culture and infrastructure with respect to 
corporate greening. 
 
8.8. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
 
The above story of corporate greening is not only about a once heavily polluting cement 
factory becoming “greener” (in terms of physical pollution as well as visually or 
aesthetically), but also about a development in the relationship between the plant and the local 
community. The change in the cultural dimension of the institutional context seems to be a 
necessary explanatory factor in this story of corporate greening: 
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“I think the pace of development has passed all around. As the quality of our life has 
changed in many respects... the factory itself and its environment have changed in this 
[i.e., environmental] field to the same extent... this is [a process of] becoming 
European. We try to set those standards to us and to our environment in every area of 
life that is necessary and important for a more civilised way of life.” (PR Manager) 
 
Rebirth was chosen as the key category for this story of corporate greening. 
Undoubtedly, the possibility for a “greener” rebirth was provided by the wider institutional 
context (structure), as well as the strategic actions of different stakeholders (agency). The 
impacts of macro socio-economic changes were discussed as threats and opportunities for 
corporate greening. The roles of internal and external agents were also introduced – agents 
who could take advantage of the new macro rules-of-the-game and turn threats into 
opportunities for greening. This story of corporate greening is situated in the continuous 
socio-political transformation of Hungary in the 1990s. 
Rebirth as a key category refers to an emerging new engagement between agency and 
structure, in this case of corporate greening. The most important sub-categories are credibility 
and compromise. From a theoretical perspective, they constitute the fundamental elements of 
an “integrated strategy.” In a socio-economic context, under transformation, non-market 
elements of an integrated strategy seem to be of prominent importance. Thus, issues of social 
legitimacy, trust, and credibility are at the centre. Re-gaining social trust in a multi-
stakeholder context may be a slow and troublesome process that necessarily involves frequent 
dialogue with different stakeholders and mutual compromises for the sake of the common aim 
to improve environmental quality. The agents of this story of corporate greening seemed to be 
aware of and consciously seek these out, at the same time taking advantage of as well as 
strengthening the structural possibilities for greening.  
 
One may wonder whether systematic environmental improvements in the performance of 
the cement factory will continue unhindered or if the lack of an environmental manager as 
well as an environmental management system will, at some point, constitute impediments. 
The usefulness of an environmental management system like ISO 14001 is perceived as 
follows: 
 
“[W]hile in Europe it is expected to have an ISO-something certification, interestingly 
there [in the U. S.], I do not say, it is not important because there it is a market factor 
as well but the point is rather… how the whole operates, that is a Total Quality 
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Management perspective… we have considered ISO 9002 because it has become a 
market factor. We considered it important because its system proves to be helpful in 
clarifying processes of doing business, making feedback functions effective, but not in 
order to have it for its own sake… if ISO 14001 will become a market factor it pays to 
get it, but that is not the main point… ISO consists of a lot of formalism, and many 
just get it for its own sake but do not integrate it into their organisational philosophy.” 
(CEO) 
 
Moreover, a vision for future improvements was also expressed by this interviewee: 
 
“Probably, we will implement it [an EMS] because it is going to be a market factor 
and also because we will get to the point where our operations will effectively 
integrate those elements out of which it will be easy to construct… we are 
continuously preparing ourselves for it… we regard cement production as part of a 
total quality management system because it is much easier to organise operations 
accordingly and it pays more to do it accordingly… where the environment and the 
customer are on the centre stage.” (CEO) 
 
The cement factory seems to define itself as a part of a community of stakeholders. 
Corporate greening is thus understood as good corporate citizenship. As time passes, it will 
reveal how firm an organisational identity like this will be as a foundation for continuous 
environmental performance improvement.  
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CHAPTER 9 
A STORY OF A SENSE OF EXCELLENCE: 
CORPORATE GREENING AS ECO-
MODERNISATION 
 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The case study below is the story of the greening of the largest chemical company in 
Hungary. Eight interviews were conducted, all with the employees or managers of this, 
widely considered “impressive,” chemical firm.47  No external stakeholder was found to be 
relevant in the unfolding of this story of greening. There is no green organisation in either 
adversarial or beneficial contact with the corporation in question, which is telling in the case 
of a chemical company, nor has the local government taken the potential risks of 
petrochemical operations into serious account by establishing any kind of environmental 
organisation within its own administrative or political structure. This fact seems even more 
striking if one considers the other two potentially heavy polluting companies – an energy 
utility and another chemical plant – located close to the settlement in question.   
Yet, an external perspective is not entirely missing, as a telephone interview was 
conducted with the environmental expert of the Hungarian Chemical Association (HCA), 
introducing the official perspective of the chemical sector on environmental issues and the 
progress of chemical companies in Hungary during the so-called “transformation period” 
(1989–1998). The surprising lack of external stakeholders as significant agents in corporate 
greening was also emphasised by the Environmental Manager of the firm in question.  
Another striking feature encountered during the organization of interviews was the eager 
willingness to communicate on the part of every interviewee, especially compared to the other 
firms approached for the case studies. This resulted in an over-representation of top managers 
among the interviewees at the chemical company in question. Four top management ranked 
interviewees were, respectively, the Directors for Strategy and Business Development, 
                                                          
47 All the interviews and archival work were done by Richárd Szántó. 
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Marketing Communication, Environmental Technology and Research and Development 
(R&D) (the latter was interviewed twice). Two interviews were conducted with the 
Environmental Manager and one with the Organisational Development (OD) Manager (the 
latter reports directly to the Human Resources director).  Interviews lasted an hour, on 
average and the breakdown is as follows: 
 
Table 11 Interviews for Story 2 
 Number of Interviews 
Within the corporation: (8) 
• top management 5 
• middle management directly reporting to the top 3 
• lower middle management and shop-floor – 
Outside the corporation: (–) 
Total: 8 
 
As the story unfolds, the reader shall encounter a proud organisational self-identity 
streaming from the words of the interviewees, without exception – noteworthy sign of a 
strong culture in operation, at least in the higher ranks of corporate management.  
 
9.2. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
 The only plant of the chemical firm in question is located near a smaller town (1.5 km 
to the south). The town itself is an exemplar of the so-called “new communist settlements,” 
forcefully developed from a small agricultural village to an industrial town during the 1950s 
and 60s, at the height of central planning in Hungary. It is no accident that many of the 
interviewees claimed a symbiosis exists between the town and the chemical company as the 
largest local employer: “there is no life in town without the firm, and there is no firm without 
the town.”  
 
“The town was built at the same time as [name of company]. There were times when 
[name of company] itself served as a public utility, too. When the plant was being 
located here in the beginning of the 60s, the construction of public utility services was 
started, at the very beginning with a wastewater utility. The firm has treated 
wastewater from the very beginning of its operations; first, municipal wastewater 
streams were treated, then industrial wastewater, too.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
The location of the plant has been beneficial in terms of any potential nuisance: it has no 
direct border with any residential areas. 
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“The set of initial conditions that served as a basis for subsequent environmental 
improvements was very advantageous. For it is evident from the location of the plant 
that there is no direct border between the residential areas and the company.  
Consequently, environmental effects inflicted upon the settlement can hardly be 
experienced. Neither noise pollution nor any other types of nuisance can be observed 
as a sign of our operations.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
It is also beneficial – though primarily from an economic perspective – that the plant is 
located very close to Hungary’s second largest river of (1.5 km to the east), since this natural 
water source constitutes a relatively cheap resource for both industrial water supply and 
wastewater sink. However, there is an environmental risk-increasing condition, in that this 
plant, with a town-like size (approximately 5 sq km), is located in an ecosystem officially 
classified under the most environmentally sensitive groundwater category.  
 The firm under investigation operates as a petrochemical complex, its main products 
being polyethylene and polyprophylene which are “nowadays the most widely produced and 
used types of plastics all over the world” – according to the Corporate Environmental Report 
of 1999. As the Environmental Manager, an employee of the chemical company for 36 years, 
recalls: 
 
“This was a firm in the 60s with great future prospects, and there was very charismatic 
leadership, too. First, it was a fertilizer production plant, then, from the 70s on, the 
production activities have shifted to petrochemical operations. This was and still is the 
very first olefin plant ever built in Hungary. Later, different basic plastics-producing 
units were put into operation, polymer plants, for example, and, then, plastics 
manufacturing started to gain significance, too…” (Environmental Manager) 
 
 Every manager interviewed considered it to be of prime importance that the chemical 
company has applied the best available technologies in every respect: 
 
“[Name of company] operates the latest technologies developed in Western Europe 
and Japan. [Name of company] has ever been operating the latest technologies 
available; from its very inception, it has ever represented a high-tech production and 
operations plant.” (Director of Marketing Communication) 
 
 All the managers interviewed drew attention to organisational culture as a significant 
element of the set of initial conditions beneficial to any subsequent environmental 
improvement. From the start of production in 1964 until 1989, the chemical firm was 
managed by the same individual, said to be a charismatic as well as authoritative leader. His 
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personality has left significant imprints in the organisational culture: 
 
“He was an extremely strict person and an extremely precise person. He required 
everybody to keep order, tidiness, and discipline within the company… then, a 
civilised surrounding was created and maintained. The production units were in 
competition with each other over tidiness, being free from accidents, and many other 
aspects and workers’ consciousness was formed in this way, too.” (Environmental 
Manager) 
 
The Director of Strategy and Business Development perceived no adaptation problems to the 
gradual enactment and increasing strictness of environmental legislation and regulations in 
the years of political transformation, because  
 
“At [name of company] technological discipline was ever so high and widespread that 
it was extremely easy to build upon it – also with strict discipline – an environmental 
organisational system.” (Director of Strategy) 
 
 Once a state-owned socialist company, the chemical firm become a still state-owned 
but stock-based company on January 1, 1992 when the preparation for privatisation started, 
finally (1996) resulting in the chemical firm becoming a publicly traded company, issuing its 
stocks on the Budapest and London Stock Exchanges at the same time. During the period of 
preparing for privatisation, the chemical plant was audited three times by western European 
environmental service companies. The results of all the audits mirrored the widely held belief 
within the firm that there is no environmental problem out of control associated with the plant 
– they are leaders in their sector by environmental standards, as well. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to encounter proud satisfaction in many interviews about corporate environmental 
performance in general, and the findings of the three environmental audits in particular: 
 
“Corporate environmental performance every time was judged to be good.” 
(Environmental Manager) 
 
The political regime change and the process of privatisation meant discontinuous 
change neither in the economic situation of the chemical company in question nor in the 
process of greening. From an economic viewpoint, it is significant that the firm had already 
been connected to developed Western markets well before the large-scale changes in the 
institutional environment in Hungary, since more than 50 percent of its exports served the 
demand of these markets. Though in its home country, environmental legislation and other 
sources of environmental expectation did not yet constitute an important strategic factor, the 
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environmental requirements gradually emerging in its western markets were channelled to the 
firm quite early on. 
Today, the chemical firm operates organisationally as a holding company, owning 
many satellite companies and having a number of commercial units abroad. The chemical 
plant (the firm’s headquarters) consists of four business units, of which its petrochemical 
business is the largest in every respect, followed by plastics manufacturing, services, and 
environmental technology, respectively (according to number of employess as well as gross 
and net revenues). This latter and latest business unit includes three legally independent 
companies (public limited companies, or PLCs). The holding company has approximately 
five thousand employees, of which the chemical plant employs approximately 2,300.  In 
2000, a main strategic decision was taken about the gradual divestment, or sale, of the plastics 
manufacturing business units, which seems thus far to be quite a slow process.  
The story of corporate greening being told here is restricted to the chemical plant; it 
does not cover the whole holding company.  
 
9.3. ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT WITHIN ORGANISATIONAL 
HIERARCHY 
 
 The Office for Environmental Protection (or briefly, as it is used throughout the firm, 
Environmental Protection) functions as a central staff unit within the organisational structure, 
under one of the directors. The superior of this environmental unit was changing almost year 
to year: for example, in 1998 it reported directly to the Director of Technical Services, 
whereas in 1999, it was assigned to the Director of Administrative and Legal Affairs, then, 
during the last two months of 2000, its position in the formal organisational hierarchy 
changed again when it was placed under the newly-created position of Director of Technical 
Affairs. Yet, the Environmental Manager himself reports no substantive change in the range 
of functions and authority of the relatively small environmental unit (consisting of ten 
positions overall), which covers all the ecologically-related aspects of the whole organisation.  
 
“I can say that our range of functions provides us with an authority over the whole 
company with regard to environmental affairs. This does not mean that we carry out 
operative environmental protection measures but we determine the requirements, the 
tasks according to different jobs; we manage the environmental management system 
which was the first one introduced by a Hungarian chemical firm in 1997 with 
international certification according to the ISO 14001 standard. In fact, we coordinate 
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the treatment and implementation of any environmental problems emerging from 
production, planning and design and development. We are in contact with the 
environmental authorities. We have a ‘maid-of-all-work’ role. And we control how the 
different units carry out the environmental tasks assigned to them… We are 
everywhere; we are watching and controlling everywhere.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
 Thus, the environmental protection department functions as a central staff unit just 
like the Departments for Health Protection and Safety Affairs, but in contrast to quality issues 
which belongs to the level of business units. Although all the business units of the chemical 
plant were certified with ISO 9001 quality management standard until 1993, the ISO 14001 
environmental management system was independently introduced and is also independently 
operated. As an explanation for these early-mover type actions in the Hungarian chemical 
sector, the Environmental Manager referred to market expectation: 
 
“Finally this was a market factor… If we had ignored these, then… in fact, … these 
would have been a cause for market discrimination against us. And we wanted to keep 
our market.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
Of course, he was referring to Western markets. After the introduction of quality standards: 
 
“Stemming partly from the recognition of top management and partly from that of 
Environmental Protection, top management formulated the idea that in this 
[environmental] field steps have to be taken as well, because we realised that our 
business partners have started to ask for information about our environmental 
conditions.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
Compared to the other case companies under review here, this chemical plant does not 
operate its quality and environmental management systems in an integrated way and quality 
affairs do not seem to dominate environmental issues. At least one reason is the significant 
informal power and local expertise of the Environmental Manager stemming from his being 
one of the oldest employees of the firm. As he said, without any lack of modesty, the history 
of corporate environmental protection here can be identified with the history of his personal 
career. Moreover, he proposed a detailed professional explanation of the “qualitative” 
difference between environmental and quality management systems: 
 
“At [name of company] ten-something quality assurance systems are in operation.  
Since quality assurance is a product specific system, it is arranged as a connection 
between the producer and the customer. An environmental management system is 
designed to set a system of requirements for the entire operations system. Therefore, 
there is only one environmental management certificate for a company which covers 
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all its operations. This by itself is a new, qualitative difference between the two 
management systems. The other difference is that in the case of an environmental 
management system, technologies can be modified so as to reduce environmental 
impacts. While in the case of a quality assurance system the interest of the producer is 
clear and straightforward, the motivation behind an environmental management 
system is not so. Since the latter provides only indirect benefits to the producer, 
disadvantages are more prominent especially when a number of steps should be taken 
in order to be effectively in compliance with the system.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
The difference between quality assurance and environmental protection in terms of 
motivation is of primary importance. Defects in quality make a product unmarketable (not 
confirming to the relevant product standard simply excludes a chemical product from the 
market). In contrast, environmental problems or implementing their solutions “can be 
delayed.” At the same time the Environmental Manager conveys a sense of superiority of his 
profession over quality management: 
 
“On the other hand, operating an environmental management system and treating the 
entire set of environmental problems require substantially more professional 
knowledge. Because any solutions can only be offered if one has the knowledge about 
the sources of the problem at hand and it is the entire technology itself…  In fact, the 
majority of those who are now dealing with quality assurance have never worked in 
the shop-floor, since the administrative system prescribed by the quality standard 
determines and controls the set of requirements specified for a product and 
technological knowledge has no importance here.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
 The influence and power of representatives of environmental protection were strong 
enough to maintain their independence from quality management even in the functioning of 
an environmental management system. However, they were not powerful enough to raise the 
representation of environmental protection to the level of top management, that is, 
establishing a position of Director of Environmental Protection. 
 
“We have not been successful in struggling for it. The reason could be that anyway 
things are going fine at [name of company].” (Environmental Manager) 
 
All the other interviewees at the firm argued against the symbolic importance of having an 
environmental managerial position at the top level of management: 
 
“His Environmental Manager status and position is … how can I say … [name of 
company] is not such a hierarchical company. The job of the Environmental Manager 
is very important.” (Director of Marketing Communication) 
 
“There is no need for it [that is, to have an environmental director]. The name of the 
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position someone has doesn’t matter at all, does it?” (Director of Marketing 
Communication) 
 
“The Environmental Manager … you can call him Environmental Director, too, if you 
like, but it would not mean greater authority and prestige for him.” (Director of 
Strategy) 
 
Yet, one of the interviewees revealed that the reason could well be “subjective,” in the sense 
that Environmental Protection does not enjoy full support at every level of the organisational 
hierarchy, because many perceive it as being a “trouble-making” organisational unit that 
prescribes more tasks and jobs to other units and strictly controls their implementation. Not 
surprisingly, this can easily result in conflicts, which the Environmental Manager also 
referred to when describing environmental consciousness at different organisational levels of 
the chemical firm: 
 
“It is interesting how environmental consciousness is distributed… Top management 
fully accepts these requirements; it can be said that they pursue environmentally 
conscious behaviour. At the shop floor level, including those who control the 
implementation of environmental tasks… at the level of production… that they 
control, I can say, environmental consciousness has improved a lot. Interestingly, 
those middle managers who are responsible for the performance of business units, that 
is, those who directly report to top management and whose primary responsibility is to 
carry out the numbers assigned to their units by the annual business plans, are 
sometimes willing to neglect or, compared to their importance, downgrade some 
environmental problems because of the priority of cost savings and short-term profits. 
But we are always able to counterweigh these tendencies, because we are to discuss 
them. Of course, the change in their [middle managers’ environmental] attitudes can 
be perceived, too.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
Seen from this perspective, it is obvious that representing environmental interests and 
requirements within the organisation is not the most popular task at all and is further 
aggravated by the usually less influential position of a staff unit in the organisational 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, the introduction of an environmental management system is said to 
have strengthened the position of environmental interests within the chemical firm: 
 
“Now we participate in the preparatory phase of every investment project which 
means that all investments, or plans for investments, have to be presented to us for 
evaluation.  This is a major achievement and of great importance. [This is the 
situation] since we operate the environmental management system, before it was not 
so systematic at all. But it is getting more and more systematic.  And… this is coming 
from above [that is, from top management].” (Environmental Manager) 
 
Now there is regular representation of environmental protection in the organisational pre-
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assessment of planned development projects. 
 There are two factors that should be emphasised so as to better understand the 
organisational position and strength of environmental protection within the chemical firm. 
The interviews with top managers demonstrated their environmental literacy and 
commitment; in particular, the language they used to conceptualise environmental problems 
seemed very modern and up-to-date, and the issues and concepts they raised (e.g. sustainable 
development, etc.) showed a strikingly homogeneous understanding. Although there is no 
organisational committee dedicated exclusively to discuss environmental affairs by top 
managers, the Director of Strategy pointed out that during executive meetings and even board 
meetings, environmental issues are frequently raised or discussed. The other factor relates to 
research and development and the brand new business unit of environmental technology. Both 
organisational units rank at the level of directors and both have a tight connection with 
Environmental Protection unit. Moreover, the Director of R&D is a university professor 
whose invention of re-using mixed plastics waste was just patented by the chemical company 
all over the world. This new plastic material (the result of the mechanical mix of different 
waste plastics) and its possible range of applications for alleviating different sorts of 
environmental problems constitute the business logic for establishing a new business unit for 
environmental technology within the company. For years, the Research and Development 
Department has had a research team exclusively dedicated to environmental research and 
development. Therefore, the representation of environmental interests within the chemical 
firm is much stronger than is simply evident from the position of the Environmental 
Protection Department within the organisational hierarchy. It can further be argued that these 
above-mentioned facts provide an enhanced opportunity for a preventative and integrated 
environmental management approach to emerge within the firm.  
 
 
9.4. TECHNOLOGICAL MODERNISM 
 
 Production of petrochemical primary materials (the olefin factory) is undoubtedly one 
of the most environmentally risky chemical operations. Petrol and raw petroleum 
decomposition processes in the cracking bloomeries produce ethylene and prophylene; from 
ethylene, polyethylene and from prophylene, polyprophylene are produced. During 
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production, these primary materials are granulated, after which they can be used to 
manufacture different types of plastics products. 
The Corporate Environmental Report of 1999 lists all the different technologies used 
in petrochemical production and claims them to be “modern, computer aided manufacturing 
systems.” Furthermore, interviewees talked about the technologies of the chemical firm only 
in superlatives: 
 
“As to the technologies of the company – noting that all the old-fashioned and 
obsolete ones were shut off and dismantled – I can say that every one of them are 
western, up-to-date technologies which comply with the requirements of the European 
Union and that they are judged to be the best available technologies. This, at the same 
time, makes environmental impacts easier to treat because modern technologies have 
the fewest problems… not only in terms of their operations, performance, and product 
quality but also in terms of environmental affects; environmental impacts are 
relatively negligible. I am not saying that there are no environmental affects at all 
since there are no such a technology… but they belong to clean technologies.” 
(Environmental Manager)   
 
According to the Director of Strategy, the chemical firm operates only well-known 
technologies, whose licenses are bought from those large multinational corporations that have 
enough financial resources to engage in the research and development of basic petrochemical 
technologies.  Compared to those corporations, this Hungarian chemical firm is a middle-
sized petrochemical unit: 
 
“These technologies are bought from those firms that have been the flagships of 
environmental movement and improvement. … These are all… technologies that have 
stood the test of time and come from West European, developed countries…  
Consequently, it is ab ovo nonsense that… such a technology is transferred which is 
not in compliance with the prescriptions defined by [name of company].” (Director of 
Strategy) 
 
The words of the Director of Marketing Communication mirror no less confidence than his 
colleague’s: 
 
“These absolutely up-to-date and highly developed technologies are ab ovo designed 
to have as small an environmental burden as possible. … The technologies operated 
here are ab ovo designed to be environmentally sound. … We operate western 
European, American and Japanese technologies.” (Director of Marketing 
Communication) 
 
 By studying the environmental reports of the chemical firm (from 1997 to 1999), one 
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observes an obvious trend in environmental improvements, in terms of reducing 
environmental pollution to different environmental media. For example, the quantity (kg) of 
volatile organic compounds (VOC) being released was reduced to five percent of emissions in 
1996 until 1999; emissions of nitrogen oxides were effectively eliminated altogether; and, 
diffuse air pollution was also reduced. Though carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide 
emissions remained at the same level, 1999 was the first year when the chemical plant 
complied with air pollution regulations and was not fined any related environmental fines. 
From 1996 until 1999, hazardous waste production fell by more than 80 percent. As all 
hazardous waste materials are stored, treated and eliminated according to the requirements by 
law, the chemical plant has not paid any related environmental fines for 18 years. Due to the 
location of the plant, the firm has never caused any environmental impacts beyond standards 
with regard to noise and vibration pollution. The continuous investments in wastewater 
treatment have resulted in the plant being free of any related environmental fines for three 
years. At the beginning of the 90s, serious soil contamination inherited from past unregulated 
practices was uncovered, which has since then, been gradually treated and eliminated by the 
firm; final recovery is projected to be finished in 2002. 
In sum, the environmental performance in 1999 demonstrates that the chemical firm is 
in compliance with every relevant environmental regulation and complaints were received 
neither from environmental authorities nor from the local population. Being absolutely free 
from any kind of environmental fines is truly unique when compared to other Hungarian 
chemical companies, as well as probably places this chemical firm, in the international scene, 
among better performing chemical companies with regard to environmental management. The 
other side of the coin, of course, is that the basic chemical operations of this plant involve 
high environmental risks.  It is a potentially dangerous production unit and the primary 
materials of its production are depletable natural resources – thus the firm, by the very nature 
of its industry and operations, places a considerable burden on the natural environment.  
 
9.5. CLOSING THE PETROCHEMICAL CYCLE? 
 
 The above section on technology confirms the sense of excellence manifest in the 
interview texts of top managers. However, this Hungarian chemical firm claims to go even 
further: they want to reconcile profit and environmental protection, to provide a synthesis 
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between industry and ecology. The recently established business unit of environmental 
technology and the invention of a technological solution for the re-use of mixed plastics waste 
are considered embodiments of the synthesis desired. 
 The three smaller companies constituting the Environmental Technology Business 
Unit have the following operational profiles: there is a firm for the collection, cleansing and 
preparation of plastics waste; another which operates a special waste incineration technology 
(a plasma incinerator); and the third company developed, tested and started the production of 
new plastics material, the result of applying the invented mechanical method for mixing 
different types of waste plastics. According to a news release of the chemical firm, the 
Environmental Technology Business Unit aims to close the petrochemical cycle. It promises 
that the major problem facing the use of plastics –  namely, that in the post-consumption 
phase the different types of plastics are mixed and, therefore, cannot be re-used because of 
their very different chemical and mechanical characteristics – will be solved by the new 
method for re-manufacturing developed by this chemical firm. The internal company 
magazine has recently announced that the new technology will offer “a new career for 
plastics.” 
 To date, there are three industrial applications of the new plastics material tested and 
developed or under development. The most matured mode of application is in road 
construction: by utilizing an additive agent to bitumen, the lifetime of roads is multiplied. The 
environmental implications are summarised by the inventor himself, who is the Director of 
Research and Development at the chemical firm: 
 
“First of all, the public money which is assigned to infrastructural development, 
consequently to environmental protection, will now be available to build roads with 
longer lifetime, that is, there will be savings in road maintenance costs... The other 
thing is that if road closures will be fewer, air pollution from traffic jams would be 
rarer since there is an enormous increase in emissions from cars and trucks because of 
road repairs. … And the third implication is that in principle the damaged asphalt can 
be recovered and reused, but this is so in fairy tales. In fact, the overwhelming part is 
damaged so that it cannot be reused and pollutes the natural environment. The new 
material added to the asphalt can easily be recovered and if not always still its four-
five times longer lifetime makes this problem much rarer. So there was one 
environmental problem: plastics waste – a technology applies it to road construction 
and apart from solving the original environmental problem, that is, the waste problem, 
additionally reducing another environmental burden.” (Director of R&D) 
 
Beyond the above application for road construction (mass production is planned to begin in 
2002) the new material is also used as an insulating compound. By improving current 
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insulation techniques applied in waste deposits, construction costs incurred usually by local 
governments can be reduced.  
The third possibility for applying the new material relates to briquetting: steel 
production has a particular waste material with relatively high iron content that has been 
treated as a hazardous waste but can be recovered and added back to the production process if 
it is mixed with the new plastics material. The substantive message of the invention and its 
applications is formulated by the key person, the inventor, as follows: 
 
“In fact, a major message of [name of company], a new message compared to all other 
chemical plants of the country, is that the narrow, quasi-regulation-driven and 
defensive ecological policy, which is generally the case, [name of company] has 
attempted to broaden and build into its business activity. The underlying reason is that 
it is not a reasonable starting point that sustainable development for the 21st century 
will be constructed as a social tax, but it should be built into industry. Despite the fact 
that something is green, it can be profitable, too. It is not true then if we are greening it 
will be a burden on our profits. There is synergy between them. If a specific 
technological cycle is closed it will not certainly be more expensive; it may be the 
motivation in technology development stemming from ecological principles, because 
of materials savings, natural resources savings, etc. At the same time, it reduces 
production costs… The idea of [name of company] was in fact to enter environmental 
industry and, for this purpose, it develops and applies environmental technologies. 
Environmental industrial activities constitute such services that offer industrial 
solutions to ecological problems.” (Director of R&D) 
 
This strategic conception is manifest in the creation of an Environmental Technology 
Business Unit out of the three companies managed by a director, and in gradually building up 
an environmental research capability with a team exclusively dedicated to environmental 
research within the R&D department, as well as the appointment of the inventor/university 
professor as the Director of corporate R&D. These are undoubtedly steps towards the 
integration of ecological issues into core business activities. Moreover, to provide a single 
top-level management position for the brand new business unit, extremely small in standard 
business terms compared to the petrochemical unit is of primary symbolic importance. It is an 
organisational symbol of the future prospects of environmental technology as a business 
activity and that of a “new industrial culture,” as was reported by the internal corporate 
magazine.  
 
9.6. MODERNISM IN ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE 
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 The above mentioned new industrial culture means the synergy or synthesis of 
industry and ecology. The question to be examined in this section is what kind of 
organisational culture has contributed to the emergence of this idea at the chemical firm in 
question. Due to our research methodology, the level of espoused values within organisational 
culture may be best grasped. The most striking finding during the analysis of interview texts 
was the relatively homogeneous language used by top managers to conceptualise 
environmental issues.  This suggests that there is indeed a common frame of reference at the 
top level with regard to ecology and, in particular, that is persistent and dominant enough that 
the relatively frequent fluctuation in top managers during the past ten years of macro 
transformation could not undermine it. Our top-level interviewees were relatively new in their 
positions; the eldest was Director of Strategy with his one and a half year tenure, the Director 
of R&D has been appointed for a year, the Director of Marketing Communication for less 
than a year, and the Director of Environmental Technology for six months.  
This apparently quick fluctuation in top-level management has caused neither a 
discontinuous change in organisational culture in general, nor in the gradual process of 
corporate greening, in particular. Again, the personal element of organisational history was 
emphasised by many interviewees: 
 
“For decades the [name of company] was managed by a leader of strong hand. The 
order and discipline we still have here to a significant extent is due to him. 
Consequently, …what employees were socialised into has a continuance. The order 
and discipline was created in those times. At such a large company, things are not 
changing so fast indeed…” (Manager of Organizational Development) 
 
These characteristic elements of organisational culture were not even undermined during the 
turbulent first years of political transformation that brought primarily politically driven 
changes in top management: 
 
“Then, there was a time when many changes happened in executive positions, during 
the time of political changes in Hungary… in the beginning of the 90s there were 
more changes in management.  The reason was, at that time, political.  It was, 
consequently, a one-two year long more uncertain period but this [organisational 
culture] is not such a thing which can fade away in one or two year’s time.  
Afterwards, it went along as before.” (Manager of Organizational Development) 
 
It is by no means an accident that the words of the Director of Marketing 
Communication could well be expressed by any of his executive peers: 
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“It should be acknowledged though that chemical operations here are very dangerous, 
they require extraordinary discipline, very high technological discipline and an 
enormous amount of knowledge. It is by no means an accident that [name of 
company] has a much higher rate of educated workforce than the industry average. At 
[name of company] a degree in chemical engineering is almost a basic educational 
requirement. … in fact, people working here can be said to operate, on a high 
professional level, high-tech equipments.” (Director of Marketing Communication) 
  
The Director of Strategy concurs with this line of thought: 
 
“Here people have been accustomed to work in a very well-organised way, in a very 
safe way… people have learned if something is regulated it is not regulated because of 
subjective reasons but because it can save his/her life. People think like that… And 
upon this culture it was very easy to build either an ISO 9000 system or an 
environmental management system. Consequently, people’s ways of thinking have 
grown accustomed to the fact that everything should be regulated.” (Director of 
Strategy) 
 
Order, cleanliness, discipline and regulation – the personal marks of the 11-year long, 
now deceased, charismatic leader are still observable.  The visual scene of the plant has its 
parallel in the individual minds of employees, mirroring definite characteristics of the 
organisational culture: 
 
“The whole operation of the company from the Chief Executive Officer to the 
telephone girl mirrors environmental commitment. We are doing nothing to contradict 
it indeed… It has been built into our organisational culture. If you walk through… you 
will see absolute order and cleanliness. … I myself was amazed walking over the plant 
how fantastically modern and beautiful it is.  It is really beautiful. The whole complex 
is in order, chromium-plated, stainless steel pipes everywhere.” (Director of Marketing 
Communication) 
 
Again, the Director of Strategy continues: 
 
“It was always a strategic activity at [name of company]… it was fairly consciously 
built in such a direction not to encounter substantial environmental problems… 
polluting sources… were fairly consciously treated from the very beginning so as not 
to experience any problems later.” (Director of Strategy) 
 
 The synthesis between profit and environmental protection constitute a common 
theme for executives interviewed: 
 
“The ideal environmental project, at least in our field of business activity, I think, 
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besides that it benefits the natural environment, produces profits, too.” (Director of 
Strategy) 
 
or, as the Environmental Manager explains: 
 
“The most important thing is profit.  It is even true if I think it does not hurt 
environmental features because it is a taken-for-granted thing. … You cannot separate 
the two.  Speaking about sustainable development does not only mean that 
environmental quality should be sustained but economic development should be 
sustained, too.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
The strategic decision of top management to develop environmental technology as a 
business unit required environmental commitment, a related research and development 
capability (“an intellectual infrastructure for production” – a term coined by the Director of 
R&D) and “a kind of entrepreneurial attitude” – as all the executives interviewed agreed. This 
strategic conception has not faded away after the post-privatisation change in top 
management: the new executives have brought the chemical company further on the road of 
eco-modernisation. 
 
9.7. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
 
 There is more than one element of the above story of greening to be rightly selected as 
a key category. Yet, the sense of excellence that emanates from each word of the executives 
interviewed tells this story of corporate greening best. A sense of excellence seems to be 
evident in every aspect of the story. It is easy to see it if one follows the recurrence of such 
expressions as “first,” “fore-,” “leading,” or “leader,” used by the interviewees in different 
contexts of greening (emphasis added by the author): 
 
In terms of technology – “It is the most up-to-date polyprophylene factory of Europe; 
…it is amongst the leading chemical firms globally. … it is certainly in the first 
twenty chemical corporations all over the world.” 
 
In terms of market share – “In domestic markets we are, in fact, market leaders with 
regard to every product of ours.” 
 
In terms of profits – “According to financial indicators, e.g., ROE or ROA, the [name 
of company] is indeed in the forefront.” 
 
In terms of the synthesis if industry and ecology – “It is the first chemical company, I 
think, that has established an environmental technology business unit.” 
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The same sense of excellence emerges regarding the connection between the firm and 
environmental regulation: for example, the Environmental Manager made a stark contrast, 
after a long description of the faults and weaknesses of Hungarian environmental legislation, 
between his company being able to manage its environmental impacts and the national 
environmental policy not being able to manage country-wide environmental affairs. In this 
sense, he claimed that, while Hungary is only preparing for joining the European Union, his 
company, in fact, complies with the relevant EU requirements: 
 
“We are now in compliance with current legislation in the European Union. … just 
like we are part of the European Union. … The [name of company] could indeed join 
the EU tomorrow.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
The sense of excellence is perceived to be hold with regard to their competitors, too: 
 
“From an environmental point of view our firm can be compared to any of its big 
international competitors.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
It is of a particular pride for the chemical firm that  
 
“… [name of company] has never applied for any government support to solve its 
environmental problems, …all of them were solved with our own resources.” 
(Environmental Manager) 
 
The sense of excellence as a key category helps us to understand the continuity of 
corporate greening in this case: the most up-to-date technologies have been applied and 
operated by highly educated and disciplined employees, the management of the chemical 
plant has always followed the actual level of environmental expectations and has been in the 
forefront of adopting “modern” solutions. “Modern” technologies are ab ovo more 
environmentally sound; “modern” employees are more environmentally conscious and more 
self-demanding in this respect as well. In the case of a plant with known potential hazards, 
strict discipline and careful attention are required and systematically organised and controlled 
by well-established standards; that is, rule-following behaviour is enforced and supported. 
The other key category of this story of corporate greening is synthesis. This concept 
explains the meaning of sustainable development for the chemical firm; namely, industrial 
development that is in harmony with or more precisely, that is actually improving 
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environmental quality. Ecology is integrated into industry, into “the spontaneous order of 
market exchanges” and they are no more at odds with each other.  As the Director of R&D 
frames it: 
 
“The driving force of economic development should be connected up with ecology.” 
(Director of R&D) 
 
Therefore, the symbol is “environmental technology” or the new material (named “syntumen” 
– the etymology speaks for itself), in which need for material wealth (technological 
sophistication) and for ecological sustainability are synthesised.48 In this sense, the road of 
modernisation cannot and should not be diverged from, since by channelling it into an 
ecologically sustainable trajectory, that is, by eco-modernisation, as the saying goes: “we can 
have our cake and eat it too.” It is possible – especially in developed nations – to protect the 
natural environment and implement a sustainable society without having material welfare or 
well-being in danger of being reduced. At the corporate or industry level, this means that if 
industrial systems and the technologies in operation close the material cycle, the increase in 
production as well as in consumption can go on forever without confronting the absolute 
scarcity of natural resources. Seen from this perspective, it is considered to be crazy to argue 
against any limits on the increasing use of plastics, pointing to primary needs for non-
depletable natural resources. The cognitive functioning of an eco-modernisation paradigm is 
well illustrated by an argument given by one of the Directors interviewed, who lived in 
London for years and remembered producing more household waste there because of the 
enormous amount of packaging materials, compared to his current lifestyle in Hungary. 
Notwithstanding, his conclusions are worth quoting: 
 
“In developed industrial countries everything is packaged… in plastics. … This is the 
state of affairs… of course, it is good because it protects commodities, …because they 
can be stored longer. … [T]he problem is that, after consumption, these materials go to 
the dustbin.” (Director of Marketing Communication) 
 
It is striking how the opportunity that emerged for critical reflection of the operative logic of 
the socio-economic system was immediately lost by the attraction, or activation, of the 
ideology of eco-modernisation.  Since it is “the state of affairs” – a seemingly necessary stage 
– the problem can readily be (re-)conceptualised within the frame of the dominant paradigm 
                                                          
48 One can get a déja vu feeling – remembering the Hegelian triangle of thesis–antithesis–synthesis. 
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as a problem of recycling or re-use, in contrast to its radical conceptualisation as a problem of 
over-consumption of resources. The latter problem interpretation is excluded, or at least 
dominated, by the prevailing logic of a market society. 
 The greening of the chemical firm under investigation holds the promise, on the one 
hand, of developing corporate environmental consciousness to its maximum potential within 
the dominant institutional logic or framework. On the other, it starkly points out the limits of 
greening imposed by the same institutional logic. 
 
9.8. PROLOGUE 
 
The last interviews of the case study were conducted, to some extent, under new 
circumstances. The chemical firm in question became the target, and later a more passive 
subject, of complex hostile takeover battles within the Hungarian chemical sector and 
between a Russian energy and chemical corporation and the three largest Hungarian oil and 
chemical firms. Consequently, the structure of ownership of the case company has been 
dramatically changed which, in turn, has resulted in important changes in organisational 
structure regarding environmental management. The most important changes were as follows: 
(1) among its first steps, the new major owner, who is no longer a financial investor, 
dissolved the R&D department while maintaining the position of the Director of R&D; (2) the 
Director of Environmental Technology was dropped in rank to the level of the Environmental 
Manager (i.e., it is now a Manager of Environmental Technology); and (3) a new position was 
created,  Director of Technical Affairs, under which the Environmental Protection unit, the 
previous Environmental Technology Business Unit, and the team of environmental research 
were subsumed, among others. The symbolic downgrading of the Environmental Technology 
Business Unit was emphasised by the new President of the board, who allegedly said that “an 
elephant cannot dance with a flea” (where the elephant symbolises the Petrochemical 
Business Unit and the flea, the Environmental Technology Business Unit). One can only 
wonder whether this new period of uncertainty will cause a discontinuity in the process of 
greening as eco-modernisation or if the particular environmental culture of the chemical 
company uncovered during the case study has had enough time to take root in organisational 
culture strongly enough to be able to withstand the current, more tentative state of affairs.  
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CHAPTER 10 
A STORY OF CONTRADICTIONS: THE LIMITS 
OF FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 
 
10.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This case study is about the Hungarian subsidiary of a multi-national company, which 
invested in new greenfield development during the first years of the post-communist era. 
Since then, the subsidiary has become the dominant producer of two market segments of the 
packaging industry; namely, milk and juice packaging. 
Ten interviews were conducted for this case study. Eight of these were with employees 
of the company, one was with a representative of the relevant trade association and one was 
with an activist from a green pressure group focusing on waste issues (the latter has strongly 
criticised the multi-national company since the beginning of its Hungarian investments). Six 
interviews were conducted with the Environmental Manager of the company, one with the 
Human Relations (HR) manager, and one with the Quality Manager. The breakdown of 
interviews is as follows: 
 
Table 12 Interviews for Story 3 
 Number of interviews 
Within the company: (8) 
• Top management – 
• Middle management directly reporting to the top 7 
• Middle management 1 
• Shop-floor – 
Outside the company: (2) 
• Trade association 1 
• Environmental NGO 1 
Total 10 
 
Data for the case study analysis were also gathered from documents published by the 
company (e.g., newsletters and the corporate environmental report of 1999), all of which were 
provided by the interviewees. Further information was collected from other, second-hand 
sources, such as published articles, newspaper reports and the regular newsletter of the green 
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organisation.49   
 
10.2. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
The multi-national firm describes itself in its Hungarian information leaflet as “[name 
of company] develops, produces and supplies packaging materials for fluids products. Most 
important of these are milk, fruit juices, and other fruit-based drinks.” The multi-national firm 
has 57 factories and 72 commercial offices around the world, and globally employs 18,200 
people. The company sells 200 million packaging products every day in 150 countries of the 
world. The turnover of the firm was 11 billion Swiss franks in 1998 (according to the 
company’s website). 
This multi-national company established its Hungarian subsidiary in 1990, with a 
greenfield investment. The subsidiary enjoyed substantial economic advantages as provided 
by the Hungarian state (e.g., company tax relief), as did every 100 percent foreign-owned 
firm at the time. The multi-national company had developed six different packaging materials 
production systems; it moved one of these technology systems to Hungary, which produces 
packaging materials for long-life milk and fruit juices. The subsidiary also sells other types of 
packaging materials in the Hungarian market that are produced by the multi-national 
company.  
The packaging product, which is produced in Hungary, consists of paper (75 percent), 
polyethylene (20 percent) and aluminium (5 percent). Onto the paper base a polyethylene 
layer is pressed, then aluminium and then, two further polyethylene layers. On the other 
surface of the paper base, some sort of graphic is printed and then a polyethylene layer is 
pressed atop that. The paper makes the packaging solid; the plastic (polyethylene) provides 
impermeability; and, the aluminium ensures that the stored fluid has a long shelf-life, by 
keeping out the light and oxygen. This final product is called “combined packaging material.” 
The company produces only this packaging material in its factory, which is then shaped and 
filled with milk or fruit drinks in the outlets of the customers. The subsidiary of the multi-
national firm provides automated filling machinery to its customers (through various ways: 
leasing, selling the property outright, or lease-to-buy) and supplies them with reels of the 
packaging materials according to customers’ needs. The company controls 70–80 percent of 
                                                          
49 All the interviews and archival research were done by Zsófia Hajnal. 
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the market segment for packaging fruit juices and 30–40 percent of the market segment for 
milk packaging in Hungary.  
All paper used in the production is imported from the country of origin of the multi-
national firm. This is because the pine trees in that country have favourably characteristic 
long fibres when pulped, which means that the papers produced from the trees are of good 
quality and can be recycled many times. Thus the Hungarian subsidiary does not have a free 
choice in making decisions about its main basic production materials. Nor can the subsidiary 
influence its research and development activities, as these are completely centralised in the 
country of origin of the multi-national firm. Hence, decisions regarding technology and 
product developments are given, pre-determined factors for the Hungarian subsidiary. 
Another important feature of the subsidiary is that the main positions in the firm (such 
as Managing Director and Director of Production) are still filled by non-Hungarian employees 
of the multi-national company, although since the start of the greenfield investment and the 
consolidation of the company’s market position in the country, more and more Hungarians 
have been employed in the management of the subsidiary. The dominance of foreign 
managers can be partly explained by the ownership structure of the multi-national company. 
The firm is still owned by the inventor-founder family. This explains – as the interviewees 
argued – why the company is closed, is not usually in cultural dialogue with the outside 
environment and applies strict rules of secrecy. These are considered by the interviewees to 
be general features of the multi-national firm, not only those of the Hungarian subsidiary.  
As a result of these characteristics, no data about the production and performance of 
the Hungarian firm are available. It is estimated that the subsidiary employs around 150 
people, which would indicate a middle-sized company. However, its market position and 
market share suggest that the firm is of a more considerable size (probably among the top 200 
largest companies in Hungary). The multi-national company published an environmental 
report the first time in 2000 (about the year 1999), which summarises the main relevant 
environmental data for the firm as a whole. According to one of the interviewees, this report 
and a recent televised interview with the Managing Director of the multi-national company 
indicate that the firm is slowly opening up and is becoming more communicative. 
“The structure of the Hungarian packaging market is similar to those of the developed 
countries,” emphasised the Secretary General of the National Association of the Packaging 
Materials Industry (NAPMI), the trade association of the most prominent packing materials 
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producers in Hungary.50 The most significant difference is that in Hungary, per capita 
packaging materials consumption is half that of more developed countries. Per capita 
packaging materials consumption is around 70–80 kilograms a year in Hungary, while in 
Western Europe it is between 140 and 160 kilograms and in the United States between 250 
and 280 kilograms. Trends in the developed world indicate that demand for packaging 
materials increases with domestic economic growth, according to the Senior Manager of 
NAPMI. Increase in exports creates more substantial demand than expansion of consumption 
in the home-market, because long distance transportation adds to the demand for packaging 
materials. As the Hungarian economy and exports have been growing steadily in recent years, 
NAPMI predicts more expansion in the packaging materials market and in particular, the per 
capita packaging material consumption in the country is expected to grow.  
 
10.3. GREENING OF THE PACKAGING COMPANY 
 
Contradictions are the main features in the greening of the company, which will be 
discussed in the following sections. There have been considerable efforts and success in 
making the company more environmental friendly, however, with limitations and 
inconsistencies. 
 
10.3.1. Environmental protection in the organisational hierarchy 
 
In terms of responsibilities and duties in the greening of the organisation, the company 
has a peculiar feature. The spheres of authority (in terms of environmental protection) are not 
always with the Environmental Manager, and she does not necessarily play a decisive role. 
This is partly due to the fact that in front of the law there are actually two companies: one is 
the production site and the other is the commercial and administrative services provider 
division. The Managing Director is the same person in both companies. The Environmental 
Manager is in the commercial firm in a staff position, and is directly responsible to the 
Managing Director. (The Human Relations Manager, who was also interviewed for this 
research, works at the commercial firm as well. She is directly responsible to the Finance and 
                                                          
50 Member companies of NAPMI include, e.g., Coca Cola, Pepsi Co., some of the largest Hungarian chemical 
firms, etc. 
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Administrative Manager.) 
The environmental affairs of the production company are managed by the following 
employees: the Director of Production, whose position is second highest after the Managing 
Director, is responsible for the total environmental performance of the factory; the Quality 
Manager (one of the interviewees), who is directly under the Director of Production, works as 
a co-ordinator for the Environmental Management System; the Production Manager, who is 
the Emissions Coordinator; the Maintenance Manager, who is the so-called “Services 
Coordinator” and as such, is responsible for the supplying utilities; and, the Logistics 
Manager, who reports directly to the Customer Services Manager under the Director of 
Production, is the Materials Recycling Coordinator. 
The Quality Manager and her department of six people are the most important actors 
in managing environmental protection in the plant, in terms of running an integrated Quality 
and Environmental Management System (Q/EMS). Similarly, in the other part of the firm, the 
commercial and administrative services providing division, the Environmental Manager is not 
only responsible for environmental issues, but has to deal with non-environmental tasks, 
specifically public relations and relations with governmental bodies. The official job title is 
Communications and Environmental Manager. 
The organisational structure, titles and responsibilities indicate that environmental 
management is divided into two main groups of tasks: internal (within the company) and 
external (mainly communication and relations with outside bodies and organisations). This is 
not conventional, as the individual who acts as the Environmental Manager in the eyes of the 
outside world (authorities, customers, consumers, civil organisations, etc.), does not have 
direct control and influence over developing the internal greening of the firm, which is 
overseen by other managers.  
This practice in itself is not necessarily a problem, if internal cooperation is effective. 
Internal cooperation in fact is working. The Environmental Manager provides a sort of 
environmental consultancy service to her colleagues at the production site. She also has 
access to the company’s computer database of environmental data and parameters, as she has 
to authorise compulsory reports and audits for the authorities (she is the only one in the 
company who has the relevant professional qualification required by the Hungarian 
Environmental Protection Law of 1995). However, our case study analysis suggests that the 
internal cooperation is also problematic. Thus, the first contradiction in ‘greening’ of the 
company is found in the organisational structure of the firm. There are several examples 
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illustrating this. 
One of these is an instance when selective office (not factory) recycling, which was 
proposed by the Environmental Manager, was halted by the Director of Production. 
 
“ … I tried to introduce selective office recycling three or four years ago… but it did 
not get off the ground… the then Director of Production was against it and looked for 
technical problems, such as the fact that we would have had to store bales of papers 
for a month or two until enough accumulated that made it worth transporting to a 
recycling centre. The Director of Production viewed this as a major problem. He also 
complained about that when we put used cans into bales, the baling machinery got 
contaminated and this was unhygienic.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
Another example is the development of the EMS. This process was directed by the 
Quality Assurance Manager, not by the Environmental Manager. This in itself would not be a 
problem, yet the interviews suggested conflicts. For instance, the Quality Manager’s answer 
to the question of whether she had to collaborate and work with the Environmental Manager 
continuously was: 
 
“Yes. Or rather, the Environmental Manager had to collaborate with us. There were 
more of us at the Quality Assurance Department. Of course, it was important that we 
worked together on the development of the system [EMS], it was important that the 
Environmental Manager took part in it, especially because later she had to do the 
communication of the whole system. Despite this, she could only receive information 
intended for external communication with the permission of the Director of 
Production.” (Quality Manager) 
 
This suggests that the company is secretive and reluctant to provide data and information 
about its activities not only towards the outside world, but in its internal systems, as well.  
The third illustration supporting the perception of contradictions is the fact that the 
Environmental Manager was highly reluctant to talk about her relations with the 
environmental agents in the factory. She hardly talked about this relationship in five 
interviews and only when a direct question was asked about it during the sixth interview did 
she commented upon it. Instead, she emphasised in positive terms her relations with 
Environmental Managers of other subsidiaries of the multi-national firm: 
 
“The collaboration is very very good. I think the cooperation is much better in 
environmental affairs than in marketing or sales [however, she excluded the 
environmental agents in the factory from this!]. It is probably because there are only a 
couple of people working on these issues in each company, thus everybody knows 
everybody in this field. We gather together for a three-day working session each year. 
We also established a small East Central European team a couple of years ago… there 
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is communication between all Environmental Managers almost every day… this is a 
great small team… the members of which help each other when they struggle with 
some problems… this is also because nobody else helps us.” (Environmental 
Manager) 
 
The first contradiction in the greening of the company, then, is the relative isolation of 
the Environmental Manager within the company’s structure. The comments cited above 
indicate that she feels herself to be the solitary person responsible for ‘environmental 
management’ in the company. The feature of the organisational structure that places the 
Environmental Manager directly under the Managing Director hardly reveals anything about 
the real influence and power of the Environmental Manager in the firm. In fact, as our 
analysis showed, her real influence and power is rather restricted in terms of the greening of 
the company.  
However, this peculiar structure for environmental protection could have easily 
developed as a result of (partly unconscious) defence mechanisms. Already at the time the 
subsidiary was launched in 1990, a group of environmental activists were protesting against 
the investment of the multi-national company in Hungary. For the protesters, it was the 
company’s main product that was considered problematic and unacceptable from an 
environmental standpoint. This aspect of the case study will be analysed below. 
 
10.3.2. Environmental aspects of production 
 
A life cycle perspective does play a role in the company. First, the subsidiary’s 1999 
environmental report identified this perspective as the essence of environmental management 
at the company. Second, the company commissioned a group of experts from a Hungarian 
university to carry out a study that compared the company’s milk packaging techniques with 
sachet milk packaging, the only alternative in the Hungarian market. The findings of this 
research, however, are confidential, thus no information about it was provided to us. Each 
stage of the life cycle of the product is analysed below on the basis of the available 
information. By analysing each stage of production, discrete environmental impacts – and 
specifically contradictions – could be identified and considered.      
The three principle base materials used in the production processes of the company are 
paper, plastic and aluminium. These are all imported from abroad. Paper is imported in reels 
from the country of origin of the multi-national firm. The available information about this 
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aspect of the production is that the multi-national firm stopped using extreme methods of 
forest management, such as clear-cutting, which betrays evidence of an ecological 
consciousness on the part of the company. Instead, more sustainable, selective methods of 
cutting are used, which leave enough trees for the forest to remain intact. The company also 
operates tree nurseries. A specific method is used in these nurseries in order to “make” the 
trees grow quicker: the trees are “deceived” – as the Environmental Manager described the 
method – by artificially controlling the diurnal-nocturnal cycle. The pine trees then grow 
faster and become available for paper production sooner. Paper production is carried out in 
the country of origin of the multi-national firm, from whence the paper is then transported to 
various subsidiaries, including the one in Hungary. 
The greening of the subsidiary is also evident in one aspect of the production of the 
plastics used. The supplier of the plastic granulate is one of the largest chemical companies in 
the world. In the first years of its contract, this supplier provided the plastic granulate in large 
boxes, which were transported by many lorries and left in its wake a huge amount of rubbish. 
The case company managed to “persuade” its supplier to change this practice, which was seen 
as wasting both environmental and economic resources. A large silo was built next to the 
factory and today, “tankers bring the plastic granulate, which is transferred into the silo 
pneumatically; therefore, no packaging material is required and it works very well,” as the 
Environmental Manager described the modifications.  
In the factory of the Hungarian subsidiary, only the packaging materials are produced 
and they are not filled there on the spot. At the time of the interviews, the factory is utilised 
50–60 percent of its capacity – considered to be high. The company is going to take over the 
production of another subsidiary of the multi-national firm, from another country, in the near 
future. The recycling of production waste had already been investigated and arranged when 
the greenfield investment started. The company signed a contract with a Hungarian pulp and 
paper firm that is capable of recycling paper waste. The Environmental Manager argued that 
the positive attitude of the multi-national company towards environmental issues was 
demonstrated by the fact that in every country in which it invested, production wastes in the 
subsidiaries are recycled. The company carries out and pays for the selective collection and 
baling of waste products, as well as for transporting them to recycling firms. 
Another environmental issue to which attention was paid by the company was energy 
consumption. The laminating machines, which press the polyethylene and aluminium layers 
onto the paper box, use the largest amounts of energy in the production process –. merely 
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switching these machines on consumes a lot of energy. In order to save energy, the company 
tries to organise a single production process for a given type of product. They wait until all 
the demand for a particular packaging product with a particular design has been ordered, and 
all the production materials are available, and then start the laminating machines. After 
finishing a lamination run, the machines are turned off and not switched on again until the 
next production cycle (or design).  
Someone is responsible for each type of waste product in the company. S/he must 
ascertain that the recycling and waste managing firms, which handle the waste products of the 
subsidiary, do not just dump them at a rubbish tip. Furthermore, the Environmental Manager 
argued, they also try to minimise waste products by offering financial incentives to the 
employees, who can earn extra money if they suggest and are able to implement any 
alternatives resulting in material conservation. 
In the company’s factory, production basically entails pressing the various layers of 
afore-mentioned materials – plus the design and print of the required graphics – onto the 
products. The packaging materials are then reeled and stored until they are transported to the 
customers. The materials are shaped and filled with either milk or some sort of fruit juice by 
filling machines, which are placed at the customers’ facilities. These machines also carry out 
various technological processes, such as milk sterilisation. 
 
“The long-life milk in these packaging materials will never go sour” (Environmental 
Manager) 
 
The company also takes care of waste products from production activities located at 
the customers’ facilities. If required, the firm supplies baling machines, in which the customer 
could collect the waste products. The company – in fact the Environmental Manager, herself 
– then organises the transportation of these baled waste products to the recycling machines, 
which recycle the company’s own waste products. However, she admitted that her efforts in 
this respect were not always successful: 
 
“The system did not really work, mainly because of the attitude of many milk 
producing companies. There is one such a firm, whom I tried to persuade to accept 
baling machine and to collect waste products selectively. But the firm still dumps the 
waste at a tip… On the other hand, there are some companies which adopt the system. 
For example, one of our fruit juice producer customers has been using the baling 
machines and selective waste collection for four years.” (Environmental Manager) 
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However, she also pointed out that even in this positive case, there were some conflicts. 
 
“At the time when this company adopted the system, the owner of the local rubbish tip 
phoned me complaining that I took away business from him.” (Environmental 
Manager) 
 
10.3.3.  Establishing the environmental management system  
 
An analysis of the establishment of the EMS is important for two main reasons. First, 
an integrated Q/EMS can play a significant role in developing and supporting environmental 
consciousness throughout the company. In this case study, the Q/EMS was developed only for 
the production site of the subsidiary, thus it is not relevant to the commercial and 
administrative services provider division. Second, the way the system was established, with 
several ups and downs, can potentially reveal more about the greening of the company and 
the organisational culture.   
In 1992, three years after launching production at the factory, the company received a 
quality assurance certificate according to ISO 9001 standards. This greatly influenced the 
introduction of EMS. Establishment of the Quality Management System (QMS) took quite a 
long time, as admitted by the interviewees, themselves. On the basis of a suggestion, the then-
Director of Production, a consultant from the multi-national firm, was put in charge of 
introducing the QMS. However, the consultant failed to deliver. According to the Quality 
Manager of the Hungarian subsidiary, this was partly due to the fact that the consultant did 
not have real power or authority and was not part of the organisational hierarchy, and partly 
to a lack of interest on the part of middle management. The reason for this – as she argued – 
was that those managers did not have knowledge about quality assurance, which top 
management did not realise at the time. Things changed and speeded up when the middle 
managers received adequate training and a responsible manager with authority and power was 
appointed to develop the QMS.  
 
“In the end, four middle managers were sent to training. After the training, these four 
people made a ‘revolution’ in the company as they became dedicated to the issue. 
They were able to convince other people and influence the whole organisation… This 
was the first step, the acquisition of knowledge. The second step was that we 
developed an in-house training about the issue. It was called ‘active training,’ because 
in those sessions there was a two-way flow of information… we were not only taught 
what to do and why to do it, but we listened to the employees what they thought 
should be done.” (Quality Manager) 
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Introduction of the EMS resembles the establishment of the QMS. The company 
started to develop its environmental management system following the decision by the multi-
national firm to acquire quality management certificate according to ISO 14001 standards for 
all of its subsidiaries. The management of the Hungarian subsidiary then decided that it was 
going to integrate its EMS with the already-developed quality assurance system. They also 
decided that the company was going to develop its EMS from its own resources, without the 
help of external environmental consultants. The Quality Assurance Manager was appointed to 
head the team set up for developing the EMS, in order to ensure its integration with quality 
assurance. The members of this team were middle managers, including the Environmental 
Manager, the Production Manager and the Maintenance Manager.  
According to the interviewees, development and certification of the EMS was a long 
and troublesome process. The Quality Manager, the head of the team, argued that integration 
of the quality and the environmental management systems required additional work, as the 
existing quality assurance control system had to be revised according to new (environmental) 
considerations. This was viewed as a positive development: 
 
“… the integration advanced the quality control system because it became more 
transparent. This can be best seen at the shop floor level. The company developed job 
descriptions for the employees who run the machines… which included quality, 
environmental as well some labour safety aspects. The latter ones were embraced 
since humans are part of the environment, thus their protection needs to be covered in 
an Environmental Management System. … Hence, the employees today have a job 
description which includes all three aspects.” (Quality Manager) 
 
Similar to the introduction of the quality assurance control system, ‘active training’ was 
deployed during the development of the EMS by the management, with the aim of involving 
employees.  
Another problematic area in the establishment of the EMS was the attitude of senior 
management. The local senior management team reacted quickly following the decision of the 
multi-national firm to introduce an EMS in each subsidiary. However, apart from the initial 
decision to integrate the quality assurance and environmental management systems the senior 
management did not do much. The Quality Manager described the events with some 
resentment: 
 
“It was hard… we were left with the decision, but then we did not get support. … The 
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work of the team was not hindered, but it was not helped either… The senior 
management did not hamper our efforts, but did not support us either. Rather, I should 
say… they [senior management] did want the Environmental Management System to 
be developed, but did not invest in it a lot. And we [the EMS team] felt that. The 
problem is that if an employee senses that his/her boss is not behind a particular 
project or task wholeheartedly, the employee will have a similar or sluggish attitude 
towards that particular project or task. That is what happened in this case.” (Quality 
Manager) 
 
The Environment Manager gave a similar account in the interview. She argued that the 
development of the environmental management system was a long process that was initiated 
and carried out within the company. However, middle management played the main role in 
the process and not senior management. 
 
“The senior management did not want to spend too much time on this” 
(Environmental Manger) 
 
It was difficult even to put the issue on the agenda of senior management meetings.  
It is interesting how the Quality Manager explained the attitude of senior 
management: 
 
“There is obviously a reason, namely the consideration of profits, which is a main aim 
of a company like this. It is easier to be devoted to quality of production, as there is a 
direct link there between quality and profits. In the eyes of senior managers 
environmental issues and considerations mean costs, not profits… they are not viewed 
as profitable… senior management thinks rationally [in the sense of profit making], 
hence it is difficult for them to be dedicated to environmental issues, much more so 
than to quality assurance issues.” (Quality Manager) 
 
Thus, the development of the EMS is another example of contradiction in the greening 
of the company. While the multi-national firm heralded its commitment to environmental 
protection in its 1999 environmental report and in earlier company brochures, in its 
Hungarian subsidiary the dedication was questionable, as senior management loaded the task 
and the commitment to middle managers.  
 
“… it took rather long to make senior managers realise that reducing waste output 
actually has extra profits, both for the company and the environment… They believed 
that having an Environmental Management System merely means investing in waste 
management… and buying filters… It was rather difficult to change this type of 
thinking and attitude, and make them realise that all aspects of our production and life 
are in fact affecting the environment.” (Quality Manager) 
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Initiating organisational changes at the level of middle management, rather than that 
of senior management, is not a problem, in itself. In fact, that practice is well-documented in 
the organisational change literature. In this case study, however, it relates to further, more 
profound contradictions in the greening of the packaging company. One of these is about the 
product, particularly the issue of its recycling, and the other is about the communication 
practices of the company. In the followings these two aspects are analysed in detail. 
 
10.3.4. Environmental aspects of the product 
 
The packaging material of the company can be distributed effectively and transported 
in great quantities per carrier, which is a positive characteristic of the product from an 
environmental point of view. The main question in relation to environmental protection, 
however, is concerned with the product being so-called “combined packaging” material. It 
was mentioned above that the product contains paper, polyethylene and aluminium. These 
three components vary considerably, from an environmental point of view. One of the most 
significant differences is that while paper is made of a renewable resource, the other two 
components are not. The Environmental Manager emphasised this aspect of the constituent 
materials: 
 
“I – as consumer – would choose paper packaging material, if I could. Simply because 
I know that it is made from renewable resources, namely trees… and when the product 
is thrown out it would disintegrate to a certain degree…” (Environmental Manager) 
 
Recycling of combined materials is more difficult than those of products made of a 
single material. The Environmental Manager pointed out that there were three ways to recycle 
the company’s products after they are consumed. First, the waste materials of the products 
can be reused by the pulp and paper industry. It was mentioned above that the subsidiary has 
had a partner in the Hungarian paper industry from its onset, who collects and removes the 
waste materials both from the factory and its willing customers. According to a representative 
of this paper company, the firm struggles with recycling and received hardly any support from 
the subsidiary in this respect.51  It should be mentioned, however, that the paper firm does not 
pay for anything, even the transportation of these waste materials, which could be reused. 
The paper material is separated from the other two components in a pulper. The paper 
                                                          
51 Telephone interview with the representative. 
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gained from the waste materials this way is reused, while the polyethylene and aluminium are 
dumped. A company report claims that 550 tons of waste materials were recycled this way in 
1994, which is 2 percent of the total packaging materials the firm produced that year. 
According to the Environmental Manager, the figure increased to around 800–1000 tons by 
the end of the decade, as a result of expanding production and growth of waste materials both 
at the factory and the industrial customers of the company. However, the waste which results 
from individual consumption of milk or fruit juice packaged in the company’s product is not 
recycled at all. The Environmental Manager estimated that 50–60 such boxes are used per 
capita annually in Hungary. 
Another way to reuse the waste materials from the company’s products would be with 
“techtan-based” recycling. In this process, all three components of the waste are ground, 
heated and pressed. During the process, the polyethylene glues together the paper and 
aluminium. This pressed material is then cut up and used in the production of various goods, 
such as worktops or plaster walls for dividing rooms. This method, however, is not employed 
in Hungary; although the latter products are produced in Slovakia. The Environmental 
Manager was puzzled about the reason: 
 
“Not one Hungarian entrepreneur was interested in this production technology. I have 
no idea why.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
The third main option for recycling the waste materials would be to burn them. 
However, this method is not employed in Hungary, either. 
 
“… in Finland, for example… one third of the waste materials from the packaging 
products are burned in boilers.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
In other countries, the cement industry produces energy by incinerating the waste 
products. According to her, this cannot be done in Hungary for technological reasons. 
However, the view of the Environmental Manager is questionable, as some cement factories 
in Hungary do burn solid waste materials for energy (for example, the practice of burning 
used tyres). 
Environmental perceptions of the product depend on recycling, although as was 
discussed earlier, only to a limited extent. The fact that the product is of combined materials 
restricts recycling considerably. The company did make some effort to improve the reuse of 
waste materials; however, due to the nature of the product they were largely unsuccessful. 
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One of these efforts was to reduce the weight of the packaging material from 32 to 28 grams; 
another was to decrease the thickness of the aluminium layer by 30 percent.  
Efforts to improve recycling and deposition of waste materials, however, focused only 
on waste accumulated in the company’s factory and at its industrial customers’ plants. There 
is no concerted attempt whatsoever to recycle waste from the end-users of the packaging 
material, the individual consumers of the milk or fruit juice. The company seems to refuse 
any responsibility for this volume of waste, a position often criticised by green organisations.  
The company has to pay the environmental product fee imposed on all packaging 
material in Hungary since 1995. According to the Environmental Manager, the amount of this 
tax was not considerable for the subsidiary, yet the company used it as an excuse for not 
doing anything, insisting that the tax now makes it the State’s responsibility to handle 
selective waste collection from individual users (through general local public waste 
collection, etc.). The company would also argue that the fact that the State spends the amount 
collected from this environmental product fee on other things is not a fault of the firm. The 
view of the company is that it does everything for recycling and environmental protection that 
the current legislation requires. Actually, they would claim to have gone a step further, in 
working through the trade association (NAPMI) of the packaging sector.  
The Association developed a model for waste management, which – according to the 
members – conforms to European Union standards. In this model, the state hands over the 
environmental product fee and the duties and responsibilities of waste management to a non-
profit organisation. Such an organisation was already established by members of the 
Association under the name, ÖkoPannon. The Environmental Manager of the company plays 
an important role in the development of this model and in general in the environmental 
ventures of the Association: she is currently President of the Environmental Protection 
Committee of NAPMI. 
The representative of the Association believes that the system embedded in the model 
would establish a “closed-cycle economy,” desirable for sustainable development. The system 
“would have to prefer materials which could be recycled at relatively low costs,” he 
maintains. It is questionable whether combined materials – such as the case company’s 
expensive packaging materials – would survive in the market under such a system. 
Furthermore, as described above, it is more difficult to manage wastes of combined materials 
that make recycling more complicated and expensive. Given these features of the product, it 
is difficult to argue with the accusations of the interviewed representative of a green 
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organisation: 
 
 “… packaging method of the company is… the most squandering and the least 
environment friendly method… They [the case company] try to present their 
packaging material as the most environment friendly, while in reality it is actually the 
most expensive and the most wasteful.” (member of green NGO) 
 
Arguably, the contradictions could not be more evident. The discussion of the next 
aspect, on corporate environmental communication, reveals even more contradictions.   
 
10.3.5. Environmental communication 
 
It was mentioned above that the multi-national firm tends to be secretive and closed to 
external observers. This does not mean lack of communication from the company; rather it 
implies peculiar ways of communication. An unusual organisational feature is that apart from 
the Marketing and Communication Departments, the Environmental Manager is also 
responsible for external communication. The odd feature of this is that she does not only deal 
with external communication in terms of environmental issues, but with communication in 
general, as well. For instance, the Environmental Manager edits the company newsletter, one 
of the most important PR materials, albeit colleagues from the Marketing Department help her 
with this task. Another example is that the Environmental Manager is responsible for 
developing and maintaining the company’s website. The Environmental Manager’s view is 
that the Managing Director gave her this task because “he thought he would not have PR 
problems with it then”. However, she admitted in the interview that the responsibility for the 
website is a nuisance for her, and that she is much more interested and committed to 
communication regarding environmental protection. She is active in the latter respect and has 
even published quite progressive writings.  
Under the editorship of the Environmental Manager, environmental issues, questions 
and information are discussed regularly in the newsletter. Among these was the firm’s 
environmental policy statement, which even in her judgement was rather pompous. The 
colourful newsletter is distributed to every employee, as well as to all business partners.  
The Environmental Manager also edits another publication, which she inherited from 
the previous Environmental Manager (who was from the United States). The title of this 
publication does not refer to the company but to the integration of environment and business. 
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Indeed, the quarterly journal, which is of quite high quality, does not serve direct PR 
purposes. It obviously publishes issues relevant to the company’s work, such as introduction 
of the EMS; however, most articles discuss problems of environmental protection in general, 
ways of solving these problems, events related to environmental protection, or reviews of 
relevant books. The journal includes news and information about activist green organisations, 
such as Greenpeace, as well as about the trade association, NAPMI, its plans and model(s) for 
waste management in Hungary.  
The target audience of the journal is quite different from that of the PR newsletter. 
Although the publication can be found lying around in company meeting rooms, it is mainly 
distributed to experts working on environmental issues, such as researchers, university 
lecturers, journalists and politicians. This sort of external communication best shows the 
Environmental Manager’s commitment to environmental issues. Arguably, the journal could 
be seen as her own publication, since other employees of the company – including senior 
management – do not even read it regularly. The openness to dialogue with the outside world 
that the journal represents seems to be an isolated phenomenon, rather than part of the 
organisational culture. From the point of view of the company, the publication contributes to 
the development and improvement of external relations, which in fact is another responsibility 
of the Environmental Manager.  
Two programmes aimed at school-aged children were among the most significant 
projects in external communication. One of the programmes was the school milk project and 
the other was an environmental education project with a special ‘instructive bus’ (called ‘eco-
bus’). The main aim of the school milk project did not initially involve environmental issues. 
It was run in cooperation with companies in the milk industry. The Environmental Manager 
played an important role in the project, which presumably is why environmental protection 
was then integrated into the aims of the programme. However, not only the Hungarian 
subsidiary ran a school milk project. According to the 1999 annual report of the multi-
national firm, similar programmes were operated by several subsidiaries in different 
countries.  
The main aim of the project was to promote daily milk drinking among school-aged 
children, who increasingly consume various carbonated soft drinks, such as cola. These drinks 
are usually perceived to be less healthy than milk. The company – with the milk industry – 
could provide milk considerably cheaper to schools that participated in the project, because 
the costs of retailing were left out. The milk, which was packaged in the combined packaging 
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material of the company, stayed fresh for a long period even without refrigerating. Thus 
deliveries did not need to be every day, which was seen as an environmental advantage 
reducing transportation. The Environmental Manager arranged that every school received a 
special rubbish bin to collect the milk boxes, the waste of which was removed regularly by 
the company.  
A further element of the project was that the company provided the children with an 
educational pack about waste materials in the packaging industry as well as various gifts, 
such as timetables from recycled paper. The subsidiary had high hopes about the programme, 
yet despite all their efforts, it did not expand to a national level. The Environmental 
Manager’s view is that the project became the subject of heated political debate and as a 
result, the company withdraw from the programme. Today, one of the ministries organises the 
provision and delivery of free milk to some schools. With the changes in the programme, the 
environmental aims disappeared completely. The Environmental Manager saw this as very 
regrettable: 
 
“… when we organised the project, we paid a lot of attention to environmental 
considerations.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
The other main programme of the company, the environmental education project with 
a special “instructive bus,” was also the Environmental Manager’s idea. She developed and 
organised the whole project. The idea behind the project was quite unusual (though 
companies in food industries usually have programmes in which products, such as chocolate 
or drinks are given to children free in schools). Thus, the Environmental Manager had to 
argue and press for support and money for more than a year, as senior management was 
initially quite sceptical about the project.  
She acquired and rebuilt a bus, which was provided with computers and furnished 
with techtan-based furniture. (She chose techtan-based furniture in order to make the point 
that there are various possibilities for recycling waste materials.) Initially there was one part-
time teacher, who travelled with the bus to schools in different parts of the country. The 
project became quite successful, and later two part-time teachers were employed. The 
teachers held classes about waste management, especially in relation to packaging waste 
materials. Computer game programmes were used in the classrooms, in which the children 
could play and imitate the various stages and problems of waste management.  
An important symbolic part of the project was that at the end of the class, every child 
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received a small paper box – which interestingly was not made of combined materials – and 
in which there were a few pine tree seeds. The children were then supposed to plant them 
with the box. This symbolised – at least for the company – that the packaging materials of the 
firm have became a part of natural material cycles and in time, new life would grow out of 
them. The project was aimed not only at children but teachers as well, who received teaching 
packets about waste management. The programme lasted for two years, during which the 
senior management became increasingly supportive – not least because of the positive media 
coverage the project received. The Environmental Manager was given some time to devote to 
the project’s organisation, which she was pleased about. (She was very enthusiastic about this 
project and once even substituted for one of the teachers who had fallen ill.) 
Despite some differences, the two projects are similar in that they both contain 
contradictions. The aims of both programmes are noble and desirable: it is important that 
children drink more milk for health reasons and it is also desirable that environmental 
education is improved in schools. However, there are deep-rooted contradictions in the two 
projects. The aims of the programmes serve the interests and well-being of members of 
society. Arguably, however, as these are aims of society, it should be the community who 
aspires and works for them, not a private company. If private companies take up social aims, 
problems arise. Most significantly, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to draw the line 
between working for social aims (promoting milk or environmental education) and working 
for the aims of the company (to sell more products and increase product awareness among 
customers).  
Green organisations did accuse the company of using “dirty tactics” and trying to 
“brainwash” people. Given the fact that it is very difficult to draw the line between these 
conflicting aims, these accusations could not be easily defended, especially because the 
targeted audiences of the projects were children, usually perceived as more vulnerable and 
receptive to advertising. The marketing profession, as well as the Environmental Manager, 
would counter-argue that children are not treated as school-aged consumers in promotional 
campaign, but as what they are: children.  
However, the extent to which children could distinguish between the importance of 
milk drinking and the usefulness of the company’s packaging material is highly debatable in 
the campaign described above. Furthermore, the milk provided in the school programme was 
distributed by the teachers to the children in the classrooms, and teachers are generally seen 
as role models and one of the most important authority figures for children. Hence, the 
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representative of the green organisation seems justified in arguing that: 
 
“… this was a very deceitful campaign, because… it was aimed at children. It is not 
ethical to teach in the classrooms that the milk which is in the packaging material of 
the company will last long… We [the green organisation] condemn that these types of 
campaigns target children.” (member of green NGO) 
 
Promotional campaigns that are aimed at adult audiences are usually seen as less 
problematic. However, these can also be misleading. For instance, a television advertisement 
about the packaging material for milk produced by the company is rather ambiguous. In the 
ad, the layers of the product are shown visually, but in a way that audiences could easily think 
they comprise a single-component product. It is not evident from the ad that it is a product 
made of combined materials, not only from paper, a renewable resource, but from 
polyethylene as well as aluminium.  
One of the environmental PR materials published by the company about its product 
also contains misleading images. For example, in the illustrations, decomposition of the 
product is compared to the process of peeling an apple. This and other such images suggest to 
the readers that the product is natural, easily decomposed and could be recycled without 
major difficulties. This is either a clever plot by the company, using more environmentally 
friendly paper packaging material with a thin polyethylene layer in the advertisements, which 
is distributed but not produced in Hungary, or it betrays a conscious decision on the 
company’s part to keep quiet and misinform about the recycling more general environmental 
problems related to this product.   
The Environmental Manager was aware of the contradictions in the marketing 
communications of the firm. She made considerable efforts to assure that the components of 
the packaging material are at least indicated on the bottom of the product. 
 
“… I managed to convince my bosses last year to print the composition of the product 
on the boxes. It has not happened yet… This would be a very important step to inform 
customers what the product actually contains.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
However, colleagues in the Marketing Department do not agree with her. According to 
their market studies, customers are satisfied with the packaging product from an 
environmental standpoint. “Why should we include then more environmental considerations 
and concerns about the product in our promotional campaign?” (as the Environmental 
Manager later recollected). Arguably it should be important, because it would provide 
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genuine information about the product for customers.  
The Environmental Manager has so far not managed to convince her colleagues, most 
of who thought she worried too much about the issue.  “… [T]he concern that customers 
might have misconceptions about the product is only in your head… you only see the worst 
case scenarios… those which are heralded by green organisations… or by some biased MPs,” 
she was told (as she further recalled). The Environmental Manager clearly saw the danger in 
the strategy of keeping quiet about some environmental aspects of the product and using an 
ambiguous promotional campaign. In the interview, she made the point in relation to this that 
the green organisation, which criticised the company’s ad campaigns, had already filed an 
official complaint about another packaging company misleading the public to the Customer 
Protection Agency. That company, which ultimately was fined, used the international symbol 
for recycling on its product whilst it was well aware that the symbol did not mean anything in 
Hungary because there was no selective waste collection in the country. Albeit this was a 
more serious case of misleading the public, it could nonetheless serve as a precedent for our 
subsidiary. 
 
10.4. THE EXTERNAL CONTEXT OF GREENING OF THE PACKAGING 
COMPANY 
 
Two types of organisations are particularly important in the analysis of the greening of 
the company. These are the green organisations, who challenge the environmental practices of 
the company, and the industrial trade association (NAPMI), which has been quite active in 
environmental affairs.  
The Environmental Manager explained in her first interview that NAPMI plays a 
pivotal role in environmental issues within the industry, and that the packaging industry lobby 
is rather strong in environmental affairs. The interviewed representative of NAPMI said that 
their 92 members, most of which are large companies, “represent the whole supply chain of 
the packaging industry.” The environmental committee of the Association was set up shortly 
after the establishment of NAPMI itself at the beginning of the 1990s. The committee, the 
members of which are Environmental Managers of the member companies, develops the 
environmental policies of the Association.  
The immediate reasons for setting up the committee were the official preliminary steps 
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towards introducing an environmental product fee in Hungary and the ongoing efforts of the 
European Union to issue a directive on packaging waste materials. NAPMI has been 
proactive on environmental issues, which is evident by its work to develop plans and a model 
for waste management in the sector, to establish a non-profit organisation for waste 
management (ÖkoPannon Kht.), and in its cooperation and lobby work with the authorities on 
the environmental product fee and waste management laws. The Association has been 
working on environmental issues for more than eight years, and the company of the case 
study has been quite active in this work, particularly through the Environmental Manager. 
Therefore, it is not at all surprising that the “cognitive framework” prevalent in the sector is to 
a great extent shared by the packaging firm in question. 
 One of the fundamental premises expressed by both the Environmental Manager and 
the Secretary General of NAPMI is that packaging fitted to the given function in itself 
constitutes environmental protection, because it protects a product from harm. A given 
function is determined by the demand of the customer (what kind of a product, how much it 
costs, distance it must be transported, etc.). It follows that the economic interest by itself 
provides for the “optimal packaging solution” because 
 
“… the self-determining laws of the [market] economy will, sooner or later, eliminate 
wrong packaging decisions, though there are… problems of over-packaging.” 
(Secretary General of NAPMI) 
 
At the post-consumption phase, the crucial issue is  
 
“… how much expenditure is needed for directing materials back to the circulation of 
products?” (Secretary General of NAPMI) 
 
 And the optimal packaging solution will be achieved 
 
“… [i]f these [environmental expenditures] are internalised in product prices, then it 
will in fact automatically go in the direction that price and cost conditions will 
determine which [packaging] solution will be applied.” (Secretary General of NAPMI) 
 
In other words, if the external costs of environmental pollution are internalised, the 
economic system automatically will turn to a materially closed, “circular economy.” 
Furthermore, the Secretary General of NAPMI placed heavy emphasise upon the fact that it is 
not possible to go against “the rules of market economy,” it is only conceivable to “correct” 
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them where they fail to function. All interventions into the operations of free markets 
undermine efficiency and such intentions will be “crushed by the rules of market economy.” 
Moreover, these “rules” do not respect national borders: 
 
“… we participate in an international division of labour and thus it is not possible to 
enact a number of environmental regulations nationally because negative 
consequences will be greater than positive ones. … We [trade association] do not 
believe in solutions focusing solely upon Hungary … [since] it is an international 
competitiveness issue.” (Secretary General of NAPMI) 
 
By implication, it follows that since current consumption of packaging materials in 
Hungary amounts to half the European average, 
 
“… reduction in packaging consumption is not a reasonable objective for Hungary, it 
will necessarily increase… in the process of catching up to the average economic 
development of the European Union… what can reasonably expected to be reduced is 
per-unit packaging consumption” (Secretary General of NAPMI) 
 
 It can be argued that the Secretary General has articulated an environmental approach 
that could be called “free market environmentalism.” The starting point of this approach 
embraces a particular definition of “being developed” and of the necessity of “the process of 
development.” From this perspective, the West (with a capital “W”) and the EU constitute the 
apex of “being developed.” The currently dominant form and operations of a market economy 
have a “rule-like” nature; the only environmental improvement one has to seek is making the 
market function efficiently – in terms of pollution, by correcting market prices through 
internalisation of external costs – it is the way to institutionalise an eco-efficient market 
economy. An eco-efficient market economy produces “sustainable economic growth.”  In 
contrast, there is no room for constraining growth – that is, reducing production and 
consumption in absolute terms – since it is not compatible with “the rules” of free markets. 
Intervention is justified only to the extent that it “corrects” relative inefficiencies. Moreover, 
the proper parameters for intervention are the subject of political debates where corporate 
lobbying activities should be pursued “because they are very important from the perspective 
of society.” 
 From an industrial perspective, the greening of the packaging firm appears to be a 
positive example, since the company focuses its environmental management efforts upon 
improving eco-efficiency, by reducing the weight of packaging products or the thickness of 
aluminium layer, etc., while functionally satisfying consumer demand by making more 
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appealing packaging products with plastic caps, etc. 
  
 The other external perspective from which the greening of the packaging firm may be 
seen is that of the environmental organisation, which has expressed a radical refusal toward 
the product in question. The environmental organisation interviewed has a country-wide 
reputation with regard to waste management and considers itself a civil organisation holding a 
radical green philosophy against the global market economy. The leader of the green 
organisation summarises his opinion about the packaging firm in question as follows: 
 
“The packaging product of [name of firm]… is the most wasteful and most 
environmentally harmful type of packaging… Therefore, the greening efforts of the 
firm constitute a special problem… and it is absolutely undeserving of the 
environmental ideal… on top of it all, they have initiated so-called environmental 
education programmes… [which] we call, from its onset, brainwashing…” 
(representative of green organisation) 
 
It should be emphasised that “the greens” do not have a problem with internal greening 
measures at the packaging company: 
 
“We have no problem with the technology itself.” (representative of green 
organisation) 
 
Their critiques do not concentrate on the eco-efficiency of production and operations 
processes of the packaging firm, nor on the core activity of packaging product manufacturing. 
The environmental critiques target the main packaging product, made of combined materials, 
that is manufactured in Hungary.  
 
“This packaging material is unsuitable for recycling.” (representative of green 
organisation) 
 
The greens have been highly critical towards the packaging firm in question from the 
onset of its greenfield investment, since the transfer of combined packaging product 
manufacturing to Hungary symbolised for them the arrival of “throw-away civilisation” from 
the “developed” West. No eco-efficiency improvement in the production process or in the 
product itself can change the rejection expressed by the greens against the product and the 
packaging firm. 
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“These combined packaging materials are the most harmful… next, those throw-away 
packaging which are made of homogeneous materials… and then returnable 
systems… The best [packaging materials] are returnable bottles… [Though] bottle 
packaging involves some environmental problems as well, but a returnable bottle turns 
forty times in the market on average; that is, it is re-bottled forty times.” 
(representative of green organisation) 
 
 The so-called “green” critique is much more complex than has thus far been 
discussed. The functioning of a large multi-national packaging company is also believed to 
involve an “aggressive market expansion” policy that sooner or later eliminates or at least 
reduces alternative packaging options available to consumers: 
 
“… [the packaging firm] is undoubtedly becoming a monopolist in the juice market… 
and consumers are forced to buy… this expensive packaging…” (representative of 
green organisation) 
 
Moreover, the communication policy pursued by the firm to support its market expansion 
is considered unethical by the greens, since primary school children are targeted as consumers 
– as “mini-consumers” – in the name of environmental education. A crucial point is that the 
greens’ understanding of communication as such differs from that of the packaging 
corporation, as does their understanding of the role and opportunities of consumers. From a 
green perspective, it seems obvious that consumers’ opportunity set has shrunk, with regard to 
fluid product packaging over the years of economic transformation, and consumers are 
targeted by “manipulative” campaigns that seriously undermine the ideal of “consumer 
sovereignty.” It should be pointed out that a fundamental difference between the frame of 
reference of greens and that of the packaging industry lies in their respective visions of the 
economy. The greens’ economic vision involves an economy based on local resources and 
economic relationships: 
 
“… small milk production facilities and local, regional markets should be promoted… 
concerning milk supply, the best solution would be to use milk-cans for transporting 
milk to the schools and children would drink milk in school.” (representative of green 
organisation) 
 
From the greens’ economic perspective, corporate greening in general is only deserving 
of the environmental ideal if there is a change in institutional structures as well, otherwise 
greening of large corporations leads to a dead-end. Visions of an economy framed by the 
radical green approach implies a general negative attitude and judgement toward the greening 
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of the packaging firm in question, and a continuous conflict between them and the “free 
market environmentalism” expressed by the packaging firm as well as NAPMI. 
 Closer scrutiny reveals that even the points of agreements between the two conflicting 
sides lead to the suggestion of radically different solutions. Though both industrial and green 
representatives agree on the failure of current Hungarian regulation regarding environmental 
product fees and call for a radical reform, they suggest different solutions due to their 
different institutional ideals. The institutional ideal of free market environmentalism leads 
industrialists to support free market solutions to the packaging waste problem, suggesting a 
voluntary agreement between regulators and industry that puts the management of 
environmental production fees in the hands of an industry not-for-profit organisation, with the 
assigned task of establishing and operating selective waste management practices. In contrast, 
the greens’ distrust of central government and for-profit corporations calls for a solution that 
establishes strict social control over waste management. Civil distrust stems from unequal 
political power relations: 
 
“… we [civil organisations] can express our opinion only from the edge of the playing 
field… [name of representative of NAPMI] goes to the Ministry for Environment as 
frequently as I go to the railway station. They have enough time and money to lobby 
at the Environmental Committee of the Parliament for changes in draft laws favouring 
their industrial interests.” (representative of green organisation) 
 
The Environmental Manager of the packaging firm under investigation also 
acknowledged the weaker political position of environmental NGOs compared to that of the 
industry, but at the same time, condemned the media for providing the greens’ agenda with 
too much publicity. 
 Both representatives of industry and environmental NGOs pursue a practice of 
“disadvantageous labelling” of each other. Representatives of the packaging industry are 
annoyed by the “emotional politics” of greens who “look for trouble wherever they can” and 
“if you try to convince them by explaining facts they start to bull or shirk the issue.” They 
charge the greens of “tending to write about issues from the point of view of their own 
interpretation and theory that are false” and of expressing “statements out of which fifty 
percent are false,” and so forth. A deep distrust on the part of the civil sector was expressed 
many times during the interview: 
 
“This corporate greening is doing well since some thousandths of the corporate budget 
are spent to make consumers believe that ‘we follow an environmentally conscious 
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business behaviour,’ but then the structure of production and product line is just the 
same as before…  we can hardly see a true intention, but such a nice colourful 
publication [referring to annual environmental reports] has already been produced… 
the surface is beautifully painted green but inside you find the same shit as before. 
And the enormous volume of products manufactured and the type of marketing 
activities pursued, all influence millions of consumers and promote consumption…” 
(representative of green organisation) 
 
 Despite all this opposition, there are still some points of agreement. Both 
representatives of the packaging industry and environmental NGOs speak of the need for 
internalising externalities in order to make waste recycling economical and achieve a closed 
material cycle. Both parties distrust environmental regulation enacted by central state 
agencies. Moreover, greens also acknowledged the time factor in corporate greening: 
 
“… they [companies] cannot stay competitive in this market if they wanted to solve all 
these [environmental problems] at the same time …” (representative of green 
organisation) 
 
From this fact, however, it is not the omnipotence of “the rules of free markets” that is 
implied by the greens, but the necessity to change the rules of the game (i.e., a change in 
institutional structures). A more constructive and rewarding dialogue might seem to be 
institutionalisable by making both positions be perceived more “equal” in politics as well as 
in the media. 
 
10.5. SUMMARY ANALYSIS 
 
 Five contradictions emerged in this story of corporate greening: 
 
Contradiction 1: Separation between environmental communication and organisational 
greening 
From the perspective of organisational hierarchy, the position of the Environmental 
Manager is separated from the control and management of the environmental impacts of 
productions and operations. The primary authority and responsibility of the Environmental 
Manager lie with environmental communication, public relations, and government affairs. 
This contradiction is manifest in the under-representation of actions and the results of 
greening organisational routines and operations in the messages of environmental 
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communication. 
 
Contradiction 2: The issue of product recycling 
Though to some extent a theoretical possibility exists for complete product recycling, it 
poses enormous practical difficulties. At the current level of technological capabilities, to 
recycle a composite packaging material requires a huge investment of energy and therefore, 
seems to not be economically viable at the present time. A related problem is the issue of 
product liability. Here the sector-wide attitude is currently characterised by a “washing one’s 
hands of it” posture.  As the environmental fee imposed upon the sector by regulation – 
although considered even by the firms themselves to be too low to induce industrial actors to 
pursue a more environmentally conscious behaviour – is paid to the central state budget, the 
prevailing view of the packaging profession is that they carry no responsibility to seek 
solutions for treating household wastes related to their products. 
 
Contradiction 3: Corporate environmental communication towards consumers 
The packaging company under investigation here is aware of the fact that in general, its 
consumers are not aware of the actual composition of the packaging material utilised for milk 
and juice drinks, and that consumers perceive it as more benign environmentally than in fact 
it is. While the packaging firm produces advertisements that visually associate its product 
with an “all-natural” image, one can posit that the company does not just “forget” to inform 
consumers but actually misinforms them, in order to keep consumers’ misperceptions intact. 
One can also argue that even if it is acknowledged that Hungarian consumers in general lack 
an environmental consciousness (as many commentators claim), this has nothing to do with 
corporate malpractice in the form of false environmental communication. 
 
Contradiction 4: Corporate communication targeted to children 
The high-minded claims of the company with respect to its two environmental and health 
campaigns targeted at primary school children confronts us with the paradox of the 
separability of private and common interests. It can be argued that the campaigns directly 
targeting children in primary schools initiated by the packaging firm blur the distinction 
between private profit motives and community health, environmental and educational 
objectives, and in a way that creates too much room for the potential manipulation and 
corruption of public interests by private ones. These campaigns do not seem to be genuine 
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public-private partnerships; at least the more indirect forms of corporate involvement seem to 
be ethically preferable in community education, if corporations belong there at all. 
 
Contradiction 5: Paradoxes at the individual level 
Thus far, the individual level has not been touched upon; however, a careful reader might 
have sensed some apparent contradictions in the words of the current Environmental Manager 
of the packaging firm. This issue requires a little more elaboration than the other four 
contradictions since it was not mentioned explicitly before. 
 In a sense, the paradox of a “loyal radical” confronts us here. On the one hand, there 
are clear signs that the Environmental Manager interviewed for this study is relatively more 
committed to environmental improvement than many of her peers in other companies. It 
seems that she seeks to reduce the environmental impacts of her private life by reducing 
personal consumption and “greening” consumption activities. Her environmental commitment 
was even appreciated by the environmental NGO in continuous conflict with the packaging 
firm she represents: 
 
“… she has always tried to be friendly with us and talk to us in an informal tone of 
voice. She looks to be very committed and to take environmental issues very 
seriously.” (representative of environmental NGO) 
 
She also acknowledged that in a sense, she is in the same boat with the civic 
environmentalists. On the other hand, her personal reasons for espousing environmentally 
conscious consumer behaviour seem to not be in line with the support she gives to the 
environmentally friendly characteristics of the product made by the packaging firm for which 
she works. The Environmental Manager clearly expressed her preference for packaging 
products made of renewable materials over plastics in her day-to-day consumer decisions: 
 
“… I don’t like plastics [packaging].” (Environmental Manager) 
 
At the same time, she praised the packaging firm’s product for being made of wood, 
while ignoring the fact that the product also contains two non-renewable materials. 
Furthermore, the multi-national packaging company, whose Hungarian subsidiary she works 
for, has just launched its new business unit for plastics packaging materials production. How 
does she perceive it? 
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“Consumers like plastics packaging because it is easy to open it as well as close it and 
it is of a light weight…  therefore we [i.e., the packaging firm] try to adapt [to those 
preferences].” (Environmental Manager) 
 
Consumers are obviously regarded here as ‘sovereign’ decision-makers whose likes 
and dislikes impose strict constraint upon corporate product decisions. The Environmental 
Manager also claimed that every one of us should be aware of “the importance of 
environmental protection at shopping decisions,” pointing to a possible solution of 
“consuming no more than what we really need.”  Yet, she does recognise systemic 
contradictions prevalent today: 
 
“… to induce people to behave in a way… which is in the opposite direction of the 
development of the economy is… especially difficult. Not only to motivate them to 
consume more and more, buy more and more, but to some extent, to take care of what 
and how much to consume and what happens to things after consumption – it is much 
more difficult.” (Environmental Manager) 
 
This remark made by the Environmental Manager clearly points beyond the logic of a market 
society that institutionalises, as one of its fundamental rules-of-the-game, the principle or 
promise that “more is better.” 
 The Environmental Manager has personally experienced the conflicts between her 
environmental commitment and the “business-as-usual” attitude of the companies she worked 
for. 
 
“I have had it many times … that ‘Dear [her name], this is not an environmental 
company. Have you had a look at what is written above the main entrance when you 
came to work this morning? There is no word for »environment« there!’ 
(Environmental Manager) 
 
Yet, she believes that 
 
“… from within [the company] it is possible to do more for the environment than 
working for the environmental movement… there is money here for it. If the money 
will be spent carefully and thoughtfully here, then it is possible to take preventative 
actions, not only end-of-pipe ones… It is possible to do this job very correctly and 
well, in a way which also corresponds to the economic policy of the firm.” 
(Environmental Manager) 
 
 This story of greening of a packaging firm seems to highlight that the optimism of the 
Environmental Manager, as expressed in the last citation above, may be considered well-
 196
grounded if one regards market-based approaches to environmental issues (“free market 
environmentalism”) as a sufficient tool (or cognitive frame) for solving our ecological 
problems. The so-called “radical green NGOs” (like the one in this story) typically doubt the 
effectiveness of the free market approach and envision a more radical departure from the 
institutionalised logic of a market society. In this sense, the story of greening of the packaging 
firm highlights the limits or contradictions inherent in the paradigm of free market 
environmentalism; one might also sense a conflict between potentially different institutional 
logics of corporate greening. It is by no means intended here to argue that those different 
institutional logics are of an antagonistic nature, since there are “points of agreement” 
between them (e.g., the accepted need for internalising externalities and for constraining 
central state intervention). However, it is asserted that those institutional logics differ 
substantially from each other in the sense that they envision different social, political and 
economic arrangements. The table below highlights some points of difference between the 
institutional logic of free market environmentalism and civic environmentalism, referring to 
the above story of greening of the packaging company.  
 
Table 13 Two Competing Institutional Logics of Corporate Greening 
 
Comparative criteria 
Free Market 
Environmentalism 
Civic Environmentalism 
Environment-economy vision Global, materially closed, 
circular economy 
Local/regional economy within 
the limits of ecological carrying 
capacity 
Economic vision Globally free market competition 
plus a “nightwatch” central state 
Local/regional economy with 
limited market competition and 
constrained central state 
intervention 
Objective Sustainable growth Sustainable livelihood 
Tool Eco-efficiency Reduction in production and 
consumption 
Role of consumers Sovereign consumers and 
children targeted as consumers 
Consumers protected against 
manipulation and exclusion of 
children as consumers 
 
 It may not be necessary to emphasise that the two institutional logics of corporate 
greening given above are not the only possibilities, but that contrasting them in the above 
table is intended to focus on this specific story of greening. This story highlights the 
limitations to a theoretical approach (to corporate greening or environmental management) 
that limits its reach to organisational processes and actions, without linking them to the 
mechanisms and factors at work in the institutional context. The story of greening of the 
packaging company would only be a story of environmental excellence if one concentrated on 
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the environmental performance of production and operations, and the various environmental 
communication efforts. To understand it as a story of contradictions within a corporate 
greening process requires a perspective that takes into account the broader issues of 
institutional structures (e.g., through the contrasting perspective of the environmental NGO). 
Subsequently, it helps to critically interpret the story of greening of the packaging firm as the 
operation and/or activation of free market environmentalism.  
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CHAPTER 11 
MAJOR THEMES IN CORPORATE GREENING 
 
The analysis based on coding the interview texts has produced some major themes of 
corporate greening in Hungary during the 1990s. These themes might deepen our 
understanding of the main factors, characteristics, processes, and discourses of corporate 
greening in Hungary in the given time period. First, two themes – “regime change” and 
“privatisation” – will be introduced that demonstrate the influence of the wider social, 
political, and economic context upon corporate greening. The socio-political transformation 
of the country as well as the process of privatisation (and the institutional development of a 
market economy in general) have had a profound impact: environmental or ecological issues 
have become, although to differing extent, strategic concerns to corporations. The next two 
themes – “leadership” and “environmental manager as agitator and mediator” – demonstrate 
the limits and opportunities of individual agency with regard to organisational greening. It 
will be pointed out that, during the institutional re-structuring at the macro level, there has 
been room for taking strategic actions and influence the extent and direction of organisational 
greening. The next major theme of corporate greening relates to organisational power. The 
most salient power conflict emerging in the processes of organisational greening is the 
conflict between quality management and environmental management. Many times this 
conflict is manifested in the process of institutionalising an EMS. Then, the aesthetics of 
organisational greening as a main theme will be introduced. The visual aspects of greening 
have come to dominate, to a considerable extent, organisational discourses to our great 
surprise, sometimes reaching to the aesthetics of industrialism itself. The next three themes 
relate to the enactment of separate discoursive legitimacy orders of corporate greening. The 
first one – “becoming European” – is very specific to a country of transformation from a 
Soviet-type authoritarian regime toward a democratic European nation state, being in the 
process of accession to the European Union. Another discoursive legitimacy order identifies 
the modern, culturally as well as technologically, with being environmentally sound. The last 
discoursive legitimacy order advocates the approach of “free market environmentalism.” The 
last major themes emerged as dimensions of muteness in corporate greening and relate to the 
de-emotionalisation and de-moralisation of corporate greening, unchanged or unquestioned 
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organisational identity, and lack of critique or reflection at the system level. 
Obviously, the separation of these major themes serves analytical purposes and they are 
necessarily intertwined in understanding the particular cases of corporate greening. Although 
they might be of a general theoretical relevance for building models of corporate greening in a 
so-called transition economy. 
 
11.1. “STRUCTURE” IN CORPORATE GREENING 
 
Political and economic regime change constitutes the structural (macro-level) aspects of 
corporate greening in Hungary during the 1990s. These changes in the socio-economic regime 
implied a clear rupture in basic organisational characteristics (technology, culture, 
organisational structure) at the majority of the case companies. Consequently, regime changes 
triggered a discontinuous organisational change. However, one company, the case firm of the 
second story reported above, was an exception. Apart from two years of uncertainty due to 
incompetent management caused by unwanted central government intervention, the chemical 
company has demonstrated an unusual continuance in organisational identity. The relatively 
stable market position this firm enjoyed due to strong export performance in western 
European countries made this chemical company avoid the financial difficulties that were 
typical to most of the state-owned large industrial firms during the first half of the 1990s. 
Moreover, its strong organisational culture, characterised by a sense of excellence, enabled 
the company to gradually accommodate changing expectations and demands, including 
environmental ones. Nevertheless, for large state-owned industrial firms, regime change 
brought a crisis situation, with threats and opportunities at the same time.  
 
11.1.1. Political regime change 
 
In interpreting organisational processes of corporate greening the large-scale changes in 
the socio-economic regime in Hungary obviously constitute crucial factors.  The institutional 
setting of political democracy re-arranged the relationship between economy and society in 
general and between local communities and corporations operating in their neighbourhoods in 
particular. Overall the institutional changes resulted in increasing the significance of social 
legitimacy as a strategic issue to corporations: How credibility and trust can be regained or 
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rebuilt in a new institutional context? To a great extent, legitimacy constitutes not merely an 
ethical or political issue but has serious economic implications (see, e. g., adversarial 
relations, or mistrust, between a firm and the local government might cause delays in the 
permission process for new investments resulting in huge amounts of unrealised profits). 
Nevertheless, significant differences may be detected in the importance of legitimacy 
processes of corporate greening. The contrast, in this sense, between the our first story of 
rebirth and that of a sense of excellence above is the most striking. In both towns local 
economy and politics were intermingled and dominated by the case companies respectively 
during the communist regime. However, the major difference in technology – technological 
excellence of the chemical firm as opposed to the relatively outdated technologies of the 
cement factory – constitutes only a partial explanation of the difference in environmental 
strategies of the firms in question. There is much more than that for a more complete 
interpretation. There were significant differences between the historical development of the 
two settlements, where the firms are located, that has, to some extent, influenced the 
possibilities of corporate greening. The town where the cement plant is located has been a 
settlement with a stronger, and longer, history of civic development, while the chemical plant 
is located in the neighbourhood of a small village which was forced to become a new 
industrial town during the era of communist urban planning. Consequently, in the town where 
the cement plant caused its enormous air pollution, there is a population with a more genuine 
civil attitude than in the newly industrialised town where overwhelmingly the employees of 
the three large companies settled as newcomers.52 This fact had enormous consequences for 
the local political contexts of greening during the post-communist era as well. In discussing 
the case of the cement factory, it was pointed out how the importance of a “spontaneous civil 
movement” against pollution in town and, then, green concerns have gained momentum in 
local politics, including local government policy making, after the regime change.  Moreover, 
and relatedly, the local government of this town with a civic history, during the first years of 
institutional transformations, attempted to loosen its economic dependence on the cement 
factory imposed during the communist era and has been successful in establishing a more 
diverse and prosperous local economy by attracting many new investments. The local 
government of the newly industrialised town had no such intentions at all, as they had 
enjoyed comparatively more resources from the central government during the communist era 
                                                          
52 For example, one of the largest and most influential green organisation in Hungary has been established in 
this  town. 
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and, after the regime change, it was satisfied with the revenues coming from local industrial 
tax, paaid by the three large companies operating in the neighbourhood. The chemical plant 
has always been considered a modern industrial complex in the CEE region and there were no 
pressures, or local demand, exerted upon the firm to change policy regarding ecological issues 
after the regime change.  
Our findings may also be read as strengthening the general conclusions of sociological 
analyses of environmental interests in Hungary in a historical context.  These studies 
conclude that towns with a longer civic history in the pre-communist era were able to 
recognise and protect their own interests; to organise civil co-operation in conflict situations; 
and solve their problems by themselves. In contrast, the newly industrialised towns were not 
able to act as autonomously as the towns with civic history to develop and protect their own 
interests with regard to ecological issues; consequently, they were more exposed to the 
domination of short-term interests over the longer ones (see Szirmai [1999], especially pp. 
50–53 and 90–91). 
From the point of view of formerly state-owned corporations, the previous neglect of 
environmental performance began to take its toll in the form of a legitimacy crisis. After the 
regime change large corporations perceived that public mistrust was typically widespread 
with regard to their environmental performance. Many state-owned company faced serious 
financial difficulties and were balancing at the edge of bankruptcy; internal problems were 
aggrevated by a depressed organisational climate due to uncertainty over the future. 
Sometimes the growing voice of civil organisations – due to the enacted legislation related to 
negative freedoms53 – triggered a profound change process at such industrial firms. For 
example, one of our case companies, a large chemical firm had to face frequent and strong 
civil pressure after the leakage of information about an accumulating serious soil 
contamination problem. Therefore, one of the most urgent task of the new top manager – as 
he recalled during the interview – was to develop plans for cleaning up past contaminations, 
institutionalising good houskeeping practices, stabilising the chemical firm’s financial 
position, and establishing a cooperative organisational climate, while achieving a positive 
change in stakeholders’ perception in order for the company to survive and revitalise. 
Political regime change thus re-organised power relations between economic agents and 
local communities by eliminating the overwhelming dominance of the former over the latter 
through new legislation that has institutionalised the fundamental civil rights. From the point 
                                                          
53 Such as the freedom of press, of association, etc. 
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of view of business, this change pushed legitimacy issues in the fore front. It seemed very 
obvious that in the climate of public mistrust there is no possibility to conduct business-as-
usual, even if competitiveness is not at stake in the short run. Consequently, non-market 
strategies gained prominance as large industrial firms struggled to re-establish and/or 
maintain their credibility (to overcome organisational crisis). Corporate environmentalism 
was, in this respect, problematised as a minimum requirement for good corporate 
citizenship.54 
 
11.1.2. Economic regime change: privatisation  
 
Privatisation – through different phases and different methods and many times publicly 
heavily contested – has resulted in the acquisition of large Hungarian companies by foreign 
owners. The new owner has brought additional resources and/or new management attitude 
and practice, and ultimately survival for many large industrial firms. Providing financial 
resources for corporate greening (e. g. technological restructuring) constituted a contribution 
by foreign owners at least to the extent that enabled the cleaning up of past environmental 
burdens. This was clearly motivated by shorter term financial interests of the new owners in 
the sense of reducing financial risks emerging from bad environmental performance and 
reputation. In other instances, in order to be able to be privatised through the stock market, 
huge environmental investments and establishment of environmental management systems 
were straightforwardly needed (financed by cenral government funds as a re-organisation 
before privtisation). 
However, there seems to be some difference between financial investors and professional 
ones with regard to the continuance of environmental motivation. Financial investors are 
primarily interested in avoiding financial risks due to bad environmental performance (e. g. 
falling share prices due to bad reputation, worsening insurance conditions, etc.) and do not 
force, though do not hinder either, environmental improvements beyond that level. 
Professional investors, in the form of acquisition by a foreign firm with similar business 
profile, typically bring their management style and practice which, at least through a good 
houskeeping attitude, help further environmental improvements. In these latter cases, owners 
typically force an institutionalisation of some form and extent of stakeholder dialogue and 
                                                          
54 See Vári–Caddy [1999] for an analysis of current possibilities for public participation in environmental 
decision-making in Hungary that obviously relates to the strength of civic pressure on corporate environmental 
 203
involvement. They are primarily motivated by gaining a good corporate citizen position 
within the local community. 
Note, however, that improvements in corporate environmental performance due to 
privatisation are by no means an intended result of well-designed processes and methods of 
privatisation in Hungary. In fact, as Csanádi–Páczi [1998] and Csanádi [n. d.] point out, 
environmental concerns were consciously supressed by Hungarian state privatisation agencies 
in favour of short term financial revenues. In a sense, therefore, the structural changes in 
economic institutions contributed to or enabled corporate greening to the extent if 
organisational change agents, more specifically, a green champion and a supporting leader, 
could take advantage of the crisis situation and initiate environmental improvements. 
 
11.2. “AGENCY” IN CORPORATE GREENING 
 
Institutional changes at the macro level have clearly had a profound influence upon 
corporate greening, though there still remained room for strategic actions with regard to 
environmental issues. Which direction and to what extent corporate greening would take has 
been affected by individual agents as well. Two types of individual agency were apparent 
during organisational crisis and contributed to the institutionalisation of environmental 
concerns within large corporations: leader and green champion. Environmental managers has 
typically played the role of the latter. It seems that the function of an environmental manager 
is heavily loaded with internal as well as external communication and, since environmental 
issues might emerge in relation with all functional areas of business, their task requires a 
special sensitivity to organisational politics, too.  
 
11.2.1. Leadership 
 
The role of a leader seems to be of primary significance in processes of corporate 
greening, particularly when greening is enacted at a time of discontinuous organisational 
change. Political regime change, with ongoing socio-economic changes, in the Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) region in general and in Hungary in particular put many firms in a 
crisis situation: declining market shares resulting from outdated technologies and product 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
performance. 
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lines and import competition; collapsing Eastern (COMECON) markets; lack of financial 
resources following a sharp decline in state financing or subsidies; legitimacy deficits in local 
communities. Therefore, greening was typically emerged as part of a broader organisational 
crisis. To find a way out for formerly state-owned, large corporations in an emerging market 
economy, transformative leadership was essential at top management level. 
In order to overcome the organisational crisis, leaders typically face tha complex task to 
regain public trust and, at the same time, reduce uncertainty and conflicts within the 
organisation in question and eventually establish a co-operative organisational climate. The 
three stories of greening above provide a detailed description of the former task. However, the 
latter was equally difficult and complex as the following citation from two top managers of 
another chemical firm demonstrates: 
 
“I met all the engineers… but the first half a year at the company was devoted to 
[assure them] that they can be honest, there will be no harm to anyone. I explained that 
the whole thing is happening so as to improve on all things. It took about a year to 
make the engineers of business units be open and write down what they see to be 
wrong and how they see it is possible to change it.” (CEO, chemical firm) 
 
“We met the experts, technicians, plant engineers, and managers of business units 
and… in fact we had to establish a common language… A process started at the 
company that we called truth-telling. Reality should have been uncovered honestly 
because we had to solve the problems…” (Businees Unit Director, chemical firm) 
 
Sometimes the leader him-/herself is the green champion, too. S/he might almost be 
considered as a “trouble-maker” but s/he should clearly have personal credibility: 
 
“… and a gentleman arrived here who is a green man… Who immediately wanted to 
realise a number of things here that he had previously seen all around the world. 
Generally, the problem was that he couldn’t make as great a progress as he wanted to. 
… [He was] a man who took enormous steps in demolishing polluted buildings and 
gave week-long or ten days long deadlines for handling toxic wastes… He was a man 
of credibility. Of course, it couldn’t happen differently anyway since noone follows an 
uncredible person…” (Engineering Director, electric equipment manufacturing firm) 
 
From the perspective of greening, it is not necessary that the leader himself initiates the 
processes of greening, though it is important that s/he develops a general programme for 
organisational change and demonstrates a commitment whereby greening efforts from the 
lower echelons are supported and encouraged. Our case studies suggest that a leader can 
succeed with greening without a “green change agent” at lower echelons (that is, s/he is the 
leader as well as the “green champion”), but “green change agents” typically at middle 
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management levels cannot be successful in their greening efforts unless at least one leader 
back her/him up. Some of the cases examined demonstrated that, for example, after the 
leader’s leaving the organisation greening was “frozen” at the level reached, and new 
initiatives of the green champion are no longer welcomed or supported. It might be said, as 
the case study of a food company has profoundly demonstrated, if managers replace leaders 
after a gradually regained market and non-market position, ecological concerns tend to be 
relegated to an operational level and organisational resources are channelled more into 
increasing or maintaining market share. Short-term market goals might easily subvert longer 
term non-market ones; environmental initiatives should compete with other projects on a very 
narrow cost-benefit calculus.  
The firms where leaders are still in power might promise a better prospect for future 
environmental improvements than those “lead” by managers. The importance of leadership 
was, in a sense, supported by the cases of corporate greening whithout leaders at the top. The 
story of the chemical firm above speaks about an organisational culture that was established 
during the past political regime by a charismatic leader. Not having been experienced the 
deep crisis, typical at the first half of the 90s in the Hungarian economy, this culture of 
excellence set an evident, or non-contested, stage for greening – there was no need of a 
leader, in a transformative sense, to initiate or back up efforts to “green” the firm. Similarly, 
the third story of corporate greening above presented a different organisational context for 
greening: green leadership was typically missing whereby seriously restraining the legitimate 
room for an internal green champion (recall the selective waste handling initiative of the 
environmental manager, or the perception of the quality manager about top managers support 
to the introduction of an EMS). 
 
11.2.2. Environmental manager as agitator and mediator 
 
No corporation among our case companies provides a senior position in top management 
for environmental affairs. Corporate environmental officers tend to be either in staff position 
directly reporting to one of the directors (or executives) or in a middle management rank. 
Thus, they characteristically function in a “buffer zone” from where they struggle for 
transferring environmental ideas, or awareness, to the top, as well as to the lower levels of 
organisational echelons. They are, at the same time, facilitators, agitators, and influencers 
who have to develop excellent communication skills to succeed in their day-to-day jobs and 
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overcome organisational resistance arising typically from short-run cost minimisation and 
profit maximisation concerns. Corporate environmental officers struggle to construct a 
legitimate discourse about environmental issues, essentially public affairs, within a private 
institution – a task unavoidably full of contradictions. 
 
“The environmental protection [unit] is a mediator – it mediates those tasks that 
business units should dealt with technically or otherwise. Of course, we have tasks to 
be implemented at a company-wide level and also very difficult co-ordination tasks. 
But our role as mediator is more significant than the other two. To accomplish it, very 
good human skills, persuasiveness and an ability to communicate are needed. Top 
management should be persuaded about the importance [of environmental issues] 
because it requires a lot of money. Then, one should also persuade those who will 
eventually carry out the tasks. To assign tasks for others is not happily accepted in any 
community, is it? There should be an intention to do it but they should be persuaded 
about the necessity of those [environmental] steps.” (Environmental Manager, 
chemical firm) 
 
“… I have to develop very sophisticated small strategies… when, what, how, whom, 
and why I tell something… Sometimes I make mistakes.” (Environmental and Quality 
Manager, electronics firm) 
 
Furthermore, environmental managers are at the border of their own organisations, 
thereby typically acting in a dynamic stakeholder context: keeping in touch with street-level 
environmental regulators, green NGOs, and local people; exposed to the possible tensions 
between those different but legitimate stakeholder interests. Corporate environmental officers 
thus experience their professional life as a constant struggle. 
 
11.3. THE ORGANISATIONAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GREENING 
 
Since environmental managers reside typically in less influential organisational positions 
(e. g., in staff position or in middle-management), organisational power relations may pose 
critical problems to them. Many environmental managers argued that the introduction of an 
environmental management system (EMS) has increased or broadened their range of 
influence. Institutionalising an EMS (either ISO 14001 or EMAS55) within the organisation 
makes environmental tasks systematic and routine-like, forces all employees to take 
environmental concerns into account to some extent. The principle of continuous 
improvement included in an EMS provides a rationale for arguing for more environmental 
                                                          
55 European Environmental and Auditing Standard 
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efforts implemented over time. 
However, the idea and the actual process of implementing an EMS creates specific 
organisational conflicts or tensions between representatives of quality management and those 
of environmental management. Since quality assurance standards were typically 
institutionalised before EMS, quality departments have usually more organisational power 
and influence than their environmental counterparts. By implication, when debates arise 
whether to implement either an integrated quality and environmental management system 
(Q/EMS) or separate systems, representatives of environmental interests find themselves in a 
weaker position compared to those of quality issues. It is not at all unusual that the quality 
assurance department directs the process of implementation of an EMS, as well as the day-to-
day management of the integrated system (see e. g. the third story of corporate greening 
reported above). All these processes are full of possible and actual conflicts, resulting at worst 
in the total subversion of environmental concerns and resources to quality assurance 
interests.56 The following relatively longer quotation of the relevant explanation given by an 
environmental manager at another chemical firm is telling in this respect: 
 
“Quality assurance is a department and environmental protection operates as a 
different department… They are stand-alone organisational units. Within the overall 
management system, quality assurance and environmental protection are linked 
together. But only within the overall system, not functionally… Both of them are 
stand-alone professional units, though they are unified under the company-wide 
management system… One should be very careful of not speaking of fusions… 
[Quality and environment are linked] only at a company-wide management level, not 
at a professional level. These are nuances, but they are very important.” 
(Environmental Manager, chemical firm) 
 
The more influential organisational position of quality assurance interests is not only a 
historical contingency but also has a lot to do with the managerial perception of their 
respective business importance. Some of the interviewees cited above (particularly the quality 
manager of the packaging firm, the third story, and the environmental manager of the 
chemical company, the second story) noted the main difference between quality assurance 
issues, perceived by managers as having direct competitive advantage, and environmental 
considerations, perceived mainly as costs of doing business or, at best, having indirect 
beneficial effects on competitiveness.  
                                                          
56 As it has happened with one of our case companies, the food products firm, where the entire environmental 
unit was eliminated and the environmental manager has been put under the direction of the quality assurance 
manager. 
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11.4. THE AESTHETICS OF CORPORATE GREENING  
 
Organisational greening has a profound aesthetic dimension. Greening is often described 
as an aesthetically discontinuous change over time. While the past state-of-affairs is 
characterised as “dirty,” “polluted,” „grey,” „dusty,” “messy,” and “untidy,” aesthetically 
more positive terms are attached to the present, such as “green plants,” “flowers,” “tidiness,” 
“cleanliness,” “harmony,” and “beauty.” The aesthetic dimension of corporate greening is a 
particularly salient feature of the story of the cement plant above. However, in the story of a 
sense of excellence reported above, an aesthetics of industrialism appears in the words of the 
Director of Marketing Communication: 
 
“ If you walk over [the plant]… you will see absolute order and cleanliness. … I 
myself was amazed walking over tha plant how fantastically modern and beautiful it 
is. It is really beautiful. The whole industrial complex is in order, chromium-plated, 
stainless steel pipes everywhere.” (Director of Marketing Communication, chemical 
firm) 
 
11.5. ENACTED “LEGITIMACY ORDERS” IN CORPORATE GREENING 
 
The case studies revealed some specific discoursive patterns emerging during many 
interviews or appearing in many written documents. Those discursive patterns have a 
common characteristic: they all amount to attempts to legitimise or rationalise efforts at 
corporate greening. The three discourses separated by the analysis draw, in a sense, the frame 
of the dominant discourse of corporate greening in Hungary during the 1990s. The discourses 
legitimise specific ways of thinking and acting while, at the same time, de-legitimise other, 
competing ways of thinking and acting with regard to corporate greening. The three 
discourses might therefore be called “discoursive legitimacy orders.” 
The first one introduced below seems to be very specific to the Hungarian context, to be 
more precise, to the context of a so-called accession country. “Becoming European” (perhaps 
again), that is, joining the EU, constitutes a widely used discoursive element in public fora all 
over the Central Eastern European (CEE) region. The other two discoursive legitimacy 
orders, however, seem to have a more general applicability. It might be argued that they 
constitute a dominant frame of conceptualising sustainable development by the North. In this 
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sense, discoursive patterns that identify environmental soundness with being modern and 
advocate the logic of free markets to be applied for solving, or mitigating, ecological 
problems clearly relate to the paradigm of “eco-modernisation.” 
 
11.5.1. Becoming European 
 
The EU-focus in political discourses in Hungary has its impact upon the interpretations 
of corporate greening, as it is reflected by the texts of interviews conducted. References to the 
regulations, norms, practice, and awareness in the EU serve a point of comparison as well as a 
source of legitimacy. 
 
“These are all… technologies that have stood the test of time and come from West 
European, developed countries…” (Director of Strategy, chemical firm) 
 
“The technologies operated here are ab ovo designed to be environmentally sound. … 
We operate western European, American and Japanese technologies.” (Director of 
Marketing Communication, chemical firm) 
 
Concerning, for example, environmental regulation, the main point of reference is, again, 
the “reasonable” policy of the European Union, as opposed to the Hungarian: 
 
“… [I]n this respect, western Europeans are… the best examples… [since] one should 
set reasonable and economically feasible tasks. It is nonsense to put unproportional 
burdens upon… a company… and wanting it to solve problems within a year because 
it will loose its competitiveness compared to other companies… If it looses, it will go 
bankrupt.” (Business Unit Director, chemical firm) 
 
A number of interviewees spoke of greening as a process of becoming more “civilised,” 
or of accessing “the developed and modern West.” The EU and other developed countries are 
considered to be the ideals, both technologically and culturally. In this sense, processes of 
greening amount to the import and application of environmentally sound technologies, as well 
as a cultural transfer.  
 
11.5.2. Being Modern 
 
Another widely applied discoursive pattern emerged from the interviews was the 
identification of “the modern” with environmentally sound in terms of both technology and 
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culture (awareness). An up-to-date technical solution or technology is argued to be, at the 
same time, environmentally more friendly than its previously applied counterparts. Modern 
technology is argued to be necessarily producing better environmental performance. By 
implication, technological modernisation does typically provide “win–win” outcomes: 
improving competitiveness and environmental quality at the same time. 
Similarly, a modern organisational, hence corporate, culture cannot almost be imagined 
without environmental awareness. As modern technology is becoming cleaner than the one 
previously applied, modern organisational men are growing an environmental consciousness 
that was not at all typical in the past – so the argument goes. Modern organisational men are 
said to be “aware,” “disciplined,” and “taking care” of the tidiness of their environment. 
Modern technology needs modern men in order to proceed further on the road of 
modernisation – this time, though, on the road of eco-modernisation (or ecological 
modernisation). Ecological modernisation seems to be a natural extension of the 
developmental thinking of modernity. Further, or more and more modernisation, with regard 
to both technology and culture, will automatically solve ecological problems. 
 
11.5.3. Free Market Environmentalism 
 
Three major logics of modern social organisation are the market, the bureaucracy, and 
the community (or civic logic). The role of them with regard to corporate greening is also 
evident and expressed by the interviewees, though the importance attributed to each of them 
greatly differs. “Free market environmentalism” is chosen here to underline the dominance of 
the logic of the market as an institutional frame to be applied to making sense of ecological 
issues. Many discoursive patterns revealed this dominant frame. For example, a well-
functioning economy is advocated as a fundamental condition for providing resources for 
environmenal protection. Environmental management, both at an organisational and societal 
level, can only be pursued at or beyond higher levels of economic development. Relatedly, 
environmental protection is better to treat the “laws of the market” as given and attempt to 
capture the dynamics of free markets in favour of conservation or preservation interests. Free 
markets might serve the interests of ecology – as the argument goes – if the rules of the 
market game is properly set. This leads to the well-known argument for internalising 
externalities, that is, eliminating price distortions due to unaccounted pollution costs. 
However, if all costs are reflected in market prices, free markets will automatically produce 
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an eco-efficient economy that proceeds on a green growth path.  
The task of integrating environmental considerations into the rules of the game is 
obviously assigned to the government sector. Environmental legislation and regulation is 
justified to the extent of internalising pollution related externalities in ways that do not hurt 
business competitiveness. The bureaucratic logic has, therefore, its special role to play but 
clearly within the dominant frame set by the free market logic of social organisation. During 
the interviews, for example, it was often referred to that corporations are primarily for making 
profit and environmental protection will be pursued to the extent that it may make itself 
compatible with business’ financial objectives (shareholder value). The issue of international 
competitiveness is also cited as an objective condition which environmental regulation should 
accommodate to. 
 
“If Hungary does not take on parameters according to her stage of development, or 
perhaps overbid current European directives, legal rules will look impressive, but will 
be unfeasible. It will retard the country’s growing international competitiveness. Thus, 
we are struggling for creating legal standards which are feasible and do not lead to 
reduction in competitiveness for the growing Hungarian economy.” (Environmental 
Manager, chemical firm) 
 
Moreover, corporate environmental managers – according to the interviews – perceive 
environmental regulators as more professional at the lower echelons of environmental 
bureaucracy (street-level environmental inspectors) than at higher ranks. They typically report 
good, professional connections with environmental inspectors but complain about the role of 
the Ministry for Environment and other government bodies of environmental policy 
formation: 
 
“… mistrust is intended to be deepened by those who formulate legal requirements. It 
is nonsense that in Hungary authorities could fine for everything… Obviously, such a 
system naturally involves resistance against fines, as well as attempts to refrain from 
fines… The method of enforcement – in a democracy – should be the legal way.” 
(Environmental Manager, chemical firm) 
 
The role of environmental NGOs seems to be accepted in general, particularly from the 
point of view of the “civil identity” of corporate people interviewed. Civil organisations are 
widely seen as a necessary constituency for a democratic political setting. At the same time, 
the acceptance is only partial, and fraught with contradictions, in the sense that corporate 
people percieve and claim civil agents to be unprofessional, emotional, and agressively 
radical. Therefore, the majority of green NGOs are considered not to be potential partner for 
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business. 
 
“When greens call for a return to nature, it sounds good and promising, as well as for 
shutting down industrial operations… [but] it should not be taken seriously… If we 
acted that way we would do so much harm that would undermine conditions for 
environmental protection.” (Environmental Manager, chemical firm) 
 
 
The case studies of corporate greening are telling in another respect: discourses of 
greening are mute at least regarding three important dimensions.  
 
11.6. CORPORATE GREENING STRIPPED FROM ETHICS AND 
EMOTIONS 
 
Almost no interviewees applied any frames of ethics while speaking of corporate 
environmental management. When questions of responsibility or moral conduct were directly 
posed to them, they typically eluded straight answering. Emotionality with regard to the 
environment was also missing to a great extent and when emotions appeared, they were 
related to the beauty of some natural landscape (that is, aesthetics of nature). 
Ethics was relegated to the private sphere, as demonstrated, for example, by the personal 
environmental commitment of the packaging firm’s environmental manager, as well as by the 
following interview: 
 
“Responsible Care is a form of behaviour… This is an expression of a sense of 
responsibility for others. Strictly speaking, this is not a matter of business. Practically, 
this is a humane issue…” (Environmental Manager, chemical firm) 
 
It is only at one firm where ethics, or to be more precise, social responsibility of business 
is an issue of importance. The top manager of an electronics company has long been 
demonstrating, or widely known of, his commitment of corporate social responsibility. It is 
not accident that he places the issue of ecology in the wider discourse of the social 
responsibility of business: 
 
“Experience that I had either in my personal environment or during travelling abroad 
has motivated me to spread it [environmental commitment]… This is a mission. In my 
family, everyday we speak about environmental protection. I would like this 600 
people working here to talk to their children about such issues… This is an internal 
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motivation. You happen to be in such a situation, you are well-known, have influence, 
can make decisions and you have to take responsibility for it. Obviously, it is not at all 
indifferent what you support and prohibit.” (CEO, electronics firm) 
 
The case studies show corporate greening as generally de-moralised and de-
emotionalised processes and interpretations.  
 
11.7. CORPORATE GREENING AND ORGANISATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
It might be argued that it is indeed a telling example of the extent and transformative 
power of greening that no one firm appointed a top manager position for environmental 
management. It is of a symbolic importance whether environmental issues are structurally 
assigned a strategic significance, or not. It seems therefore that the representation of 
environmental interests remains with leaders as well as change agents and greening has not 
come up to an organisation-wide transformative potential. 
Relatedly, no one firm investigated has started a process of third-order change, in which 
organisational identity – core activities, main products or business units, organisational 
routines – is questioned or reconsidered from the point of view of ecological impacts. 
 
“Compliance with environmental requirements… are always emerge with regard to 
issues of production, or increasing productive capacity.” (Environmental Manager, 
chemical firm) 
 
When questions at the level of organisational identity or core activities are posed by outside 
stakeholders, typically environmental NGOs, it is not even understood, or taken seriously, by 
corporate people. It seems that coporations do not consider the question how to produce profit 
without environmental harm, rather they stick to the question how to produce as much profit 
as to be able to allocate subsequently some part of it to environmental protection. 
 Organisational identity is tightly connected to the moral side of corporate greening. 
The issue is well captured by the following interview: 
 
“It has to do with who we are. This is important so as to make 600 people start to think 
in this way… [and] not to make others see us this way… We are not doing it because 
of this [the latter]. Strip everything what is PR, what is business, and what remains is a 
sense of social mission.” (CEO, eletronics firm)  
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This statement clearly confronts us with the essential difference between image and identity, 
referred above in the chapters reviewing the literature. Greening organisational image falls 
short of greening organisational identity with regard to the transformatiove potential of 
change processes involved. 
 
11.8. CORPORATE GREENING WITHOUT CRITICAL REFLECTION 
 
Corporate greening as revealed from the case studies lacks a critical reflection upon the 
practice and legitimacy of business-as-usual. Put it differently, the primary social 
responsibility of business is considered to be business (i. e. making as much profit as 
possible). Furthermore, there is no critical reflection upon the concept of development or the 
production and consumption orientation of developed nations from an ecological point of 
view. By implication, the North, particularly the EU, is understood as an ideal to be srived for 
concerning environmental regulation, environmental awareness, and environmental 
management. The EU is identified with environmental excellence, environmentally sound 
technologies – the EU is a prime example of ecological modernisation. There is only one way 
of development that is followed by the developed nations through economic growth with 
environmental protection added on. Raising issues of ecological problems related to over-
development or over-consumption is not supported or even discarded. Sustainable 
development is the way of development that Western European and North American countries 
have taken. It seems that as growth with equity was accomplished by the welfare state, green 
growth is being implemented by the European Union and other highly developed countries 
nowadays. There is no need to change the paradigm of develoment because of ecological 
considerations. The dissenting voices again come from the civil sector (see the summary 
analysis in the third story of corporate greening, Chapter 10). 
 
 
11.9. A THEORETICAL PROLOGUE: GREENING INDUSTRIAL 
BUREAUCRACIES 
 
Based on the major themes of corporate greening introduced above, the rudimens of a 
model of greening industrial bureaucracies. It seems that the dominant logic and mechanisms 
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of corporate greening might be interpreted with the help of the Weberian ideal-type 
bureaucracy. The Weberian model seems to explain the possibilities as well as limits to 
corporate greening: 
 
• The dominance of a rational discourse (stripped from ethics and emotions); 
• The attitude of modern professionalism, that has come to include environmental 
awareness as well as related management skills; and, 
• Corporate environmental management can only be effective if it is operated as a system – 
an environmental management system (EMS) establishes a cognitive order (disciplined 
and rule-bound individual cognition) on the one hand, and makes organisational processes 
predictable and conrollable. 
 
Modern industrial bureaucracies – that is, corporations – are so-called man-machine 
systems. A man-machine system has two fundamental elements: organisational culture and 
technology. A modern industrial bureaucracy is greening itself both culturally and 
technologically in order to come up to the latest expectations and remain up-to-date. An ideal 
modern industrial bureaucracy operates a cleaner, best available technology that comply with 
the most stringent environmental regulations; strives for continuously improving eco-
efficiency (i. e. efficiency of energy and materials use) and establishing a closed material 
cycle. 
Moreover, modern organisational men are the only ones who are able to work with such 
an up-to-date, high-tech technology. A modern organisational man is disciplined and 
environmentally aware. A modern organisational man is aware of the fact that all modern 
industrial operations have a certain risk potential. To be in control, thus, organisational men 
need rules and routines to follow. At the level of organisational culture, therefore, ecology (or 
environmentally aware routines, behaviours, values) should be synthesised with the industrial 
and business culture. Accordingly, modern organisational men attempt to control ecology in 
order to gain sustainable competitive advantage and reap the benefits/profits of win–win 
opportunities. 
The disciplinary order and up-to-date professionalism of a Weberian ideal-type 
bureaucracy rationalises ecology. An ideal industrial bureaucracy has a technology that is safe 
and clean by design and employs personnel who are aware of and disciplined by the rules, 
norms, standards, regulations, etc. set by the bureaucratic organisation in question. Top 
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managers of the ideal industrial bureaucracy are in control. They established a rational order – 
a system – for managing ecology related to the organisation in question. Within the 
framework given by the established system (such as an EMS), all organisational men know 
their tasks and responsibilities, all behaviour seem predictable and all employees are 
controllable. 
This rudimentary model of greening industrial bureaucracy is obviously abstracted from 
the particularities of the Hungarian context, but to a great extent depends upon, or situated in, 
the dominant institutional logic of modern, market societies. Consequently, it is historically 
situated, therefore does not constitute an attempt to build a universal model of greening 
business enterprises. A green industrial bureaucracy is a particular product as well as a 
constitutive element of the particular institutional setting in which it is situated. The 
operations and effectiveness of green industrial bureaucracies can be interpreted with 
reference to the prevailing socio-technological regime. The institutional logic of the 
prevailing socio-technological regime opens up opportunities for corporate greening, though, 
at the same time, closes off alternative ways of social learning to become ecologically 
sustainable. As an opportunity, ecological modernisation is called for. The paradigm of 
ecological modernisation might be interpreted as an inherent part or the extension of the 
project of modernity. 
However, the project of modernity governed by instrumental rationality also has its 
inherent limits and dangers. The disenchanted world (as Max Weber put it) ruled by 
instrumental rationality might easily lose substantive values or ideals that cannot rationally 
argued for or explained. The dangers lie partly in a de-emotionalised and de-moralised 
approach to issues of ecology and partly in the lack of critical reflection upon the power 
dimension or the “logic of dominance” inherent in the paradigm of ecological modernisation. 
Arguably, it is a paradigm emerging from the European–North American cultural tradition – 
it is therefore historically, culturally situated. It is of primary importance to reflect upon the 
system level of the operating logic of ecological modernisation in order to prevent the loss of 
cultural diversity and, correspondingly, ecological diversity. Greening as ecological 
modernisation might constitute one useful logic and way toward sustainability, but it seems 
more prudent no to be considered the only way available. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUDING NOTES 
 
The main objective of the present dissertation and doctoral research work was to explore 
theoretically as well as empiricaly the possibility for an ecologically sustainable corporation. 
To accomplish this task, first the different interpretations of organisational greening found in 
the relevant literature were reviewed. A theoretical typology was developed in order to clarify 
the assumptions and analytical structures of the different theoretical interpretations of 
greening. Note however that the typology presented above is not complete in every respect. It 
may be argued that the organisational crisis management literature provides a particular 
understanding of corporate greening that should be dealt with separately. Moreover, 
particularly reflecting upon the debates between so-called anthropocentric versus ecocentric 
prescriptions of greening, a separate and important line of research has emerged which 
employs a theoretical perspective informed by and rooted in the rich tradition of feminist 
social sciences. A feminist perspective has a clear relation to the interpretation of 
organisational greening as a political-economic change since both approach focus upon power 
relations and the “logic of domination” prevailing in the discourses and practices of 
organisational greening (see Meriläinen [1998]). It might be further argued that a “Third-
world” (or “indigenous”) perspective on organisational greening in particular and on 
sustainable development in general has been emerging and informing related discussions by 
pointing out some of the ethnocentric tenets of the dominant discourses and practices of 
greening (see Banerjee [1999a] and [1999b]). An important research task for the future is to 
integrate these perspective with the typology presented above, or re-assess the typology of 
corporate greening in light of these different lines of reasoning. 
The theoretical discussion or analysis of the case of values-driven corporate greening 
acquired a particular importance with regard to the chosen task of the present dissertation. It 
was argued that good (i. e. environmentally conscious) intentions aside, within the prevailing 
institutional logic of a globally free market economy, the missionary efforts toward a 
sustainable business practice (“the business manager as a sort of eco-hero/ine” – Newton–
Harte [1997]) may too easily fail. It might be argued that the “institutionalised logic of 
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action” in a market society has serious inherent flaws from an ecological point of view that 
seriously limit the transformative potential of greening efforts. Or, as Princen [1997] puts it: 
 
“Business strategy and state policy tend to create a never-ending search for frontiers, 
however simulated and however unecological they may be.” (op. cit., p. 235) 
 
The myth or logic of a “frontier economy” is institutionalised within modern market societies 
and the social agents, be they producers, consumers, or political decision-makers seem to act 
upon it and, at the same time, continuously re-construct it. However, this myth or logic is in 
contradiction with the basic laws of thermodynamics as well as ecology of today. In a 
physically finite world, unhindered economic expansion is not possible for all. Consequently, 
as Sachs [1995] argues among others, the crisis of nature is, at the same time, the crisis of 
justice. Students of organisation studies should therefore be aware of the system level in 
addressing the issue of a sustainable organisation or organising for sustainability. 
 The case of community supported agriculture was decidedly introduced and analysed 
since it is believed that a more effective search for a sustainable organisation (or organising 
logic) might be found in elevating the community or civic logic of action and its 
corresponding institutional structures. In contrast to the frontier perspective inherent in todays 
market logic and the de-emotionalised, de-moralised logic of bureaucracy (i. e. dominant 
business organisations), a civic economy might be characterised to take into account the 
ecological and social limits of expansionism since it is situated in time and space, in a 
particular ecological and cultural place. While the bureaucratic–market logic may call for 
sustainable development, green growth, high-tech eco-efficiency, and green image building, a 
civic or community logic might pave the way for sustainable livelihood, smaller scale 
technological solutions, and an organisational identity situated in a cultural and ecological 
place. Being aware of the dangers of utopianism, it is argued here instead that a civi or 
community logic of action might fruitfully be employed as a complement and antidote to the 
bureaucratic–market logic dominant today in the so-called developed part of the world. 
 The qualitative research reported above might have shed some light on the operating 
dynamics of corporate greening and the opportunities as well as the inherent limits mentioned 
above. Moreover, the paradigm of ecological modernisation emerged as the discoursive frame 
of reference legitimising efforts to green corporations. Ecological modernisation calls for as 
well as promises a huge improvement in eco-efficiency of production and business 
operations, a development and expansion of future markets for green products and services 
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for the environmentally conscious and demanding consumers, and a synergy between the 
industrial/business culture and ecology. The driving force of ecological modernisation can be 
the Weberian ideal-typical bureaucratic corporation. Corporations are argued to possess the 
financial, organisational, and human resources needed for implementing any change on a 
relatively larger scale. Up-to-date technology is operated by a highly skilled and disciplined 
workforce. The instrumental rationality embedded in bureaucratic organisational structures 
and routines are argued to be directed toward the objectives of making ecology efficient and 
competitive. 
 Clearly, ecological modernisation requires the speeding up the co-operation between 
the bureaucracy of modern science (scientific institutes) and that of the economy 
(corporations), while supported by bureaucratic organisations of the political arena. The idea 
of progress, the authority of science and technology – essential features of modernity (see 
Redclift [1993]) – are not given up, indeed they are further reinforced, this time, in the name 
of ecology. However, one should be aware of the darker side of the modernist discourse and 
practice. As Zygmunt Bauman forcefully argued in his thorough and provocative analysis of 
the Holocaust committed by the Natzis against Jewish population in Europe, the rational 
world of modern civilisation has made the Holocaust thinkable and, tragically, realisable 
(Bauman [1989]). The machine of destruction set in motion by the Natzis was operated and 
accomplished by the predictably rational routines of bureaucratic organisations and with 
industrial efficiency. In other words, the instrumental rationality of modern science, 
technology, and organising tend to avoid, neglect, or even eliminate discourses perticularly 
about power, the dangers of dominating knowledge, as well as ethics and emotions. In this 
sense, it may risk to contribute to the realisation of a “brave new world” ruled by an elite 
obsessed with the idea of material progress and instrumental rationality. 
 In a sense, it is inevitable that the ideas and reflections pursued in the present 
dissertation constitute an inherent part of the “becoming-a-doctor game” (Räsänen [1998]). 
Clearly, there were periods of writing when this feeling has been dominating. However, there 
were also periods when the present author could enjoy seconds of intellectual honesty and a 
sense of responsibility. Hopefully, the latter feelings might come to dominate all scientific 
endavours. 
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APPENDIX 
 
The first data collection phase of the research programme, In Global Competition, lasted from March 
to the end of June 1996. The sample was selected based on a 1994 database of the Ministry for 
Finance. The basic population of firms was restricted to legal entities that were doing business before 
1992, used double-entry bookkeeping, and employed more than 50 employees. Out of 5618 
companies, a representative sample was created according to four aspects: industrial branch, 
geographical location, size, and ownership structure. However, to the 593 firms that got into the 
sample, companies ranked by net revenues in 1995 (the so-called Figyelő Top 200) were added 
(resulting in a sample biased towards large firms). Altogether 665 companies were contacted and 325 
provided usable data. The second phase of data collection started in February 1999. Out of the 
previously responding 325 firms (1996), 285 was successfully contacted in 1999, the rest were closed 
down or moved to unknown places. Since a significant part of the firms contacted refused to 
participate in the second survey, it was necessary to enlarge the sample. The Ministry for Economic 
Affairs provided two representative samples, including 252 and then 203 companies, as well as further 
94 firms were also asked to participate by the interviewers. Finally, out of the 834 companies 
contacted in 1999, 319 provided usable data – amounting to a 38.2 percent response rate. Test for non-
response bias was not conducted. For further details with regard to the final sample of 319 firms see 
Czakó–Zoltayné Paprika [2002]. The tables below summarise the characteristics of the sample of 204 
industrial firms on which the quantitative analysis reported in this dissertation was performed. 
 
Table 14 Sectoral Distribution of Industrial Firms in the Sample of 1999 
 
Industry Sector 
Number of Firms Percentage 
Food, beverages, tobacco 22 10,8 
Textile and clothing 19 9,3 
Leather products 6 2,9 
Wood products 4 2,0 
Pulp and paper, publishing and printing 44 21,6 
Energy, cokes, oil products and nuclear fuel 4 2,0 
Chemical products and fibers 14 6,9 
Rubber and plastics products 11 5,4 
Other non-ferro mineral products 11 5,4 
Metal raw materials and metal products 23 11,3 
Machines, equipment 16 7,8 
Electric and optical equipment, telecommunication products 10 4,9 
Road and other vehicles 2 1,0 
Furniture and other manufacturing products 9 4,4 
Mining 9 4,4 
Total 204 100,0 
 
 
Table 15 Distribution of Industrial Firms in the Sample of 1999 According to Company Size 
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Category of Company Size 
(Number of Employees) 
Number of Firms Percentage 
–99 64 31,4 
100–249 77 37,7 
250–499 25 12,3 
500– 32 15,7 
In Sum 198 97,1 
Missing Values 6 2,9 
Total 204 100,0 
 
Table 16 Distribution of Industrial Firms in the Sample of 1999 According to Net Revenues 
Category of Net Revenues (M HUF) Number of Firms Percentage 
–250  41 20,1 
251–500 38 18,6 
501–1,000 42 20,6 
1,001–2,500 33 16,2 
2,501– 42 20,6 
In Sum 196 96,1 
Missing Values 8 3,9 
Total 204 100,0 
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